

TULLY'S  
OFFICES,  
IN  
Three Books.

Turned out of

L A T I N  
INTO  
E N G L I S H.

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By Sr. Ro. L'E S T R A N G E.

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**The Fifth Edition Corrected.**

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To which is Added a T A B L E.

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L O N D O N,

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THE  
REVIEW

THE PEOPLE

THE

IMAGE

BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

THE REVIEW

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1600

## TO THE READER.

**T**IS hard, me thinks, that a Man can-not Publish a Book, but he must pre-sently give the World a Reason for't; when yet there's not One Book of Twenty that will bear a Reason; not One Man of a Hundred, perhaps, that is able to Give One; nor One Reason of a Thousand (when they are given) that was the True Reason of Doing it. The True Reason (I say) For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a Good Reason, for the doing of a thing, and the True Reason why the thing was done. The Service of God is a very Good Reason for a Man's going to Church; and yet the meeting of a Mistress There, may, perchance, be the True Reason of his Going. And so likewise in Other Cases, where we cover our Passions and our Interests under the Semblances of Virtue, and Duty. But however, since Custom; (the Plague of Wise men, and the Idol of Fools) since Custom (I say) will have it so, that a Man had as good go to Court without his Cra-vat, as shew himself in Print without a Pre-

## To the Reader.

face ; *I shall e'en Content my Self to play the Fool too, in so Much, and in so Good Company, ( General Dedications being no Other, than Fashionable Fopperies.) For what can be more Ridiculous than for a Man to Treat Princes, and Tinkers ; Coxcombs, and Philosophers ; Men of Honour, and Rascals ; promiscuously, all in a Stile ?*

*Now as it is no Ease Matter to give a Good Reason for Writing at all ; so it is yet more Difficult to give That Reason in an Epistle ; which, at best, stands in need of another very good Reason, for its own support. But Prefaces, at the Ordinary rate of Prefaces, are wholly Inexcusable ; Only an Idle Deal of Fiddle-Faddle betwixt the Writer and the Reader, made worse, by Care, and Pains ; and Digested, out of Vulgar and Pedantic Common-Places, into one Mass of Putid and Elaborate Folly. This Liberty of Prefacing against Prefaces, may seem a little Unreasonable ; but Common Scribblers are allow'd the Priviledges of Common Strumpets. One of the Frankest Prostitutes that ever I knew since I was born, had These Words the ofteneſt in her Mouth : Lord ! (says ſhe) to fee the Impudence of ſome Women !*

*To come now to the Reasons that induced me to the Translating of this Little Book ; I ſhall begin with the Excellency of the Work it*

## To the Reader.

it self; which has ever been Esteemed, both for the Method, and Matter of it, as one of the most Exact Pieces of the Kind that ever was written, and the most Instructive of Humane Life. In so much, that Cicero himself valu'd himself upon This Tract of Morals, as his Master-piece, and accordingly recommended the Study of it to his Beloved Son, under That Illustrious Character. Secondly, as it was Composed in a Loose, and Troublesome Age, so was it accommodated also to the Circumstances of Those Times; for the asserting of the Force, and Efficacy of Virtue against the utmost Rigour, and Iniquity of Fortune. Upon which Consideration likewise, I have now turn'd it into English, with a regard to a Place, and Season, that extremely needs it. I do not speak This, as if at any time it would have been Superfluous; but that Desperate Diseases require the most Powerful Remedies.

To give you the Sum of it in a few Words; It is a Manuel of Precepts for the Government of our selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Humane life; and tending, not only to the Comfort of Men in Society, but to the Conducting of Particulars also, into a State of Felicity, and Virtue. It is a Lesson that serves us from the very Cradle, to the Grave. It teaches us what we Owe to Mankind; to our Country; to our Parents; to our Friends;

## To the Reader.

to our Selves; what we are to do as Children; what, as Men; what, as Citizens; It sets, and it keeps us Right in all the Duties of Prudence, Moderation, Resolution, and Justice. It Forms our Manners; Purges our Affections; enlightens our Understandings; and leads us, through the Knowledge, and the Love of Virtue, to the Practice, and Habit of it.

This Treatise of Offices, I find to be one of the Commonest School-Books that we have; and as it is the Best of Books; so it is apply'd to the Best of Purposes; that is to say, to the Training up of Youth, in the Study and Exercise of Virtue. The Foundations of an Honourable, and a Blessed Life, are laid in the very Cradle; and we suck in the Tincture of Generous or Perverse Inclinations, even with our Mothers Milk: Insomuch that we may date the greater part of our greatest Mis-carriages, from the Errors, and Infelicities of our First Institution, and Education. But tho', upon the whole matter, I do highly approve of the Usage of This Book in Schools, I must confess yet, with Submission, that I am not at all satisfy'd in the ordinary way of using it. For the cutting of it out into Particles, here and there a Chop, makes it a Lesson, to the Boys, rather of Syntax, than Morality; beside the prejudice that it suffers under the Trivial name of a School-Book; and

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## To the Reader.

the disgust which naturally continues with us, even when we are Men, for that which we were whipt for, when we were Boys.

Now the Matter of this Book being so Excellent ; and truly the Latin of it hardly Ciceronian ; it should be own bus'ness rather to inculcate the Doctrine than the Stile ; and yet in such manner too, that the One may be Attended, without Neglecting the Other. And This may be effected to the Common Benefit of the Scholar, in Both Kinds ; by, First Reading, and Expounding These Offices, Whole to him, in English, before he be put to Hack, and Puzzle upon them by Snaps in the Original ; the One Facilitating, and Preparing him for the Other. Let him be, First, and in his Mother-Tongue, instructed in the Principles of Moral Duties ; and he shall then with the more Ease, Profit, and Delight, take the same Notions down in Latin, and Digest them. Whereas in beginning with the Latin, the Pupil has little more to do, than to bring together the Nominative Case and the Verb, without either Understanding, or Heeding the main Scope, and Intent of the Book.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the Interruptions I have met with, in the Course of This Translation ; how it has been only the Work of Broken Hours ; and I might plead These Distractions in

## To the Reader.

excuse of all its Inequalities, and Defects. But such as it is, Plain, and Simple, I do here present it to the Publicke, without either Vanity, or Complement: and, I hope, without giving unto any sort of Reader any Just Cause of Complaint. For He that does not like it, may let it alone; and there's no Hurt done.

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**TULLY's**

# TULLY's OFFICES.

## The First B O O K.

**A**LTHOUGH, after Twelve Months spent in the School of *Cratippus*, and That at *Athens* too, you cannot (my Son *Marcus*) but be abundantly instructed in the Precepts and Institutions of Philosophy, by reason of the Great Authority of the *Master*, as well as of the *Place*; the One, for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you shall do well, nevertheless, to take the same Course in *Your* studies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle your *Latin* with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Conducing to the Latin, Bus'ness, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philosopher*: Beside, that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In this Particular, I am perswaded that I have done my Country-men no small Service; and that not only those who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themselves will acknowledge, that I have in some sort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*. Wherefore, as you have the greatest Philosopher of this Age for your Master, you shall also Learn of him as long as you please: and so long, certainly, you ought to desire to learn, as you

*Are a great  
advantage,  
Good In-  
stitution,  
and Good  
Example.*

*Greek, and  
Rhetorick  
and Philo-  
sophy, do  
well toge-  
ther.*

*cer-*

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Cicero  
half a Pe-  
ri-  
tique.

A better O-  
rator, than  
Philosopher

None of  
the Greeks  
Excellent  
in Both  
Kinds.

find your self the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will see a great deal in them of the *Peripatetique*, (for I am a Follower of *Socrates*, and of *Plato* both.) As to the Matter it self, you are at liberty to use your Own Judgment; and yet the Acquainting of your self with my *Stile*, will undoubtedly be of some Use toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in this be thought arrogant neither; For, allowing my self the meanest of many *Philosophers*, I have yet some Right, me thinks, after an Age spent upon this Study, to value my self upon all the Parts of an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, and the *Flowers*, and *Ornaments of Well-speaking*. Wherefore I must Earnestly recommend unto you the Perusal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewise of my *Philosophical Discourses*, which are now swell'd almost to the Bulk of the Other: and that you will read them with Intention and Care: for tho' there may be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This smooth, and temperate Mixture is not to be neglected. Among the

Greeks, I have not found any Man that has Successfully apply'd himself to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unless I should reckon *Demetrius Phaleranus* for one: who was indeed a subtle *Disputant*, no very powerful *Orator*; but then such a Vein of Sweetness with him, that a Body might imagine *Theophrastus* had been his Tutor. For my own part I have labour'd in Both These Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato* I believe, would have made a Ready, and a Weighty *Pleader*, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demosthenes*, a Queint, and a Polite

## The First Book.

a *Polite Philosopher*, if he would but have treated of, and stuck to what he had from *Plato*. And this was the Case also, of *Aristotle*, and *Isocrates*: they were both of them fond of their Own Way, and slighted one another.

B U T being resolved to Write somewhat to you at present, and more, hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon that Subject, which I look upon to be most accommodate to your *Age*, and best becoming the Authority of a *Parent*. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philosophy, which have been accurately, and copiously handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greatest Latitude, falls under the Head of *Offices*, or *Duties betwixt Man and Man*; whereof we have many *Precepts* and *Traditions* transmitted to us from our Fore-fathers. For there is no Condition of Life, either *Publick*, or *Private*; from *Courts of Justice*, to *Particular Families*; either *Solitary*, or in *Society*; but there is still a place for *Humane Duty*: And it is the *Well*, or *Ill discharging of this Office*, that makes our *Character* in the World, either *Glorious*, or *Shameful*. And this is the Common Theme too of all Philosophers; for who shall dare to *Usurp* that Sacred Name, that never pre-scrib'd Rules for the Government of Life?

B U T there are some Sects yet, that upon a Mistake about the Measures of *Good* and *Evil*, <sup>He taxes</sup> the Epicureans render These Offices wholly Vain and Useless: for whoever thinks of Separating the *Supreme Good* from *Virtue*, consulting his own Ease in the Case: That man can never be, either a *True Friend*, or a *Just*, and a *Generous Person*, upon That Bottom; that is to say, in a *Con-sistence*

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Tully's Offices.

sistence with himself, and without Harkenning some time to the Direction of a Better Nature. Can any Man be *Brave*, that makes *Pain* the *Worst of Evils*? Or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleasure* the *Supreme Good*? This is so Obvious, that there is no Room left for a Doubt: beside that I have spoken to this Point in Another Place. The Patrons of These Opinions cannot pretend in any sort to intermeddle in This Matter, without contradicting Themselves: for there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty, erected upon any other Foundation then This; that *Virtue is Only, or at least Chiefly Desirable for its Proper Self*. So that the *Stoicks, Academicks, and Peripateticks*, were much in the Right in This Particular:

Nothing  
desirable  
for it self  
but Virtue.

As the Whimsyes of *Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus* are long since exploded, and out of doors. Not but that they had the same Right to a Freedom of Debate with other People, if they would but have left us in a State or Capacity of *Election*, without cutting off the very Means of any Communication with *Humane Duties*. Wherefore, at This Time, and upon This Subject, I shall follow the *Stoicks*, not as an *Expositor*, but (after my Usual Way) I shall Draw what Water I think fit from that Fountain, and then Apply it according to my own Discretion.

All Dif-  
futes to be-  
gin with a  
Definition

BEING now to treat in this Discourse of the *Offices or Duties* of Mankind; it will be Proper, in the First place, to define what is meant by the Word *Office*: a Thing omitted by *Panetius*, which I much wonder at. For all Reasonable Propositions should be introduced by a Definition, for the better understanding of the Matter in Debate.

OF

OF Duties, or Offices; there are Two Kinds: A Division the One has a Respect to the *Summum Bonum*; of Offices, the Other consists in certain Rules and Practices accommodated to the Use and Conduct of Humane Life. Under the Former, there Occur These Questions. *Whether All Offices be Perfect or not: whether One Office be Greater or Less than Another: and what Offices are found to be of the same Sort and Degree.* But those Offices that are deliver'd to us by *Precept*, though they have a Relation also to the Constitution of the *Sovereign Good*; it does not so much appear yet, because they seem to be rather a Provision for the Ordering of Life in Society. These are the Offices which we shall Discourse of in this Book. There is also another Division of Offices; some are call'd *Middle*, and *Imperfect*, others *Perfect*; We may call the *Latter*, a *Right*, (according to the Greek word *κατέργων*) and the *Other*, a *Common Office*, (*Καθηνον*) defining *That* to be *Perfect* which they call *Right*, and *That* to be a *Middle Office*, when a *Man may give a Reasonable Account for the doing of it.*

IT is Natural to *Deliberate*, before we *Re-Deliberate*; and *Panaetius* reduces the subject matter <sup>in according to Panaetius, under three Heads.</sup> of *Deliberation* into *Three General Heads*. The First Question is, Whether the thing *deliberated* upon, be *Good*, or *Evil*? Wherein several Men are many times of several Opinions. The Second Enquiry or Consult refers to the *Ease*, *Pleasure*, or *Convenience of Life*; as *Estate*, for the purpose; *Wealth*, or *Power*; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our selves, and our Friends: Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or not? And this Question is carry'd by the Appearance of *Profit*. The Third Point

Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Case, where the *Honest* and the *Profitable* come in *Competition*. For when *Utility* drives *One way*, and *Virtue* invites us *Another*, there follows a *Distraction* of *Mind*, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought*. It is *Cicero makes five*, a great failing to leave out any thing in a *Division*; and yet there are *Two* things omitted in *This*. For the *Question* is not only, Whether a thing be *Honest*, or not? but where there are *Two things Honest*, before us, which is the *Honester*? and of *Two Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable*? So that his *three Branches* must be *extended to Five*: *First*, the *Concurrence* of *Two Good Things*; *Secondly*, that of *Two Profitables*; and *Lastly*, *Both* of them in *Comparison*. Of which in *Order*.

*Self-love is Natural.* **A L L** Living Creatures are Originally mov'd by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of *Self-preservation*: As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies*; the *Avoidance* of things *hurtful* to them; the *search*, and *provision* of all *Necessaries* for *Life*; as *Food*, *Shelter*, and the like. It is likewise Common to them All, the *Appetite* of Propagating and Continuing their *Kind*; with a certain *Care*, and *Tenderness* for their *Issue*.

*The Difference betwixt Instinct and Reason.* Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently this Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *sense*, and to *That* only which is *present*; with little or no regard to what is either *past*, or to *come*: whereas the *Other*, by the Benefit of *Reason*, sees the *Consequences* of *Things*; their *Rise*, and their *Progress*; and couples together, *Causes* and *Effects*; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions* and *Events*; tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*, and so taking in his whole *Life* at a *View*, he prepares all things for the *Use*, and *Comfort* of it.

## The First Book.

IT is by force of the same Reason, that *Nature* The Seeds makes one Man a *Friend* to another; that she <sup>of Justice.</sup> moves us to the Love of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Af- Liberality.* *fection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us the *Necessity*, of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for Food, and Clothing; and not for our selves alone, but for our Wives, our Children, our Friends, and for all those that are under our Protection. This *Prudence*. Impression raises great Thoughts in us; and fits us for Action: but there is nothing so *Appropri- ate*, and *Peculiar to Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Fatuity* of Tracing out the Truth. Insomuch, that we are no sooner at Liberty from Common *Cares* and *Business*, but our Heads are present- ly at work upon something to be either *seen*, or *heard*, or *understood*: accounting upon the know- ledge of things *wonderful*, and *hidden*, as a *ne- cessary Ingredient* into a *Happy*, and a *Virtuous Life*. From whence may be drawn this Conclu- sion, That *whatsoever is True, Simple, and Sin- cere, is most congruous to the Nature of Man*. This love of *Truth* is accompany'd with a desire of *Rule*; so that a *Generous* and *Well-qualified Magnani- Mind*, will never be brought into *Subjection*, un- *misly*. less either for *Learning*, or *Instruction* sake; or in submission to a *Just*, and *Lawful Governour*, for the *Common Good*. This Elevation begets a *Contempt* of Fortune, and a *Dignity* of Spirit. And it is no small matter neither, the power of *Moder- ation* Reasonable Nature even in This respect: that *Man alone* understands *Order*; the *Bounds* of *Decency* in *Words*, and *Actions*, and the *Terms* of *Moderation*: That *only Man* is affected with the *Beauty*, the *Gracefulness*, and the *Symmetry* of *perance.*

of *Visible Objects*. Now if *Nature*, and *Reason*, take such Care to convey the *Images*, even of *Sensible Things*, from the *Eye*, to the *Mind*; how much a greater Value must she set upon the *Grace*, and *Constancy* of our *Manners*; and the keeping such a guard upon all our *Words*, and *Deeds*, that no *Unmanly* thing, not a *loose Syllable*, or *Thought*, escape us? This is the Composition of that *Honesty* we look for, which is never the less Venerable, for being little Esteem'd: For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole Earth cannot yet hinder it from being praise-worthy in its own *Nature*. Oh! my Son, *Marcus*, we may fashion to our selves some faint *Idea* of *Virtue* or *Wisdom*; but if it could be presented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Lustre*, how should we be transported (says *Plato*) with the *Love* of it?

*The four Cardinal Virtues, and the subject matter of each.*

THERE is not any Virtue whatsoever but arises from *One*, or *Other*, of these four *Heads*; and consists either, First, in the *Search*, and *perception* of the *Truth*; or, Secondly, in the *Con-servation* of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*, and *keeping* *faith* in all *Promises*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatness*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly in the *Order*, and *Measure* of all our *Words* and *Actions*; according to the *Rules* of *Modesty*, and *Temperance*.

*Distinct Duties in a plicate, and Link together, there are yet certain complication of Virtue.*

*Prudence searches the Truth of Things.*

NOW though these four *Virtues* may be *Complicated*, and *Link* together, there are yet certain *distinct Duties*, that issue severally from each of them: As the *Scrutiny* and *Bolting* out of a *Truth*; from *Prudence*, which is a *Faculty* particularly appertaining to *That Virtue*: For he that makes the best judgment of the *Truth* of *Things*,

Things; he that most readily finds the way to't; and gives the best account of the Reason of it, we conclude him, without all dispute to be the wisest Man. So that effectually, the proper Subject of This Virtue, is *Truth*: But the Business Justice of the Other three Virtues, is, to procure and shew it self in Society. maintain *Necessaries*, for the Commodity of Life; the upholding of *Communities*, and *Society*; and to shew the Dignity of the Mind, as Fortitude in the Communicating of our Fortunes, as in the Acquiring of them; and more yet (if there shall be occasion) in the despising of them. But Temperance in Order and Measure. And he that would aquit himself in the Course of his Life, with *Re-putation* and a good *Grace*, must observe Order, in the Computation and a good *Grace*, must observe Order, *Gravity* of all. and Measure.

OF these Four Parts, into which we have divided the Nature, and the Power of Virtue; that is a Natural Virtue, which concerns the disquisition of Truth holds most affinity with the Soul of Man. We are all of us, both drawn, and led, to a desire of Knowledge; and every man values himself upon being wiser than his Neighbor; but on the other side, to Fail, to Wander, to be Ignorant, and to be deceived, we look upon as a wretched, and a reproachful thing.

IN the pursuit of this most Natural Virtue, we must take heed of Two Mistakes: First, the taking up of Things upon Trust; and flattering our selves, that we know more, than effectually we do. He that would keep clear of this Rock (as every man should endeavour it) must diligently attend his Business, and allow himself time to consider of it. The Other is the bestowing of Curiosity. more Pains and Study upon things that are obscure,

scure, hard, and superfluous, than the Matter is worth: whereas by avoiding these Errors, and employing the same application upon profitable Knowledge, and the study of Virtue, a Man gains to himself deserved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Astrology*; of *Sextus Pompeius*, for his *Geometry*; and of other persons eminent for *Logique*; and *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exercised in the Investigation of *Truth*; and yet for a Man to divert himself, by these Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Business*, is against the *Nature of Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of Virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals, for we must Work, and Rest, by Turns. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but still in a Constant Agitation of *Thought*, even when the *Body* is most at *Repose*: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and advising upon things *Honest*, and tending to a *good and happy life*; or upon the Acquiring of *Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*. And so much for *Prudence*, which is the *first Fountain of Virtue*.

*Justice  
and Lite-  
rality.*

OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find That to be of the largest extent, which directs the Ordering of Men in *Society*: and in a kind of *Community of Life*. Of This, there are *Two parts*; *Justice*, which is the more *Glorious Virtue*; and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good Men*; and *Beneficence*, which we may otherwise call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*. The first Duty of *Justice* is *This*; *That we hurt no Man*, unless provoked to it by an *Injury*, and in our *Own Defence*. We are then to distinguish betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular*; and to use them accordingly: Not that any thing is *Private*.

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in its *Own Nature*; but as it becomes so, either *The bounds by Ancient possession, as appropriated by the first of it by the Occupant, or by Conquest*, upon the right of *Civil Law.* *Arms*; or else by *Law, Agreement, Condition, or Lot*. From hence comes the Field *Arpinas*, to be called *Arpinatum*, and *Tusculanum*, to be called the Field of the *Tusculanes*; and in like manner is it of *Private Possessions*. Now since *Custom* and *Usage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common*; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot*; and be reputed an *Enemy* to the *Publique*, if he attempt any thing beyond it. But because (as *Plato* says singularly well) *we are not born for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends*: and with the *Stoiques*, that the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were *Created for the Use of Man*; and *Man* only for *Mans sake* begotten; that one might be helpful to another: What can we do better than to *follow*, where *Nature* is our *Guide*? To lay *Common Benefits in Common*; and by an *Intercourse of Good Offices*, as *Giving*; and *Receiving*; by *Arts, Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind into One Society*.

THE Foundation of *Justice*, is *Faith*; That is to say, a *Firmness*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promises*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are *A forced great Etymologists*, will have *Fides* to be as much *Etymolgy of Fides.* *Fiat*. And that it is therefore called *Faith*, *quia* *fit quod dictum est*; because that which is said, is done. This may seem to be far fetch'd; but however we have taken the Freedom to apply it.

THERE are Two sorts of *Injustice*: One is *Two sorts the Immediate doing of an Injury*; and the Other of *Injusticed*, is, the *not protecting, or defending the Injur'd person*;

*The injur- person*; for so much as in us lies. For he that *In-  
jurious Aggres- sively* offers Violence to any man, either in his  
for.

*And the  
Deserter.*

*An injury  
out of fear.*

*Avarice.*

*Magnifi-  
cence.*

*Ambition.*

*Luxury.*

*Rage*, or any other Passion whatsoever, may be taken to be in some degree, constructively, *a Murtherer*; and he that does not his best, to *save* his Neighbour from *harm*, and to keep off the *Blow*, is as well to blame (tho' not so much) as the Deserter of his *Parents*, his *Friends*, his *Country*, or his *Companions*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpose* to *hurt* us, which arise yet from *Fears*; as when he that *watches* to do another man *mischief*, does it upon *prevention*, for fear the *Other* should *hurt* him. But the greater Part of *Injuries* are done with a design to *compafs* something we have a mind to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great share. As to the Matter of *Riches*, they are *desir'd*, partly for our *Necessities*, and partly for our *Pleasures*. The desire of *Money* in *great Minds*, is to make an *Interest* by it: and to get into our *Power*, the means of *obliging*. It was the saying of *Crassus*, that *He that would be Uppermost in a Commonwealth, could never have money enough, till he was able to maintain an Army at his own Charge*. There is a *pleasure* also, in a *Splendid*, and *Magnificent Appearance*; *Rich Furniture*; and Men take *delight* to live in *Reputation*, *Glory*, and *Plenty*; which begets an *Insatiable Thirst* of *Money* to *maintain* it. And yet we are not forbidden to *advance*, or *encrease* our *Fortunes*; provided it be done without *wrong* to *Another*; and by *Fair means*. But men are apt to forget the *Rules*, and *Measures* of *Justice*, when they come one to be transported with the desire of *Empire*, *High Places*, and *Titles*. It goes a great way, that saying of *Ennius*. *There is no*

*Faith,*

*Faith, or Fellowship in Empire.* 'Tis a hard matter to preserve *Friendship*, and *Agreement*, in a *Cafe* where there are many *Competitors*, and but one can *succeed*: which manifestly appeared in that *Tempest* which *C. Caesar* lately brought up on the Government: who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all *Laws Divine*, and *Humane*, for the compassing of that Power which he vainly propounded to get wholly to himself. And great pity it is, that this inordinate desire of *Honor, Dominion, Power, and Glory*, does for the most part infest the most Famous Wits, and the largest Minds: so that an *Error* in this *Cafe*, is the more to be avoided.

NOW in all *Injuries*, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the *Sudden*, and in *Hot Blood* (which is Commonly but *Short, and Transient*) and that which is done upon *fore thought*, and *Council*, for those in a *heat*, are much lighter than those upon *preparation*, and this shall suffice of *Injuries offer'd, or done*.

Difference  
of injuris.

NOW why do we not *Protect* and *Defend* *Injuries of the Oppressed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be several Reasons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge, or Trouble*: we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent, lazy, sluggish*, taken up with *particular Studies*: or hinder'd by *Bus'ness*, and This makes us leave those expos'd to *Ruine*, whom it is our *Duty* to preserve. Wherefore we must take heed, not to rest upon that which *Plato observes* of the *Philosophers*: as if the *studying* and *endeavouring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *despising* of the things that most Men vehemently *desire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them presently to the *Character of Honest Men*: Not considering, that

*Injuries of Omission; and the Causes of them. Expence. Fear. Sloth. Bus'ness.*

## Tully's Offices.

while they are so *just* on the *One side*, as to *wrong no Body, themselves*: they are yet so *unjust*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other people* to *do it*: And so rather than quit their *Studies*, they forsake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore (says he) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it self, if they were not compell'd by Force: A thing which ought rather to be done, by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never so *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are some, that either for *saving* of their *Own stake*, or out of an *Averseness* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Bus'ness*; *I meddle with no Body*: And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmless* people. These Men, while they *shun One Injustice*, they fall into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labour*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publique*, is a *Deserter* of the *Community*. Now these *Two sorts* of *Injuries* being laid down, together with the *Causes* of them; and having stated beforehand the *Bounds* of *Justice*, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every *Person*, and *Occasion*, its proper *Duty*, if we be not over-partial to our selves: but in another bodies *Cafe*, it is quite *Another matter*: Although *Terence's Chremes* will have every *Individual* to be concern'd in the *Common Interest* of *Mankind*: But yet being more sensible, and quicker sighted in our *Own Concerns*, than for the *Good*, or *Evil* that befalls others; (which we look upon as more *Remote*) we pass upon the *One*, and the *Other*, (tho' in the very same *Cafe*) a quite *Different Judgment*. It is good advice therefore, to for-  
bear

bear coming to a *Resolution*, where we *doubt* whether the thing be *good* or *bad*. For the *Right* is <sup>with dubi-</sup> as *Clear* as the *Sun*; but a *wavering* implies the *deliberation* of an *Injustice*. <sup>Do nothing</sup>

BUT it often falls out, that the same thing, <sup>Faith is</sup> which at *one time* would become a *Man of Honour*, and *Justice*, would at *another time* not <sup>to be kept.</sup> only vary, but prove the *Clear Contrary*. As the delivering up of a *Trust* to a *Mad man*; or keeping *promise* with him: nay in matters of *Faith*, and *Truth*, it is *just*, in some *Cases* to *desert*; and in others, not to *keep Touch*; for all must refer to those *Fundamentals* of *Justice* already propounded. As *First*, to *wrong* no *Man*; and *secondly*, in all *Cases* to consult the *Common Good*. So that the *Duty* is not always the *same*; <sup>The Duty changes with the Occasion.</sup> but changes with the *Occasion*. Suppose such a *Promise* or *Contract* past, as if it were performed, would manifestly tend to the *damage*, either of the *Party* promising, or of the *person* to whom the *Promise* was passed to have it performed. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his *Promise* to *Theseus*, his Son *Hippolytus* had been sav'd. The Story goes, that of *Three wishes*, the *Last* was in his *Passion* the *destruction* of *Hippolytus*: and the *Grant* of that request, cast him into *Inconsolable Sorrows*. So that neither are we to *keep* those *Promises* that are *unprofitable* to the *Promised*: or more *burthful* to the *Promiser*, than *advantageous*, to the *Other*. Of *Two Evils*, we are to chuse the <sup>of Two</sup> *Less*: As if I promise to plead any mans *Cause*, <sup>Evil the Less.</sup> and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerously *Ill*; it is no *Breach* of *Faith*, or *Duty* in me, not to appear, but rather the *contrary*: and it were yet worse, in him to whom the *Promise* was

made, to complain of such a disappointment, And now in matters where a man is under *Violence*, or over-aw'd by *Fear*, or *out-witted*, and *over-reach'd* by *Fraud*, every body knows that *Those promises are not Binding*: many of them being discharg'd in Form, by the *Prætors Court*: and some by the very *Law it self*.

*Injuries of  
and and  
evil.* TH E R E are several *Injuries*, that are meerly matter of *Cavil*, and only advantages taken, by a *Crafty* and *malitious Interpretation* of the *Law*. From whence comes that saying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme Wrong*. The Proverb is now worn Thred bear. Of This Sort, there have been many Practices, even upon a *Publique Score*: One agreed upon a *Truce* with the *Enemy* for 30 *days*, and afterward made *Incursions* upon him, and destroyed his *Country* by *night*: because the *Cessation* was for *days*, not *nights*. Neither can I justifie our *Countryman*, if it be true: *Q. Fabius Labeo*, or some *body else* (for I have it only upon *Hearsay*) was by the *Senate Constituted Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries of Nola and Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the *Commissioners* apart, and advised them in *private*, not to do any thing *greedily*, or to *press too much*; but rather to *abate* of their *Pretensions*, than to *demand more*: and prevailed so far upon them, that there was a good space of ground left betwixt them; so that when they had marked out their *Bounds*, according to *Agreement*, that which was left in the *middle*, was *adjudg'd* to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* than a *Judgment*; and this *Indirect*, and *Crafty* way of *Imposing*, should be avoided in all *Cases*. There are certain *Duties* to be *observ'd* also, even to those that

that do us the greatest *wrong*; for there must be a *Mean* in the very *Punishment*, and *Revenge*: and I do not know, whether it may be sufficient, for the *Aggressor* barely to *Repent* of his *Injury*, without some *Penalty* over and above: both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example of Others*.

THE Laws of *War*, among all Nations, *The Rules* should be strictly and punctually observ'd. For of *War*. since there are but *Two ways of Contending*, the *One*, by *Dispute*, the *Other*, by *Force*; the *One*, *Humane*, and the *Other Brutal*: we must of necessity have recourse to the *Latter*, where the *Former* will not take place. Wherfore the end *The End* of *War* is to secure our selves from *Violence*, in a *state of War*. of *Peace*: and in case of *Victory*, we should *The Ro-* preserve those that behaved themselves with *man Gen-* *Honor*, and *Generosity* in the *Action of the War*: *their Ene-* As our Ancestors receiv'd into the very *Privi-* *mies*. *ledges of the City*, the *Tusculans*, the *Æqui*, the *Volsci*, the *Sabines*, the *Hernici*: but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they wholly *ras'd*. I could wish they had spar'd *Corinth*: but they had a respect, I suppose, to the strength, and situation of the Place, and so destroy'd it: that for the future it might not, some time or other, prove an *Encouragement to a Revolt*. In my Opinion, *Peace* should be always consulted, where it may be had without *Treachery*: and if my advice had been hearkned to in This matter, we might yet at this day, have had *some* sort of a *Republique*, though not the *Best*; whereas now we have just none at all. We should provide likewise, not only for those that are *Overcome* in the *Field*, but for those also that threw down *And to* *those that* *their Arms*, and cast themselves upon the *Faith* *yielded*. *of*

of the General. Nay I would have an Enemy receiv'd, even after the *Battery* is begun, and the *Breach* made ; In which point, we have been so scrupulously Just, that according to the Custom of our Predecessors, those that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegiance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of what they took. And the Rights of *War* are set forth with exact solemnity in the *Provisions* of the *Facial Law* ; wherein we are

*Upon what Terms to undertake a War.*

*A Conscientious instance.*

given to understand that no *War* can be *Just*, and *Warrantable*, unless it be grounded upon some matter of *Claim*, or *denounced* beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Pompilius* the (General) held a Province : and a Son of *Cato*'s listed himself a Soldier under his Command. *Pompilius*, finding it convenient to discharge one *Legion*, *Cato*'s Son, serving in that *Legion*, was also dismiss'd ; but he continuing still in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Pompilius*, Requesting him, that if his Son continu'd with him in *Arms*, he would give him the Military Oath, over again, because his former *Sacrament* being dissolv'd, he could not otherwise justifie his putting himself into the *Quarrel*. Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the *Conscience* of making *War* ! There is extant, an *Epistle* of *Marcus Cato the Elder*, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the *Persian War*. Wherein he tells his Son, that he heard the *Consul* had dismiss'd him ; and charges him not to engage in any *Combat*, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier to fight an *Enemy*. It is remarkable, the changing of the word *Perduellis* (a *publique Enemy*) into *Hos* ; to sweeten the Foulness of the Thing, by the soft-

softness of the Term. For *Hostis* (with our Forefathers) was as much as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) as appears by the *Twelve Tables*. *Aut status dies cum Hoste.* And then, *Adversus Hostem Æterna Authoritas*. What can be Gentler, than to Treat an Enemy in this easie Language? Although *Custom*, I must confess, has made it *harsher*, by transferring the significati-  
on of it, from That of a *Stranger*, to the proper Denomination of one that *bears Arms against us*. Nay in the Case of a War for *Honor*, or *Domi-  
nion*, there must yet be the same *Causes*, and *Grounds* before-mentioned, to make it *Just*: but still all Contests of This kind must give fairer Quarter: for (as in *ordinary differences*) we di-  
stinguish betwixt an *Enemy* and a *Rival*, our *Ti-  
tle*, and *Dignity* lies at Stake in the *One Case*; but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the *other*. The War we had with the *Celtiberi*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *En-  
mity*: and the question was not, who should *Govern*, but who should *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*; and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *truel*; but the Rest more Honourable. It was a Glorious Declaration, that of *Pyrrhus*, about the discharge of some Prisoners, as we find it in *Ennius*.

Let Mercenaries Truck, and Treat for Gold; *A Brave*  
Honor's a thing not to be Bought or Sold. *Resolution*  
Courage and Steel must end this Glorious Strife: *of Pyr-*  
*And in the Case of Victory, or Life,* *thus,*  
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance of War:  
And what Brave man soever she shall spare

With

## Tully's Offices.

With Life ; depend upon't ; I'll set him Free :  
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods,  
and Me.

This was a Royal Speech, and Resolution, and well becoming the Blood of *Aeacus*.

*Faith must  
be kept  
with an  
Enemy.  
A noble  
example of  
Regulus.*

BUT even in the Case of a private promise ; and upon what pinch, or necessity soever ; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Prisoner in the first *Punique War*, and sent to *Rome* to solicit the exchange of some Prisoners, upon his Oath to return : so soon as ever he came There, he advised the Senate against himself ; and that they should not agree to the Exchange. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again ; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, than to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy. In the second *Punique War*, after the Battel of *Canna*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to *Rome*, under an Oath of returning ; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp, by *Hannibal's* permission, but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath : and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was in *Words*, but not in *Effect* : for in all promises, the Intention is to be consider'd, not the Letter. The *Censor*, set a Fine during life, upon all their Heads that were forsworn : and upon His, among the rest, that invented this shift. But the more Generous Instance of *Justice* to an Enemy, was that of our Ancestors in the Case of *Pyrrhus* : There was a Fugitive that made a Proposal

*A glorious  
piece of  
Justice.*

*The Ro-  
man's a  
generous  
Enemy.*

Posal to the Senate, for the Poysoning and dis-Patching of *Pyrrhus*: but the *Senate*, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Master: Such was the detestation they had for Treachery, that they would not make use of it, tho' to the destruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And so much for *Military Duties*.

WE must not forget neither, that toward the *of Justice* meanest of men also, there is a Justice to be ob-<sup>to Inferiors</sup> serv'd; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves: and it is good Counsel, to advise the using of them as *Hirelings*: and for their *Work*; to allow them their *Reward*. Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man an *Injury*: the *one* is by *Force*, the *other* by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*: but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the *Two*: and of *all Injustices that is the most Abominable, and Capital, which imposes upon us under the colour of Kindness and Good meaning*: and this shall suffice for *Justice*.

TO pursue my purpose, I shall now handle *of Liberality*, or *Bounty*: than which *lib.* there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many Limitations. *How to give, How much, and to Whom.* It should be our *first* Care to see, that what we *Give*, may not be to the disadvantage of the person we would *oblige*, or of any other body: and that it be not above our *Proportion*. *Secondly*, that it be suited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*, for This is the Foundation of *Justice*, to which all the Circumstances of it are to be referr'd, He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *damage*, than to his *Benefit*, is so far from deserving the Reputation of being

being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the most pernicious of Flatterers. And Those also that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the same Injustice, with them, that take Money out of their Neighbors Pockets, to put into their Own. There are many People that look big, and set up for men of Honor, that yet have this humour of *taking* from one, and *giving* to another ; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a Friend, upon what Terms soever. But This is so far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*. Let us therefore so govern our Favours, that we may oblige those we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Cesar*, the Translation of so many Estates from the Right Owners, into the possession of Strangers ? There can be no *Liberality* in a Case of *Injustice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our *Bounty* within *Compass* : and not to give beyond our *Ability* : for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those *Bounties* to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humour of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no *Scruple* of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or *Injury*, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken *Bounty*. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful* ; and This, only upon a Score of *Vanity*, without any *Frankness* of Heart ; which is rather a *flash* of *ostentation*,

*Whom to Oblige.*

*Give in Proportion.*

*Consider the intent of the Giver.*

*The Choice* than an act of *Generosity*, and *Virtue*. The *Third of the Person Caution* is, the making *Choice* of a worthy Person :

son: wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition towards us; our intercourse with him in a Community, and Society, of Life, and the good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these: but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight.

HOW BE IT, since we do not live with *There is no Men absolutely Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom*; but with those that *acquit themselves* very well, if they can but arrive at some faint resemblances of *Virtue*: let this be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign or Glimmering of *Goodness*. But still we *Whom to are to set the greatest Value upon him*, that we *value most*. find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*; is commonly more forward, and *eager*, perhaps, than is *Convenient*. The Other are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for our *Manners*.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any *How to re- Man bears us*: it is, *First*, our Duty to do *much turn Bene-* *Good*, where we are *much Beloved*: but then we *fits*. are not to express that Affection, in a Childish Ardour, and Fondness of Passion: but in a Constancy, and Firmness of Mind.

IN the Case of an *Anecedent Merit*, where *Benefits to we are not now to Enter into an Obligation*, but *be repaid to Acknowledge*, and *Require it*: there must be *with i-re-* *a more than Ordinary Care taken*. For *Grati-* *tude*

tude is the most Indispensable of all Duties. If *Hesiod* bids us, *Restore what we borrow*; if we can, in a *Larger Measure*: what ought we to do in the Case of a *Prior Obligation*? Are we not to imitate *Fruitful Lands*, that still Return more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige those that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How should we behave our selves then, towards such as we are the Better for already? Since so it is, that there are *two sorts* of *Liberality*, the *One*, of *Bestowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it: it is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: But an Honest Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it: provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to distinguish also betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*: and the *Greater* the *Benefit*, the *Greater* is the *Obligation*. Now the *Obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without either *Judgment*, or *Measure*. They Squander away their *Donatives*, indifferently upon all; carry'd on by fuddain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with Steadiness, and Consideration. As to the Placing of our Boundies, and Returning of Acknowledgments, (supposing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *First*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

*Rash Boundies.*

*W<sup>m</sup> to  
Req<sup>re</sup> first.*

FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*: and to give *most* to those that are *our nearest Friends*. But for those principles of Nature, which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it: which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Disputing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another, and cement the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are farther remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*, but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them: and the busines is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of *one Man with another*, and of *All, with All*: This *Society*, (I say) *General*, and *Particular*, is of a large extent: and herein there must be a *Community* preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men: provided always, that such things as are limited by *Laws*, and *Civil Ordinances*, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest; they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

Reason and  
Speech are  
the Bond of  
Humane  
Society.

*To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,  
Is but to light One Candle with Another :  
I've ne're the less, for what I Give—*

*Benefits in Common.* F R O M this one Case we may learn, that whatsoever we may part with to another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of this sort, we reckon many things to be in *Common*; as *Water from a River, Fire from Fire, Good Counsel to a Man that is in doubt, or distress.* All these things are profitable to the *Receiver*, without any loss, or burthen to the *Giver*. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the *Common good*. But in regard that particular persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost infinite; *Common Liberality* must have a respect to that *End of Ennius*. We must keep wherewithal to give Light to our selves, that we may have the Means of being bountiful to our own.

*Degrees of Communiti- ties.* T O descend now from *Humane Society* in the *Latitude*, of which there are many degrees; there is a nearer Bond yet, betwixt people of the same *Province*, the same *Nation*, and the same *Language*: And it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same *City*: For among *Citizens*, there are many things in *Common*: As Courts of *Justice*, *Temples*, *Walks*, *Ways*, *Lanes*, *Customs*, *Judgments*, *Suffrages*; beside frequent *Meetings*, and *Familiarities*, *Common Bus'ness*, *Commerce*, and *Contract*. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and That is the *Society of Kindred*, which is Contracted into a narrow place, apart from the

the vast Society of Mankind. It is by Nature, Common to all living Creatures, the appetite of producing the Kind: And the First Society is in *Marriage*, *Wedlock*, the next, in *Children*; it comes then to a Family, and a Community of all things. And this is the Original of a City, and as it were the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Relation of Brothers comes next; and after That, of Brothers, and Sisters Children; who, when they are too many for One House, are transplant-ed into Others, as into Colonies. And then follow Matches, and Alliances, with increase of Kindred: and their Off-spring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but *Kindred*. Relation of Blood, and the Kindness that arises from it, must necessarily endear Men to one another. For it is a great matter to have the same Pedigree: to exercise the same Religion, and to deposite their Ashes in Common Sepulchres: But of all Associations, there is none so Firm, *Friendship*: none so Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correspondency of Manners; and a Freedom of Conversation. For such is the Charm of That Honesty which we have often spoken of, that the very Encounter of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Possessor of it, where-ever we find it. Now tho' all Virtue whatsoever, is of it self, Amiable, and Attractive; insomuch that we cannot but have an Esteem for those that we find posseſ'd of it; yet *Justice* and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity*, and *Agreement of Good Manners*. For where *Similitude of manners*: there are the same Inclinations, the same Desires, and the same Will, the one cannot chuse but be

*Exchange  
of Benefits.*

*Our Duty  
to our  
Country.*

*Our Kin-  
dred and  
Friends.*

delighted with the other, as with its proper self: and it effects that which Pythagoras requires in Friendship: the making *one*, of *many*: And it is a great Obligation that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that pass Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being mutual, and grateful; must needs, upon the *Enter-  
course*, produce firm and extraordinary Friendship. But when you shall have looke over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reason can carry you: you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, than that by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents*, *Children*, *Kindred*, *Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our single Country* is more than *all the Rest*: and every honest man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that sacred Interest. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of those people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all sorts of Villany: and who not only have been, but are at this instant, conspiring the destruction of it, by a final desolation? But if there should be any dispute or Comparison, where to pay our duty, in the first place, *our Country* and *our Parents* are the *Principals*; to whose Benefits we are the most *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and *our Families* are next: as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *These*, *our Friends* and *Relations*: which are commonly of our own Rank, and Condition. Wherefore we owe the necessary helps of Life to these beforementioned: But for Conversation, Table-Society, Counsels, Exhortations, Consolations, and (upon Occasion) Reproofs: These things are found most amongst Friends: and let me tell

tell you over again : *The pleasantest Friendship is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.*

NOW in the Exercise of all these Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what without our help, he cannot attain: and in some *Duties va-*  
*ry with*  
*Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are *Circum-*  
*stances*.  
some Offices that we should rather pay to *one* than to *another*: as I would sooner help a *Neigh-*  
*bour* in with his *Harvest*, than either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*: but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman*, or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these Circumstances, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By *Custom*, and *Exercise*, we shall become good Accountants: For it is by *Adding* and *Substracting*, that we come to know what *Remains*: and consequently, in all *Cafes*, the *Bounds*, and *Limits* of our *Duty*: But as neither *Physicians*, nor *Commanders*; nor *Orators*, tho' never so well instructed in the *Rules* of their *Profession*, shall ever be able, without *Use*, and *Practice*, to make themselves *Eminently famous*: to the same end, are the *Precepts* of *Humane Duties* deliver'd us; that we should put them in *exercise*: but yet the *difficulty*, and *condition* of the *thing* does *over and above* require it. Now in what manner that *Virtue* is deriv'd, and whence that *Duty* arises, which falls under the *Consideration* of *Sociable Rights*, and *Common Justice*; we have almost said enough already.

IN the propounding of *Four general Heads*, from whence all *Virtues*, and *Duties* flow; That

## Tully's Offices.

which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind ;  
a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune,  
and Worldly things : that Virtue, I say, ought  
to be reputed the most Glorious : and therefore  
that Reproach of *Ennius*'s is always at hand upon  
Occasion :

Young Men, *in shew*, but Wenches, *in your  
Hearts* :

*While Clælia plays the Brave, and acts your  
Parts.*

*You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor  
Blood, &c.*

And on the other side, with what Transport  
and Rapture do we extol the humour of Brave  
and Generous Actions ? From hence comes that  
Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon*, *Sa-  
lamis*, *Platea*, *Thermopile*, *Leuctra*, *Stratocles* ;  
and from hence it is, that our *Cocles*, the *Decii*,  
the two *Scipio*'s, *Marcellus*, and a World of o-  
thers, especially the *Romans* themselves, are grown  
so famous, for the greatness of their Minds. And  
their ambition of Military honour, may appear  
in This, that almost all the Statues they have left  
us, are dress'd up in Armour.

AND yet that Elevation of Courage which  
is seen in Hazzards, and Adventures, unless ac-  
companied with Justice, and contending rather  
for the Publique, than for it self : That Courage  
( I say ) is so far from being a Virtue, that it is  
a Fault, and a brutal Ferity, inconsistent with  
the Tenderness of humane nature. Wherefore  
the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling *Cou-  
rage*, *a Virtue contending for Equity*. Nor did  
any man ever gain the Reputation of *True Va-  
lour*,

lour, by Treachery, or Malice. Nothing can be Honest, but what is Just: and therefore it was notably said of *Plato*. *As that knowledge (says he) which is divided from Justice, is rather Craft, than Wisdom; so That Courage, which is Bold, and Adventurous, is rather Temerity, and Foolhardiness, than Valor: if it be carryed on by Passion, or Interest, rather than for a Common Good.* Wherefore all Men of Valor, and great Undertakings, should be likewise Men of Goodnes, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of Truth: which are all Inseparable from Justice. But the Mischief is, that this Tumor, and Elation of Mind: breaks out many times into a *Pertinacy*, and an ambitious desire of *Rule*. For as *Plato* has it, the *Lacedemonians*, were naturally inflam'd with an Ardent desire of Overcoming. So that whosoever has the greatest Soul, is the most addicted to aspiring Thoughts: And to set himself above all; or in Truth rather to stand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a Man to observe the Tenor of *True Equity* (which peculiarly belongs to Justice) in the Inordinate Appetite of *Superiority*, and *Dominion*. From whence it comes to pass, that such men will not be govern'd, either by *Reason*, or any *Publique*, and *Lawful Constitution*. This humor starts Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes: whose business it is, rather to make themselves Greater, by *Violence*, than to keep themselves in a Station of *Equality* by *Justice*. But the harder any thing is, the fairer it is: nor is there any Time, or Season, that can dispense a man from Justice. Wherefore Those are Truly *Brave*, and *Magnanimous*,

*Pertinacy  
and Ambi-  
tion.*

nious, that *keep off* an *Injury*, not Those that *offer* it. He that is truly *Wise*, and *Stout*, places That Virtue which is most consonant to Nature, in *Action*, and not in *Glory*: and in *making* himself more Considerable than other men, rather than *appearing* so. No man can be said to be truly *Heroique*, that depends, for his Reputation, upon the Opinion of the Multitude. But every man the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honor, the more easily is he transported to do Unjust things. He stands upon a slippery place: For where is the Man, who after all his hazzards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures?

*True Magnanimity.* YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *Courage*, chiefly by these two *Marques*. First, he despises *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is *Becoming* and *Honest*; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The Other is a disposition of Mind (as is said before) that spurs a man to attempt things *Great* and *Profitable*; but *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self; as in other Conveniences that belong to it. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me say, the *Profit* also) of These two Things rests in the *Latter*: but the *Cause*, and the *Motive* is in the *Former*: For There is the *Rise*, and *Spring* of great Resolves, that carry men even above the Consideration of any thing that is below. The thing it self is seen in *Two particulars*: *First* in Judging That only to be *Good* which is *Honest*; and, *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it must be confess to be

be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Those, as Little Things, which, many Account to be Great, and Glorious ; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a firm, and settled Judgment. It is likewise the part of a Constant, and Invincible Mind, so to bear all sorts of Calamity, and Affliction, as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to descend below the Dignities of a Wise man. How Incongruous is it for a man that stands the shock of *Danger*, to be broken with *Lust* ? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labour* ; and then to be overcome with *Pleasure* ? This must therefore be avoided ; and so must the greedy desire of *Mony*. There <sup>Contempt</sup> is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and <sup>of Mony.</sup> Wretched Mind, than to do<sup>e</sup> upon *Pelf* : Nothing more humane, and honorable, than to despise it, if we have it not ; and to employ it generously, and do good with it, if we have it. And so for the Affectation of *Glory* : We must <sup>Affectation</sup> beware of it (as is said already) for it bars a <sup>of Glory.</sup> man of his *Liberty* , which a Brave Man will rather dye, than part with. We should not be sollicitous, neither for *Power* ; which in some Cases, we should not receive, and in others, we should lay down. We must deliver our selves from all disorders of mind ; either by *Fear* or *Appetite* : and likewise from all *Sowrnness*, and *Transport*, either of *delight*, or of *Wrath* : that we may be Calm, and secure : In which State, we shall find both Steadiness, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repose, have wholly withdrawn themselves from Publique Business : Among these, the noblest, <sup>A Retired</sup> and most eminent of Philosophers ; and in <sup>Life.</sup> truly, of great Severity, and Weight ; who could

could neither endure the People, nor Government: and so retired into Deserts, and Retreats, to live privately with Themselves. And these men, in this Reces, had the same Design with Princes (whose privilege is to live as they list) that they might want nothing, but enjoy their Freedom without Controll. Wherefore, since both Those that affect Power, and the other Idle people that I speak of, aim at the same thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One thinks they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the Other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little: They may be Both, (for ought I know) in some measure, in the Right. But it must yet be allowed, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Easier and Safer: And less Importune, and Troublesome to Others. But the life of Those that apply themselves to Publique busi-  
ness, is more profitable to Mankind: and more conduced to the Acquisition of Honor, and Reputation in the World. Wherefore there is something to be said for those Excellent Wits that dedicate themselves to Letters; without meddling in Publique affairs: and also for such Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps some more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations, being well satisfi'd, that others should enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for those that have none of this Pretence, to talk of despising Government, and Offices, which most people have in great estimation; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I disallow of their Judgment, in the little Consideration they seem to have for Glory; but be-  
cause

cause they are manifestly afraid of the Labours, Troubles, Repulses, and Displeasures that they are to encounter. For there are many that behave themselves *Unequally in Contrary Cases*: Severe Contemners of *Pleasure*, but they sink under *Pain*; Regardless of *Fame*, but dejected with *Scandal*. Nor are they Steady, even in these every cases: But for those that are by nature, fitted and qualified for civil business; I should advise These people to apply themselves to it without delay: and to take some Commission in the Government. For This is Necessary, both as to Publique Administration; and to shew the Greatness of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philosophers themselves, (if not more) should be affected with a general disdain of External things, (as I have often said) and stated in an Immoveable Tranquillity, and security of Mind; which will deliver them from all Anxiety for things to come; and establish them in a life of Constancy, and Honor. Now this Point is by so much easier, for a Philosopher to gain, by how much his Life is less expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune: For there are not many things that he stands in need of: beside, that in case of any disaster, his Fall is not so dangerous. It is but reasonable therefore to conclude, that Men in Great and Publique places, are exposed to greater perturbations of Thought, than those that live in privacy and Repose. So that a greater Stock of courage is there necessary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and Care. But for him that puts himself into *Business*; let him first consider the *Honesty* of the Employment; and then, his Own *Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither, rashly despair, out

of heartlessness, and sloth: nor be over-confident neither, in the Opinion of himself. But in all matters of Busines, a man should diligently prepare himself before he goes about it.

*A Comparison of Military Virtues with Civil.*

B U T since most Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Consideration than *Civil*, This Opinion should be a little qualifi'd; For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themselves to that course of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and this happens most frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Especially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Disposition* carries them to the Profession of *Arms*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the *Senate*, than in the *Field*: for although *Themistocles* be worthy of all honor, and his Name, and Memory more Illustrious than that of *Solon*, *Salamis* being still mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is still prefer'd before the Counsel of *Solon*, for the Institution of the *Areopagites*. This must not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once*, deliver, preserve, and help the City; but the *Other* will ever do it. This Council preserves the Law of *Athens*, and Constitutions of their Ancestors. *Themistocles* cannot say that ever he help'd *Areopagus*, but the other may truly boast of serving *Themistocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate which manag'd the War: And so for *Pausanias*, and *Lysander*. It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarr'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws of *Licyrus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Consideration, their Armies were both *Readier* and *Bolder*. It was my Opinion,

nion, even when I was a Boy, that *Marcus Scaurus* was not inferior to *Caius Marius*; and when I came afterwards into Publique Busines; I lookt upon *Q. Catulus*, not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what signifie *Armies, Abroad*, without *Council at home*? Neither did *Africanus* (tho' an Excellent *Man*, as well as a great *Captain*) do the Common-wealth a Nobler Service in the Raising of *Numantia*, than *Pub. Nasica* (a private *Man*) did at the same time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now this Instance is not purely *Civil*; but in some respect *Military*, because it was done by a *Violent hand*: But still it was done by a *Civil Council*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable saying of mine, that is so often cast in my Teeth, by a sort of Malicious, and Envious people.

*Let Swordmen to the Gown give place,  
And Crown the Orator with Bayes.*

TO passe over other Instances. Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Commonwealth was under *My Administration*? Never was there a more malicious Conspiracy; and yet by the Influence of our Diligence, and Counsel, how quickly was it crush'd? Insomuch, that the very Arms themselves fell out of the hands of the most Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Triumph Comparable to it? This Boast, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honor of my Actions, and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boast, to You, (I say) may be allowed me. Nor is it any more than *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden

laden with Military honours) ascribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (says he) *would have been to little purpose, if Cicero, by preserving the Commonwealth, had not left me a place wherein to Triumph.* So that *Domestique*, and *Civil Resolution*, is not Inferior to *Military*. And it requires more Pain, and Study, to be employ'd upon it. That Virtue without dispute, which we look for from a High, and Illustrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is still to be kept in Exercise; and so affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counfel and Reason, in the dispatch of Business, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honesty* here in question is wholly plac'd in the Care and Consideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe*, in *Civil Administration*, bring no less advantage to the *Publique*, than Those that bear *Arms*: For War is many times, either not begun, or otherwise finish'd, by their Advice: Nay, and some brought on too: as the *Third Punic War* of *M. Cato* was: where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead. Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining*, is more desirable than that of *Contending*. Always provided that we steer not our Course rather by an *Aversion to War*, than a *Consideration to Benefit*. In the Undertaking of a War there should be such a prospect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace*. It is the part of a Valiant and Resolute Man, not to be discomposed in disasters, or to make a bustle, and be put beside himself; but to maintain a presence of Mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reason. And this is the Marque and Effect of a great Courage: so is the other, of an Excellent

understanding, to forecast in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh before-hand the Good and the Bad; and what's to be done when it happens, without being put to the foolish Exclamation of *who would have Thought it?* These are the Works of an Elevated Soul, that supports it self upon Prudence, and Judgment: but he that rashly thrusts himself into Dangers without fear, or wit: and engages an Enemy hand over head: this is only Brutality, and Outrage: But yet when the time comes, and necessity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand, and rather lose his Life, than his Honour and Freedom.

IN the Case of *Rasing*, or *Demolishing* of *Clemency* <sup>to the Conquer'd.</sup> Cities, there should be great care taken, that nothing be done either *Headily*, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a Great man, in *Publique Broyles*, to punish the *Guilty*; but still to spare the *Multitude*; and in all conditions, to adhere to that *Multitude*, which is Right, and Honest.

THERE are some that esteem *Fears of Arms* above *Civil Administrations*: (as is aforesaid) and there are Others that think it more estimable, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Crafty*, than in *Quiet* and *Considerate Counsels*. We must never in such manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *faint-hearted*: And we must <sup>Courage with Discretion.</sup> likewise have a care, on the other side, not to thrust our selves into *Unnecessary hazzards*: which is one of the greatest Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult cases, we should do like Physicians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diseases*: but in cases of *Extremity*, a *desperate disease must have desperate Cure*. None but a Mad man will wish for a *Storm* in *fair Weather*. But it

it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And the honor is so much the more, if the advantage of the success be greater than the Misfortune.

Danger  
Publique  
and pri-  
vate.

A mistake  
in point of  
Honor.

ACTIONs are dangerous, partly to the *Undertakers*, and in part to the *Commonwealth*. Some run the hazard of their Lives: Some of their Good names; and Others of the Love of the people: Now we should more frankly venture our selves, than the Publique: and more clearly expose our selves for Honor, and Reputation, than for other Commodities. Some there are that make no scruple of hazarding their Lives, and Fortunes in the defence of their *Country*: and yet are so nice and scrupulous in the matter of *Reputation*: that rather than run any risque of their *Honor*, they will leave their very *Country* in danger. As *Callicratidas* the *Lacedemonian General*, in the *Peloponnesian War*; after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at last, by not removing the Navy from the *Argimuse*, and making his Retreat without giving the *Athenians* Battel, as he was advis'd to do; to which he made This answser, that if the *Lacedemonians* lost one Fleet, they might set out another; but that if he quitted his Ground, his Honor was lost for ever. But the *Lacedemonians* however might have born this Loss, whereas the Other Blow was mortal; when *Cleombrotus*, for fear of an Ill Report, unadvisedly engaged with *Epaminnidas*, where the whole power of the *Lacedemonians* was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the conduct of *Q. Fabius Maximus*, of whom *Ennius*,

Fabius

Fabius was slow, but sure, and his Delay  
Restor'd the tottering State. Now 'twas his  
way

To mind his Bus'ness, not what people said :  
He liv'd a Great man, but he's Greater dead.

This is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided also in civil matters. For their are many that dare not speak their Opinions, tho' for the best ; for fear of falling under Evil Tongues.

THE R E are two Precepts of *Plato* to be observed by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in some sort to assert and defend the Publique Interest, that all their Actions should refer to That, with out any regard to their own advantage. The other is, to attend the service of the whole, in such sort, that while they are serving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Administration of a *Government*, as in the case of a *Ward* : The *Commission* has a regard to the benefit of those that are deliver'd up in *Charge* : and not those to whom such a charge, or care is *Committed*. But they that provide for One part of the people, and neglect another, bring into a City the most pernicious things in the World ; That is to say, *Discord*, and *Sedition* : and when they are split into parties, some side with the people ; others with the Nobility : but none mind the Whole. This wrought great Mischiefs among the *Athenians* : and in our *Republique* not only *Sedition*, but the most pestilent *Civil Wars*. A course not to be endur'd by a Sober, and valiant Patriot ; or any man that deserves a place in the Government : For such a man will apply him-  
Plato's ad-  
vice to  
Magi-  
strates.  
The danger  
of Fallins

D self

self wholly to the care of the *Publique*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it: Neither will he bring any man into *Envie*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*, or *Subordination*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die than desert the aforesaid Duties.

*Of Ambition.*

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honor is a wretched thing: Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republique*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us farther, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Armes* against the *Commonwealth*; and not such as with *Honesty*, and *Judgement* labour to *defend* it. This was the Controversie betwixt *P. Africenus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness.

*Against Anger.*

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be violently *Angry* with an *Enemy*: For there is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous person, than *Clemency* and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should joyn a *Facility* with That which we call *height of Courage*, lest if we should accustom our selves to *Transports* upon *Unseasonable Addresses*, or *shameful Importunities*, we should fall into a humor of *Morose* and *unprofitable sournes*: Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use severity also, where the *Publique* requires it; for without That, a *City* can never be kept in order.

ALL

A L L *Reproof*, and *Correction*, let it be without *Contumely*, as being directed only to the profit of the *Commonwealth*; without regard to the gratifying of his *Passion*, or *Interest* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the punishment likewise should be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjust that one man should have *Blows*, and another, not so much as a *Check*, for the same transgression. But above all things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in *Passion* will never observe the due mean betwixt the two extremes of too much, and too little: wherein the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right; if they would not also approve of *Anger* given us by *Nature* for our *Advantage*. But I am for the avoiding of it in all *Cases*; and I could wish that *Magistrates*, like the *Laws Themselves*, would never proceed to *punish*, in *Wrath*, but only in *Equity*.

LET us also in *Prosperity*, and when we have the *World* at will, as much as possible, avoid *Pride*; *disgusting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the *same Levity* to be Transported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to observe an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have still the same humor, and the same countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Lelius*. *Phillip of Macedonia*, was outstript by his Son, in *Glorious Achievements*, and *Military Executions*, but in *Gentleness*, and *Humanity* of manners, *Alexander* came short of him: So that the *One* of them was *always Great*, and the *Other* was *many Times Intemperate*, and *Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the *more Humble*. *Panetius* tells us of *Africanus*

( his Disciple, and Familiar Friend ) how he was wont to say, that as we put out Horses of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for use, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmanageable, by being chaf'd, and heat by the Action of the Battle ; so should we commit Men, that are Transported with Prosperity, and over-confident in Themselves, to some Guide that should keep them, as it were in the Ring ; or within the bounds of Reason, and good Government, to make them understand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Prosperity, that we should cheifly consult our Friends ; and allow them more Authority over us than at other times : but we must have a Care of Entertaining Flatteries, and of being impos'd upon by Fair words, wherein we are too easie to be Mistaken. For such is the conceit we commonly have of our selves ; that we think no Commendation more than we deserve. From this weaknes there arise Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praises, and high Opinions of our selves, we do but serve to make sport for Others, and labour under grievous Mistakes. And so much for this Point.

THEIR Busines that Govern Commonwealths, must of necessity be of the greatest moment, and require the largest Souls ; because it has the largest prospect, and concerns most people. This is to be given for granted ; and yet it must not be deny'd neither, on the Other side, that great Generosity of Mind has been many times shewd in a private Life ; either in the search, or attempt of Great Matters ; and the people yet keeping themselves within their own Bounds,

*Greatness  
o mind in  
a private  
Life.*

Bounds, or else mingling with Philosophers, and Men in Publique Bus'ness; contenting themselves in their Private Condition: Neither scraping together Estates, by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the use of what they had; but rather dividing with Them, and with the republique where there was Occasion. Now for *This Estate*, let it be, First, well gotten, and neither by *Shameful*, nor by *Odious ways*: Let a man next do *good* with it to as many as he can; (so they be worthy) let him encrease it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Husbandry*: and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, than *Luxury*, and *Lust*. He that observes these Rules may live Soberly, Splendidly, and Generously; and no les Candidly, Faithfully and amicably with all Men.

WE are now to speak of the remaining part of Duty; wherein *Bastfulness*, and a certain *Gracefulness* of Life, *Temperance*, *Modesty*, the Composure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be consider'd. Here it is that we find that same *Decorum*, or as the Greeks, *επίτον*; which is of so Excellent a Nature, that it is Inseperable from Virtue. For whatsoever is *Decent*, is likewise *Honest*; and whatsoever is *Honest*, is *becoming*. But still there is a difference betwixt this same *Honesty*, and *Decorum*; which may be better understood, than explained: For That which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honesty* is gone before.

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in the Virtue now in question, but also in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent use of Reason, and Speech; the doing of every thing

thing Considerately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other side to be deceived, to Mistake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming, as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And so whatsoever is *Just*, is also *Graceful*: and whatsoever is *Unjust*, or *Dishonest*, is likewise *misbecoming*. And the same Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For whatsoever is done *Generously*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*.

*And in all  
Virtues.*

Wherefore the *Decorum* I here speak of, appears likewise in all other Virtues; and does in such manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no Mistery to the finding of it out. There is in all Virtue, somewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *separable* from Virtue, by *Imagination*: As the Gracefulness, and Beauty of the *Body* cannot well be seperated from *Health*: And so it is with the *Gracefulness* here in *question*. It is a *Decorum* that is in a manner so confused with Virtue, that it is Incorporated with it; but in the Mind and Conception, it may be distinguish'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts*.

*A Deco-  
rum Gene-  
ral and  
Special.*

The *One* is a certain *General Decorum*, that shines in all Virtues; and there is *Another* that is subject to This, or dependent upon it, which respects *every Virtue* in *particular*. The *Former* is Commonly defined to be a *Decorum congruous to the Excellency of Man*, in that which differences *Man*, from *Other Living Creatures*. But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the *General*, they define to be a *quality so Congruous to Nature*, that *Moderation* and *Temperance* appear in it, with the very *image of a Generous Soul*.

*This*

This we may judge to be the *Decorum*, which the Poets observe ; whereof we have spoken more in another place. But we are then said to observe the *Strict Decorum of the Poets*, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and *Condition* of the *Person*. As what could be more Improper, and Unseemly than to bring in These just Judges, *Aetus*, and *Minos* with these words in their Mouths, *Let them hate, so they Fear : Or, the Father is the Grave of his own Children.* And yet when *Atreus* says it, what Acclamations are there, because the expression Suits with the Person ! But Nature her self, as to us, has given every man his Part, with great Excellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. So that the Poets will see to the accommodating of all parts to the variety of Persons, even the Observing of a *Decorum*, toward the worst of men, as well as the best. But since Nature has assign'd us our parts of Constancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modesty ; and the same Nature teaches us not to be wholly careless, how we demean our selves toward one another ; it is clear to us, how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs to every Virtue, and every kind of Honesty. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt disposition of the Parts, proves the Eye ; and delights us in the very Correspondence, Symmetry and apt disposition of the Parts; so this *Decorum*, that Illustrates Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Works, and Deeds. Wherefore there should a Certain reverence be used toward all men, both high, and low ; for 'tis the humour of an Arrogant and dissolute Man, not to care what the World says

*The Decorum of Order, Steadiness and Moderation.*

of him. But there's a great difference betwixt *Justice*, and *Modesty*, upon all accounts. It belongs to *Justice* not to *wrong* men; and to *Modesty*, not to *offend* them: Wherein the Power, and Virtue of a *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call a *Decorum*.

*A Decorum in a Conformity to Nature.*

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is cheifly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature; A Guide That will never mislead us; but conduct those that follow her, to all acutenes, and perspicacity of Understanding; to the best means of Uniting men in Society; to That which is strong, and manly. But the mighty Power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon: For not only the Motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be allow'd, but the Motions of the mind likewise much more.

*From the Appetite with Perturbations.*

THE Force, and *Nature* of the *Mind*, is Two fold: One part is plac't in the *Appetite*; the Greeks call it *θρεψις*; that carries a man hither and thither: The Other, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to do, and what to *avoid*, by which means, our *Appetite* shall be kept obedient to our *Reason*. In all Cases, we should have a care of Rashness and *Negligence*; and do nothing but what we can give a fair Account of. This is in some degree, the Image and Description of Duty; But then we must so order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reason*, so as neither *rashly* to *out-run* it, nor out of *Heaviness*, and *Sloth* to *desert* it; but keep it *quiet*, and *calm*, and free from all *Perturbation*. This will make us Eminent for *Constancy* and *Moderation*: For Those *Appetites* that

that wander from the *Rule*; and *Skip* from one thing to another, either by *Coveting*, or *Avoiding*: *Those Appetites*, I say, for want of being govern'd by *Reason*, will without all question pass *Bounds* and *Measure*; for they relinquish and cast of their *Allegiance to Reason*, which they ought to obey by the *Law of Nature*: and *Passion dif- orders both Mint, and Body.* their Ill Effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but also visibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Transports of *Wrath*, *Lust*, *Fear*, *Pleasure*; What an Alteration is there of *Countenance*, *Voice*, *Motion*, *Gesture*? from whence we may Collect, how necessary it is to moderate, and govern our Passions; and so to keep our selves upon a Guard, that we do nothing heedlessly, as it were by Chance, without Care, or Consideration. For man was never made for *Levity* and *Pleasure*, but rather for the severity of *Grave*, and *weighty Studies*. Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of *Froliques*, and *Divertisements*; provided that we use them only as *Sleep*, and such other ways of *Repose*; after the discharge of our *Serious* and *more Important Duties*. And our very *Liberties* in *Discourse* must not be *Profuse* neither, nor *Immodest*; but only *Candid*, and *Facetious*: For as we do not allow our *Children* all sorts of *Games*; but only such sports as hold some proportion with honest *Actions*; So in *Raillery* it self, there must be a mixture of *Candor*, as well as *Understanding*.

T H E R E are two sorts of *Raillery*, or *Mirth*; the One is *Course*, *Petulant*, *Criminal*, and *Foul*; *Two Sorts of Raillery, scurrilous and facetious*, the Other, *Cleanly*, *Gracious*, *Ingenious*, and *Plantus*, and the *Greek Comedians*, but the Followers of *Socrates*,

crates, have written much ; and stuffed their Books with a great many of their *sayings*, and *Conceits* : As *Cato's Collection of Apothegm's, &c.* Now 'tis an easy matter, to distinguish betwixt a *Course*, and a *Cleanly way of Festing*. The *One*, is a *word for a season*, only for *Recreation*, and worthy of a man of Honor. The *Other*, not fit for an *Honest man* ; especially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in as *Unclean Words*.

**N A Y** in our very *Recreations*, we should *Honest and* keep within Compafs ; and have a Care that we *manly plea-* do not lash out into Excesses, and pass the Limits *sures.* of Modesty, in the Transports of our Pleasures.

The Chase of Wild Beasts, and the Military and Manly Exercises that are Practis'd in our Field, or *Campus Martis* : These I reckon to be Honourable pleasures ; and we need never want these ways of Diversion.

**B U T** whatever we do, it should be always in our Thought, the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above that of *Brutes* ; which are only push'd on by *Violent Appetites to Sensual pleasures* : Whereas the Entertainment of a mans Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation* ; which is never Idle, but still employed either upon Enquiry, or Action ; and charmed with a delight that arises from what we hear, or see. Nay the very man himself, that is most addicted to his Pleasures : ( if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* ( for such there are ) Though he may be overcome by his *Lufts*, he yet stands so right, as to be *asham'd of*, to *conceal*, and to *disguise* his *Love of Those pleasures*, even for *Modesty* sake ; which shews that *Pleasures of the Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity of the Soul* ; but rather

*Brutal  
Pleasures.*

*The Ex-  
cellency of  
Man.*

ther *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man should be found to have a great Regard for *Pleasures*, let him be sure to use them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloaths*, and *Dyet*, we should still keep an Eye rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, than to the humouring of the *Phansie*, or *Palate*; and if we shall but duly weigh, and examine the *Dignity*, and *Excellency* of *Nature*; we shall quickly find how shameful a Thing it is to dissolve in a *Luxurious softness*, and *Delicacy*: And how becoming, on the other side, to live *Frugally*, *Temperately*, *Gravely*, and *Soberly*.

EVERY man must be understood to be invested with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common to Mankind*, as endu'd with *Reason*; and in a preference to *Beasts*, from whence we do not only derive the Knowledge of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; but the very means of finding out our several Duties. *A great Diversity both in Minds and Bodies.* The Other is a Propriety that has a respect particularly to *Individuals*. There is a great difference in *Bodies*: One man is better for a *Course*, Another for a *Scuffle*; and so in *Beauties*; One *Beauty* is *Imperious*, and *Majestical*; Another *Charming*. Now there are at least as great *diversities*, and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. *L. Crassus*, and *L. Philippus*, were both of them of a *Nature*, Wonderfully Gentle, and Gracious; and Both these qualities were yet more Eminent; and more Labour'd too, in *C. Cesar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was a strange Austerity of *Humor*, in *M. Scaurus*, and *M. Drusius*; and in the same Time, and as yet in their Youth too. *C. Lelius* was *Gay*, and *Pleasant*; his Friend *Scipio* more *Ambitious*, and *Reserved*. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a Gentle

Gentle and a pleasant Companion ; a Wit that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an Excellent faculty of speaking his Mind, under an agreeable Disguise. *Pythagoras*, on the other side, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themselves, without any *Gayety* of *Humor* at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among our *Own Commanders*, *Q. Maximus* have the Name of men extremely *Close*, and *Secret*, *Silent*, *Dissembling* ; notably good at *Strategems*, or setting Spies upon an Enemy, and disappointing their Counsels. Those that the *Greeks* have the greatest esteem of, are *Themestocles* the *Athenian*, and *Jason* the *Pherean*. But above all, they magnifie that profound, and politique Fetch of *Solon* : who, for the advantage of the Commonwealth, and for his *Own security*, counterfeited himself *Mad*. There are others now, so far from This Artifice, that they are *Simple* and *Open* : to the degree of not enduring any thing but what's done above board ; They will not suffer any thing that looks like Treachery. These men are the Servants of *Truth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and croucht to any man, for their own Ends ; as *Sylla*, and *M. Crassus* : The *Lacedemonian Ly-sander* is said to have been a great Master of his Art in This kind ; and yet *Callicratides*, that succeeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humor. And we find deversity as well in the *Stile*, and *Fashion* of *Speaking*, as in the *difference* of *Manners*. As you shall see men of great Authority, and Parts, that yet wont themselves to the *Phrase*, and *Language* of the Common people : As the *Two Catulus's*, Father and Son, and the like

*Q. Mu*

*Q. Murius Mancinus*, which I my self am a Witness of. Nay I have heard old men say, that *P. Scipio of Nasica*, had that way with him, but his Father the clean contrary, and no Grace of Speech in the World. I speak of him that reveng'd the Commonwealth, upon the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the severest of Philosophers ; and yet Famous and Eminent for that very Sourness. There are a world of *Other dissimilitudes*, both of *Nature*, and *Manners*, which are not yet to be despised. So that every man should do well to stick to that Inclination that nature has given him in particular ; provided that it be not Vitious : and by so doing, we shall more easily discover and attain the *Decorum* which we look for in this place.

BUT yet we are so to behave our selves, *Nature is* that without opposing *Common Nature*, we fol-<sup>the best</sup> low the *Dictates*, *every man* of his *Own Genius* ; *Mistress.* and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier, and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the bent of our own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature ; or to pursue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Graceful*, that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short, there is nothing more *becoming*, in humane life, than an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions* : which, if ever we depart from, and pass to the *Affection* of *another man's Nature*, we lose *our Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing foreign Words into it (as some people do) and make themselves only ridiculous for their pains) so should

should we in our LIVES, and Actions, make our selves all of a piece.

*The same* N A Y, so sensible is This difference of *Nating Good* tures, that one man shall be honour'd for destroy-  
in one, and ing of himself, and another condemn'd for it, all  
ill in ano- in the same Case: as it was with *Marcus Cato*  
ther. that kill'd himself, and the rest that rendred  
themselves up to *Cesar* in *Africa*. This might  
perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they  
had laid violent hands upon themselves: For an  
action so heroical would have born no propor-  
tion with the softness and facility of their Ways  
and Manners, but rather have introduc'd an *In-*  
*congruity* betwixt their *Lives*, and *Deaths*. But  
for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and  
*Severe*, (even to a *Miracle*) and hardn'd to it by  
a long habit of *Constancy*: a man unalterably  
*Firm* to his *purpose*, and *resolution*: it made for  
the *dignity* of his *Humour*, and *Character*, ra-  
ther to support *death* it self, than the *frown* and  
*Dominion* of a *Tyrant*. How many miseries did  
*Ulysses* suffer, in that tedious Ramble of his,  
enslaving himself to Women, (if a body may  
give *Circe* and *Calypso* that name) and a Com-  
plaisance upon all Occasions to all sorts of people?  
Nay at his own house, how patiently did he put  
up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meanest of  
his Servants there? Whereas *Ajax*, according  
to the report we have of him, would have born  
a thousand deaths, rather than those Contume-  
lies. This Contemplation should make every  
man look into himself, to see what he has of his  
*Own*, and to make his best of *That*, without  
disguising himself, to act the part of *Another*.

*Let every man Act his own Part.* *That* which every man has *Peculiar* to himself, is  
the thing which best becomes him. Wherefore  
every

every man should take a true estimate of what he is, and impartially examine his Abilities, and Defects ; What he can do, and what he cannot. That we may be, at least, as wise in our *Lives*, as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage* : who make choice, not so much of the *Best Parts*, or *Plays*, as of the *fittest* for their *disposition*. He that has the strongest Voice, chuses the *Tragedy* of *Epigonus*, or *Medea* : The best Actor prefers *Melippe* : or *Clytemnestra*. *Rutilus* (whom I remember) always acted *Antiope* : and sometimes *Aesopus* play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Stage-player* now take more care of himself in a *Comedy*, than a *Wise Man* in his *Life*? Let every man see in the *first* place, *which way* his Talent lies ; and in the *next*, let him endeavour to *improve* it. But if we should be forc'd at any time, by necessity, to play a Part that we were never made for : let it be our Care, Study, and Thought, so to behave our selves, that at least we may not *lose* our Credit, where we cannot get any. So that the best of this Case will be to avoid *Shame*, without pretending to get a *Reputation*, by the forcing of our *Nature*.

NOW to those *two parts* already spoken of, that is to say, of *Common Nature*, and *particular Inclination*, there is a *Third*, that is cast upon us either by Time or Chance, and yet a *Fourth*, which we accommodate according to our own Judgment. For Kingdoms, Empires, Dignities, Honors, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. Now it is wholly at our own Choice, what part we will Sustain. Wherefore One man takes to *Philosophy*, another to the *Civil Law*, a *Third* to *Rhetorique*, and a *Fourth* *Let every man chuse his own Study.*

a Fourth affects an Excellency rather in *One Virtue* than in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous ; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading in Their Steps: as *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law* : And *Scipio Africanus* emulated his Father in Feats of *Arms*. Some again are not content with the honor they derive from their *Predecessors*, unless they add somewhat to it of their Own. As *Africanus* did yet Augment and Illustrate the honor of his *Military Knowledge* by his *Particular Eloquence*. And so did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who being a *Captain* not inferior to his *Father*, made himself yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and *Understanding*. But it happens sometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himself rather to some Course, or design of his own ; which is a thing often found in men of large minds, that are descended from obscure Parents. All these Circumstances must be taken into Consideration, in the question of *This Decorum*.

*Some Course of Life must be pitched upon*

THE First point in Deliberation is This, what it is that we design either to *Be*, or to *Do* ; and what course of Life to take to. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to resolve, and pitch upon the Condition we propound ; at which time, we are least able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in some certain purpose of Life, before we are able to distinguish betwixt a Better and a Worse. For although (according to the Report of *Pradicus*, out of *Xenophon*) so soon as ever *Hercules* came out of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chuse what

what course of Life he will Steer ) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One of Virtue*, and the *Other of Pleasure*, he sat a long time considering with himself, which of the *Two ways* he should take: Yet this might do well enough for *Hercules*, that was the *Son of Jupiter*, but not for us, I fear, that commonly follow those men still that we like best; and take up an affection for their ways, and Studies. And yet for those that are trained up under the Institution of their Parents; they do commonly and insensibly contract an *Affection* for the Methods and *Customs* of their Education. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular practice; esteeming That still to be the *Best*; that pleases the *most*. And yet some there are, that lead the Course of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by Providence; a certain *Felicity*, or *Goodness* of Nature; a *Virtuous Inclination*, or some particular advantage of their Institution: But it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of *Eminent Wit*, and *Learning*; or to find Either of them, with so much Time for deliberation, as is needful for the *Election* of a profitable Course of Life. In this deliberation, a regard must be had to That which is most proper, and *Natural* to every particular: For (as is already said) since in whatever we do, we must enquire into every mans particular *Genius*, before we can say what becomes him; so we must be more *Careful* yet, in the *Establishment* of our own Lives, to see that we maintain an *Equality* in the main; and that we never differ from our selves, or falter in our *Duty*.

• *Nature and Fortune to be consulted what course of Life to fix upon.* BUT since *Nature* has the greatest power in *This Case*; and *Fortune*, the next; we must consult them Both; what Course of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the first place: For she is much firmer, and more constant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*: Whosoever therefore shall Conform in the Ordering of his Life, to the Inclinations of an uncorrupted *Nature*, must keep constantly to that Tenor, which is the *Decorum of Life*; unless he find himself mistaken in his Choice. And in that Case (for it is a Case to be put) there must be a Change admitted of Purposes and Manners. And that change will be more easily and commodiously wrought, under the favor of Times and Occasions: But where the Season is not favorable, it must be Introduc'd by Little and Little; as Wise men say of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendships; 'tis better to unstitch than to tear them all to pieces on a sudden. But when we have once alter'd our Course, we must be infinitely Careful to make it appear, that we have done it upon good and weighty Reasons. Now whereas I have, (in what is aforesaid) propounded the Imitation of our Predecessors; let me not be thought to advise an Imitation of them in their Vices: beside that there are many things wherein *Nature* is not to be Imitated. As the Son of *Africanus the Elder*, (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Aemilius*.) It was not possible for him, by reason of the Craziness of his body to be so like his Father, as the Other was like His. *Let every man do all the Good he can.* Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to Harangue the People in *Publique Assemblies*, or to lead *Armies*, there are some Duties

Duties yet in his Power, which he is obliged to perform: as the *Offices of Justice, Faith, Liberality, Modesty, Temperance*, which Benefits will fairly supply the want of the Other. The best of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation of Great, and Virtuous Actions, and Ancestors*; and the Son that does not uphold the Renown of his Father, is a Shaime, and a Scandal to it.

NOW in regard that there are several *Duties* properly belonging to several *Agess*; and many things that becoming a *Young* man, would be ridiculous in an *Old*; we shall say somethong also under That distinction.

IT is the duty of a *Young man* to Reverence *The Duty* his *Elders*, and to make his Choice of the *Best*, *of a Young man* and most approved among them, for his *Direc-tors* and *Governors*: For the *Ignorance*, and *Folly* of *Youth* should be ordered, and instructed, by the *prudence* and *experience* of the *Aged*. But above all things, he should be restrained *Youth* from *Loose* and *Wanton* *pleasures*: and trained *should be Temperate and Industrious* rather in *Laborious* *exercises*: and in the *Fatigues*, and *Toyles*, both of *Body*, and *Mind*. For it makes men *Vigorous*, and *Industrious*, as well in *War*, as in *Peace*: and even in the *Intervals* of *Liberty*, and *Refreshment*, young Men should have a Care of *Intemperance*: and not to pass the Bounds of *Modesty*; which will be the more Easily attained, if they be often in the Eyes of their *Seniors* and *Tutors*.

W H E N we come to be in *Years*, the labours *The Bliss-ness of Age is Wisdom* of the body must be abated, and we should en-crease those of the Mind: but striving still, by all means to be serviceable to our Friends, and to our Juniors, by our Advice, and *Wisdom*: but principally to the Commonwealth. But above

*Beware of Sloth and Luxury.* all things, have a Care of a Drowsie, a Languishing, and a Lasie Old Age; and so likewise of a Luxurious: which, as it is reproachful and dishonorable, in this Case it is most of all. But if the Intemperance of Lust be added to it, the Mischief is Double. *First*, the *Infamy* which it reflects upon *Age it self*: and *Then*, the *Ill Example*, in Authorizing young men to be more Shameless and wicked.

*The Duty of a Magistrate.* I T would not be impertinent, here to speak something of the Duties of *Magistrates*, *Private Citizens* and *Strangers*. The *Magistrates* part, is to consider himself as the *Representative* of the *City*: and to uphold the *Honor*, and *Dignity* of it: to observe the *Laws*, and *Customs*, to do *Justice*, and to remember, that all these things are committed to his *Charge*. It is the part of *A Private man*, to live with his *fellow Citizens*, under one *Common Bond* of *Legal Duty*; neither falling so Low, as to make himself despicable, nor to much exalting himself: And never to entertain any Thought, but to the *Glory* and *Peace* of the *Commonwealth*. This is the man that we esteem, and pronounce to be a worthy *Citizen*. As to the Duty of a *Stranger*: let him mind his own business, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himself within his *Compass*. By these means it will be understood, when it shall come to be diligently examin'd, what is most becoming us, under the several Circumstances of *Persons*, *Times*, and *Ages*: But there is nothing so Graceful, as to behave our selves equally, and steadily, in all our Actions, and Counsels.

*The Decorum of the Body.* B U T this Gracefulness shews it self in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and

and Postures, of the body: and consists principally in Beauty, Order, and a kind of Air, or Agreement suitable to every thing we do. 'Tis a hard matter to express This, but it shall suffice, that it may be easily understood. In the Observance of These three Points, we render our selves Acceptable in our Conversation with all People. And so much for This too.

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care *The Seeds of Modesty are in Nature.* in the forming of Mans Body, exposing only Those parts to sight, that are Beautiful, Comely and Agreeable to the Eye: and keeping Those parts conceal'd, and Cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View: and serve us only for Unclean, and Common Necessities. There is no question, but the Modesty of the Mind conforms it self, in this particular, to the exquisite fabrique of the Body: For whatsoever Nature has conceal'd, all men in their right Wits, do naturally keep out of sight, and as private as possible, in compliance with their very Necessities. Now for Those parts of the body which are of most necessary use to man: we neither call the part, nor the use of it, by the proper name: and that which may be honestly done, ( if secretly ) we cannot so much as honestly name. Insomuch, that those things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor so much as mention'd, without Obscenity. Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Cyniques*, or to *The Obscene* the *Old Stoiques*, (which are almost *Cyniques*) humor of that blame and laugh at us, for reckoning those *the Cyniques*, things to be foul, in *Words*: which are not so, in *Truth*. And yet Those things which we all agree to be foul, we can yet call by *Their own names*. As *Theft*, *Cousanage*, *Adultery*, are all dishonest

in the *Deed*: and yet we use the *Words* without *Scruple*. To beget Children is an honest Action: but it wears a Course name. And we find a great deal more to this purpose, against Modesty, in their Disputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatsoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modest man. Nay, in our very Postures, and Gestures: as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying: in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there must a regard be had still to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two things* we should *beware of*. The *One*, not to do any thing that is *Loose, Nice, and Effeminate*: The *Other*, to avoid things that look *Harsh, Rough, and Uncivil*. For why should That which becomes an *Orator*, or a *Comedian*, *misbeseem us*?

*The Modesty of the Romans.* The Discipline of the *Theatre* has a long time had such a regard to *Modesty*; that no man enters upon the Stage, without *Drawers*, lest some part of the Body should come to be discover'd by Chance that ought to be Conceal'd. The *Roman Customs* will not allow Sons, when they are Men grown, so much as to Bath, with their Fathers: Or Sons in Law, with their Wives Parent. In these points of *Virtuous Modesty*, Nature is both our Mistress and our Guide.

*Of Dignity and Grace.* Of *Beauty, or Agreeableness*, there are *Two Kinds*: the *One* is matter of *Gracefulness*; the *Other*, of *Dignity*: and we may call them *Male, and Female*: It is not for a man to be Trickt out with *Fooleries*: or to have any thing that is *Phantastical, or Effeminate*: no, not so much as in his very *Motion, or Gesture*. How are we disgusted many times, at the *Conceited actions of Stage-Players*? and the more *Odious, and affected*

*Affection is Odious.*

feeted Motions of Wrastlers? And yet we Com-mend that which is Natural, and Simple, both in the One, and in the Other. The dignity of the Countenance is Maintain'd by a good Colour: and that Colour by the Exercise of the Body: and to all This we should keep our selves Neat and *Cleanly*: not to the degree of *Niceness*, and *Affectation*, but only so, as not to incur the censure of *Rudeness*, *Sluttiness*, and *Neglect*. And the same Rule we should observe in our *Gar-ments*: In which particular, as well as in other things, a *mediocrity* does best. In our *walking* *A Mean* we must neither march so *Slow*, as if we were *does best*. officiating at a solemnity: nor yet make such *post-hast*, as to run our selves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into disorder: which is a sign of a Light, and Unsteady humor. But we must take more pains, yet, to keep the *Mind* in a temper of Conformity to *Nature*: which we may easily compass, if we can but pre-serve our selves from Falling into *Transports*, and *Festurbations*, and diligently attend to a Con-servation of the *Decorum* here prescribed. The *Motions of the Mind* are *Two-fold*. Some are of <sup>The Moti-</sup> *Thought*, and others of *Appetite*. Those of <sup>ons of the</sup> *Thought* are chiefly employed in the finding out *Thought* of *The Truth*. Those of *Appetite* push a man and *Appe-* forward to the *doing* of something. We must *tire*. be careful therefore, *First*, to apply our *Thoughts* to That which is most *worthy* of them: and, *Se-  
condly*, to keep the *Appetite* in subjection to *Rea-  
son*.

AS to the matter of *Speech*, the Power of it is *Great*; and it is also *Two-fold*. The *One* is a <sup>Of Rheto-</sup> *rieue, and Speech of Contention*; the *Other*, of *Common Ordinary discourse*. The *Former* is for the *Barr*, for *Pub-  
lique* *Discourse*:

lique Assemblies, and for the Senate; the Other, is for Ordinary Conversation, Casual disputes, private meetings of Company or Friends at the Table, The Masters of Rhetorique have given Precepts for the Former, but we have none for the Latter; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. But there's no body that addicts himself That way. For if men would but apply themselves to the Study of it, they would never want Masters to Teach it. And yet we are all of us Mad upon Rhetorique, altho', for what concerns words, and Periods, the same Rules, would serve Both. It is by the help of the Voice, that we discourse; and the Two great advantages of it, are to be Clear, and Sweet; We must stand indebted to Nature for them Both. And yet Exercise, and Practice, will help us in the One: and the Imitation of Smooth and gentle Speakers, may be of use to us in the Other. What was it but This, that gave the Catuli so fair a Reputation, both for Judgment and Language? They were Learned men, 'tis true, and so were Others; but These yet were lookt upon as the great Masters of the Latin Tongue: They had a wonderful Sweetnes of Voice, and their Pronunciation neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable; and without any Affectation: The Tone, without any Force, and neither too faint, nor too shrill. *L. Crassus*, 'tis true, was a word-flowing Speaker, and no less Ingenious: but for well-speaking, the Catuli were no less esteem'd. Now for sharpness, and pleasure of Wit, *Cesar*, the Brother of the Elder *Catulus*, went beyond them all. Insomuch that in his ordinary Discourses, he surpass'd the best Pleaders of his

*The Voice  
should be  
Clear and  
Sweet.*

*Instances of  
Excellent  
Speakers.*

his Time. All these things, severally, must be diligently heeded, to make us understand what it is that may best become us in every thing.

IN *Familiar Speech*, the Followers of *Socrates* <sup>Of Familiars</sup> are most worthy of Imitation. It should be *fair Discourse*, without being too pressing or tedious: <sup>course.</sup> and I would have it *pleasant*, and *entertaining*, in all Cases. Nor would I have any man take possession of a Common Right, in such sort as to Talk all himself, to the Exclusion of Others: but in Discourse, as in Other things, every man to take his Turn. The First thing to be heeded, is the subject Matter of the Discourse. If serious, it must be seriously handled: If Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightness, does well enough with it. But above all things, we must be Careful in the government of our Speech, not to discover any Vice or Defect in our Manners; wherein a man is most liable to betray himself, when he talks spitefully of the Absent; and either in Jest, or in earnest, maliciously exposes them to Contumely, and Re-proach. The Ordinary matter of *Familiar discourse*, <sup>The Subject</sup> is either about *Domestique Affairs*, <sup>the of it.</sup> *Republique*, or matter of *Studies* and *Learning*. If at any time we Pass These Bounds, we must as soon as may be take up again. But be it as it will, it must be thought upon, how far our Discourse may be Grateful to the Company: For we are not Equally pleased with the same <sup>Seasonable</sup> things, at all times. And then, as we begin a <sup>and not Tedious.</sup> discourse upon Reason, we must not continue it beyond Measure. But as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we should keep our selves Clear from Perturbations or violent Motions of the Mind, that rebel <sup>against</sup>

*Nor Passe-* against Reason, so should we in our Speech keep  
a guard upon our selves against Those Intempe-  
rate Motions ; and that we do not lay open our  
Distempers of Anger, Appetite, Laziness, Heart-  
lesness, or the like. We should be very Careful  
also in our Conversation, to possess the Compa-  
ny with an Opinion of the Reverence, and  
Good will that we have for them. There are  
many Occasions wherein we cannot avoid

*Let Reproof* Chiding : and we may be allow'd sometime, a  
be without more than ordinary Contention of Voice ; and a  
Anger. sharper severity of Words : but yet This is not

to be done neither, as if we were Angry ; but  
we are to proceed to this kind of Reproof, a  
we do to *Laming*, and *Scarifying*, rarely, and  
unwillingly ; nor ever at all, but upon *Necessity* ;  
and for want of some other way of Remedy  
but not in Anger still upon any Terms : For it ne-  
ver does any thing either well or wisely : And  
yet it may do well enough to use a Temperate  
and a mild way of Rebuke ; but still accompany'd  
with Gravity, that the reprehension may be ap-  
ply'd without Reproach : It must be also signi-  
fi'd that the Only thing intended by the Reproo-  
was the Amendment of him that suffers it. Nay  
it will become us in our differences, even with  
our greatest Enemies ; in despite of all Indigni-  
ties yet, to preserve a Gravity ; to keep our  
selves free from Passion for whatsoever we do  
in distemper, can neither be well done in it self  
nor approved by those that are Witnesses to the  
doing it. It is a lewd thing likewise for a man  
to talk much of himself : especially with *Thrash*  
to brag of things that are false, and to make  
Sport for the Company.

*Oppression*  
*is Odious.*

BEING now to go through all the Points of Decency and Duty (as That is my design) I shall say something what kind of House I should think fit for a Person of Honor, or a Prince, so as to have it accommodate for use; for That's the Intent of Building it: and there must yet be had a *Of Building and Palaces.* regard to the State and Dignity of the Person that Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius* (the first *Consul* of that *Family*) that he was highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scarus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd for the Enlargement of his Own. The former brought the *Consulship* first into his Family: and the latter (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and Famous person, and the House enlarg'd) brought into it, not only a Repulse, but Misery and Shame. It does well to have the *Dignity* of the Master yet farther adorned by the *House*, but not that *Dignity* to be fetch'd altogether from it. The *House* should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the *House*; and it is in a *House*, as it is in other *Cases*: a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to others. In the *House* of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted, there must great care be taken that it be large enough: but a large *House*, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a Former Posseſſor: for 'tis an Odious Thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occasion) *Here's the Old House,*

*Fit the  
House to  
the Master.*

Keep the  
Expence  
within  
Compass.

House, but where's the Old Master? I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus's Villa's* (his Country-houses:) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must be a *Mean* observ'd in These things, and that Moderation must be transferr'd in all Cafes, to the Use, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

Three  
Rules for  
all Under-  
takings.

IN all Undertakings there are three things to be observ'd. *First*, That we govern our Appetites by *Reason*, which is a sure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Estimate of our Enterprizes and allow Time, and Pains, neither more nor less than the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a Measure, even in those things that are matter of Dignity, and Reputation. We cannot do better, than to observe the *Decorum* already spoken of, without moving one step beyond it. But the First point is the most Excellent of the Three.

The Deco-  
rum of  
Place and  
Time.

Order de-  
p'g'd.

WE come now to the *Order of Things*, and the *Opportunity of Seasons*. Under this Science is comprehended that which the Greeks call *Eυτάξια*, by which we understand the *Harmony of Order*: and not *That Modesty* that regards *Temperament*, and *Measure*. Now to take it as *Modesty*; the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the skill of disposing all our Words, and Actions, in their Proper Place*. So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the same: for they define *Order* to be only the *laying together*

together of things in their due, and fitting places. But they tell us, that the *Place* of *Action* respects the *Opportunity of Time*: Now That seasonable *Time of Action*, the *Greeks* call *Euvaelia*, the *Latines*, *Occasio*. So that *This Modesty*, taken in the sense aforesaid, is the *Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action*. Which is a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are discoursing of *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and *Virtues* of that quality. Wherefore having lodg'd these matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we come now to those *Virtues* that refer to *Modesty*, and the Gaining of a Good opinion, and Esteem in the World: of which we have spoken largely.

IT should be in the *Order of Life*, as in That *Indelicacies* of an *Artificial*, and well govern'd *Discourse*. in respect of Time and Place All the *Parts* of it should be *Equal*, and *Cor-* respondent one to another. Many things do well enough over a Glass of Wine, that would be most ridiculous and shameful, upon a Debate. There should be no fooling in serious matters. It was well said of *Pericles*, at a Council of War, to his *Colleague Sophocles*, that was joyned with him in the Command of the Army. As they were upon a Consultation, there happened to pass by, a very fine Youth, *What a delicate Child is there?* (says *Sophocles*, in the middle of the Debate.) *Brother* ( says *Pericles*) *a Generals Eyes, should be as Temperate as his Fingers.* But if the same thing had been spoken at a publique Spectacle, nothing could have been said against it; so powerful is the Consideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a man were upon a Journey, and going to Plead a *Cause*,

*The Niceties of Conversation.*

*Cause*, no body would blame him for thinking of his Bus'ness, and coming of his Lesson, by the way; but That pensive, musing humor, at a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon, to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the not distinguishing of Times. Now for things which are very gross, as for a man to fall a Singing in a Court of Justice: or to do any thing that is notoriously preposterous, or improper. These are absurdities so well understood by all people, that there needs no Precept, or Caution, in the Case. But there are certain Niceties of Conversation, which are indeed so minute, that *some* make *slight* of them; and *others* do not so much as *perceive* them. And yet these are the Points that require our most diligent consideration. For as it is in Musical Instruments, let them be never so little out of Tune, a skilful Ear presently takes Cheque at it: and that's the Case in the least disconsonancy of Life. Only the Offence is so much the Greater here, by how much the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* is of greater *value*, and *effect*, than a *Consent* of *Sounds*. Wherefore, as there is no Jarr, or Discord in Musique, so small, as to scape the animadversion of a Critical Ear; no less quick and accurate ought we to be in Censuring, and Detecting the Venial Errors of Life: Being led to the knowledge of the greatest matters, even by the smallest. From the Motion of the Eye, from a Smooth or a Contracted Brow; from Sadness, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence; nay from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud speaking, and a thousand such Common Circumstances, we gather the understanding of Humane Duties; and of what Naturally becomes us, and what the Contrary.

N O W

NOW toward the Erecting of a true Judge By Observing others we may Reform our selves. upon things in This Kind, it were not amiss for us to begin our Observations abroad: And then to Avoid, or Correct that in our selves, which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For so it is (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we are much better at spying out our *Neighbours Faults*, than our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the teaching of Children to do better, by shewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to do amiss. In Cases doubtful, and hard to be resolv'd upon, it will behove us to consult men of Learning, and Experience, for direction. Now it is very Natural for men to follow the *Byas* of their proper Inclinations. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *says*; but likewise to what he *Thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them. They take advice upon what's amiss, both with Themselves and their Friends, and are induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the Opinion of *Others*. But for what concerns Customs, and Civil Institutions, there can be no place there for the prescribing, where the matter it self is a Precept. Neither let a man so much deceive himself, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the purpose, or *Aristippus*, in the saying, or doing of any ill thing against Rules of Government, must presently authorise him to the same Licence: For This Liberty, in those Great and Divine men, we are to look upon as a privilege purchas'd Great Virtues are a Privilege to some Mistakes. by

by their Virtues. Now for the *Cyniques* ( those Enemies of *Shame*, and consequently of *Honesty*, and *Virtue* ) there's no enduring of them. To Magistrates, and Persons in Authority, we are to pay all Honor, and Reverence, and so likewise to all those worthy Patriots that have spent their Lives in Great, and Honest Actions ; and in the service of their Country. We owe a respect also to Grey hairs, and even to Those that are but design'd to any Administration in the Government. We must distinguish betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Person, and a Publique. But to sum up all in a word, it is our Duty to Cherish, Maintain, and Preserve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

*A General Duty.*

*of Trade.*  
*which is*  
*either for-*  
*did.*

*And Vo-*  
*luptuary.*

WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided into *Liberal*, ( or in Vulgar English, *Creditable* ) and *Sordid*. There are some *Painful Employments* that carry along with them a *General Odium* ; as that of a *Tax gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first place, I do not like ; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Dealing*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Mean*, and *Ignoble*. The very price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Covenanting for Slavery*. It is also *Course Business*, That of a *Retayler*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels : For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying ; which is a most Unmanly submission. And so for all *Mechaniques*, they are men of *Low*, and *Vulgar* business, and we are not to expect any thing that is *Clear*, and *Generous*, from the Shop. I am likewise with *Terence*, no friend to those Trades that Minister to *Luxury* ; as *Fishermen*, *Butchers*, *Cooks*,

Cooks, Pudding-makers: Fishmongers; nor to the *Voluptuous Arts*, as Perfumers, Dancing-masters, and the whole Mystery of *Gaming*. But for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and Minister *Advantage* in proportion; as *Physique*, *Architecture*; the furnishing of *Good Instructions*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with the Condition of him that uses them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*; That way, is little better than *Pedling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be manag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be esteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, sits down (not satiated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himself, and his Possessions. Of all *Beneficial Industry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a *Man of Honor*, and *Reason*, than the *Culture* and *Emprovement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Caro Major*, we shall refer you thither for your satisfaction.

HERE is enough said already upon the *several Of Two parts of Virtue*, and our Duties arising from thence. It remains now to consider in a Case of *two Duties before us, which to chuse*: (a thing that often happens) and of *Two Honest Propositions*, which is the *Honester*, is the Question: (a Point omitted by *Panaetius*.) For since there is no *Virtue*, but what issues from One of these *four Fountains*, and has a respect either to *Knowledge*,

ledge, Society, Courage, or Moderation; it must necessarily be, that upon a *Complication* of these *Virtues*, there must likewise ensue a *Competition* of *Duties*. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is Naturally more concerned in Offices that relate to the *Community*, than in matters that only affect the *Understanding*; which may be thus made out. Take a wise man, that has the *World at Will*, both for *Fortune* and *Leisure*; let him consider with himself, and contemplate all things whatsoever, that are worth the *Knowing*. He would be yet sick of his *Life*, for all this, if he were to spend his time wholly in *solitude*, and without a *Companion*.

*Wisdom is the principal Virtue.* THE Principal Virtue is (as I have said) That, which the *Greeks* call *οὐρανία* and *We*, *Wisdom*. But their *οὐρανία* (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being the *skill of Judging what we are to do, and what not*: Or of distinguishing betwixt *Good* and *Evil*. Whereas *Wisdom* (which we call the Principal) is the *Knowledge of things Divine and Humane*: wherein is comprehended a certain Correspondence betwixt the *Gods*, and *Men*, and a *Society* among *Themselves*. Now if *This* be the most Eminent *Virtue*, as Certainly it is. So must that likewise be the most Eminent *Duty*, which refers to *Community*. For the *Speculation* and *Perception* of things; is but *lame* and *imperfect*, if it be not follow'd with *Action*; which *Action* is best seen, in providing for the *Common Benefits of Mankind*: And must therefore be reduced to the *Subject of Humane Society*; in preference to the naked *Understanding of things*. And this does every *Good man* find to be *True*, upon his *Own Practice*, and *Observation*. For where's the man, that is so transported

ported with a Thirst of Knowledge, or a desire of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he should be call'd upon the sudden, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger: Where is the Man ( I say ) that in the heat and rapture of his most Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even supposing him to be in his Thoughts already numbring the Stars, and taking measure of the Universe? This gives us to understand, that the Offices of *Justice*, conduced to the Common Utility of Mankind ( than which nothing ought to be dearer to us ) are of so much greater importance, than these of *Study* and *Science*; and never was any man so taken up in his Life, and Application, with the search of Knowledge, as not yet to have an Eye to his Duty to the *Publique*; and to Consult the well-being of Sociable Nature: As we see in the Instance of *Lycias* the *Pythagorean*, to the *Theban Epaminondas*; and *in the* *That of Pluto*, to *Dion of Syracuse*; and divers others that train'd up their Disciples to the Love, Knowledge, and Exercise of Civil Duties. And for the service, ( if any at all ) which I my self have rend'red to the *Republique*, I must ascribe it to my Masters, and to my Books, that instructed, and fitted Me for my Function. For great men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives*; but in their very *Graves* too: Transmitting their Precepts down to after times, for the Use of Posterity. Now to shew how much Their Leisures contributed to our Business: These Eminent men have not lost so much as any one point appertaining to the Laws, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth; but have still, with all their Faculties,

*Justice more valuable than Science.*

applyed the Fruits of their Labors and Studies, to the well-being of the Publique. So that a Copious Eloquence, joyned with Prudence, is much more profitable, than the most refin'd subtilty of Thought, without speaking. For Meditation does only Circulate within it self; Whereas Eloquence works upon Others, and Insinuates it self into the Affections of all that hear it. We must not imagine that Bees gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their Cells, but it is in their Nature to Congregate, and then they work their Combs. And so it is with Men, who are much more Sociable by Nature; when they are gotten together, they Consult their Common business. Now for That Virtue (of Justice) which provides for the Defence, and Conversation of Men in Society; if it be not accompanied with the Understanding of Things, it is but solitary, and Useless. And what is Courage without the softness of Humane Courtesie, and Candor, but a Savage, and Outragious Brutality? From hence we may infer the Excellency of a Practical Justice, in the Ordering of Mankind; above the force, and effect of a Speculative Notion. There are some people that phansie all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say They) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing some Extraordinary way for the furnishing of it; no man, of either Brains, or Virtue, would ever trouble his head about Busines; but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of Wisdom. But This is a mistake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude,

Leagues  
are more  
for Society  
than De-  
fense.

atitude, and wish for a Companion in his very Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond question, the Duties that defend, and support men in Society, are more to be esteem'd than those, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.

IT may be another Question whether *This Justice and Community* which is so Consonant to Nature, be in all Cases to be preferr'd to *Modesty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are some things, partly so foul, and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Posidonius* has made a large Collection of such Cases: But so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do that for the saving of his Country, which his Country it self would rather perish, than any member it self would do? But however, this is the best on't; that it can never be for the Interest of the *publique*, to have a wise man do any such thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of all Duties we are to prefer those that tend toward the Maintaining of Society. For a *Considerate Action* presumes an *Antecedent Cognition*, and *Wisdom*. So that it is more to *Do Considerately*, than to *Think Wisely*. But let This suffice; for the matter is made so plain, that there will be no difficulty to resolve upon *Two Duties in question*, which to *Cause*. But then *Degrees of Duties*. in the Community it self, there are several Degrees of Duties, in subordination one to another. The *First* is what we owe to the Immortal *Gods*; the *Second*, to our *Country*; the *Third* to our *Parents*, and so in Order, successively,

cessively, to Others. Upon a Brief Disquisition of This Matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is honest; and which the *Contrary*: but of *Two honest propositions*; which is the *Honestest*; and then, which is the *Honestest of All*. This (as I have said) was slipt by *Panarius*; but let us now proceed.

### *The End of the First Book,*

**TULLY'S**

## TULLY's OFFICES.

### *The Second B O O K.*

**I**N What manner Duties arise from Virtue, *The Sub-*  
and from every distinct Branch of it, is *jeſt of This*  
sufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in *Book*  
the Former Book. It remains now (my  
Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon some cer-  
tain sorts of Duty, that have a regard to the  
splendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches,  
Power; and a Competent provision of things  
Commodious for the Use of Man. The matter  
in question was, (as I told you) *First* what is  
*Profitable*, and what *not*. *Secondly*, What is  
*more Profitable Comparatively* with that which  
is *Less*: And *Lastly*, What's *most Profitable* of  
All things, *without Comparison*. You have here  
the Subject of This Treatise: But before I enter  
upon this Discourse it self, I must give you a word  
or two of my Purpose and Intention.

THERE are a great many I know that have *The Intro-*  
been excited, by my Books, to the Love of Let-*duction.*  
ters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but  
of Writing also: And yet Philosophy has gotten  
so Ill a Name in the World, (verily with some

good men too) that I am afraid sometimes, of hazzarding my Credit with them; for bestowing so much Time, and Labor upon This Study. But truly, for my Own part, so long as the Management of Publique Affairs past through those hands, to which the Commonwealth had deliver'd up it self: All my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way: But when One man came to Grasp all, and that there was no longer Any place for Authority, or Counsel, ( those Publique-spirited men being gone too, that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my self to an Anxious, and irksom Melancholy; or, on the other, to plunge my self into Pleasures, below the Dignity of my Profession. Oh ! that the Republique might have continu'd still in the Former state, without falling into those hands; that sought not so much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruine of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now standing, I should be doing at this instant just as I did before. First, my Bus'ness would lie more at the Bar, than In my Study; and Secondly, I should now be setting down my Pleadings, as formerly, instead of these Morals: But since the Dissolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies; There's no more Law, or Senate-Imployment. Matters being brought to This Pass, ( and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to sit still, and do nothing.) What could I better do, than to betake my self to my Philosophy; My First Study, and the most Innocent, the Honestest Diversion of my Troubles? It was the Institution of my Youth; and I spent a great deal of Time

Time upon't : Till I came afterward to push my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments ; and then I dedicated my self wholly to the Government : But still reserving Those hours for Philosophy, which I had to spare from the Publique, and my Friends ; and Those very hours were spent in Reading too ; for I had no Leisure to Write. The Calamity of those Times was Extreme : and yet we have drawn This Benefit from it, that we are now at Liberty to commit those things to Letters which our Countrymen were very little acquainted with, tho' in themselves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods !*) *What is more desirable than Wisdom ? more Excellent ; more useful to a man ? or what more worthy of him ?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philosophers*, from the *The Praise* very *Etymon* of the word : For *Philosophy*, by *of Philo-* Interpretation, is only *the Love of Wisdom*. The Ancients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humano ; and of their Causes*. What will any man speak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study ? if he seeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the allaying of his cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others : For it furnishes him, every day, with something or other, toward Attaining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unshaken constancy, be his Bus'ness, it is either to be compassed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing so small, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it : And shall any man be so mad then, as to think that there needs none toward the most Important Acquisition of our Lives ? But if there be any Discipline of Virtue, where shall we look for

for it ; if we depart from This way of finding it out ? This Question, as it falls properly under another *Topique*, So we have handled it in another place ; and more accurately too ; That is to say, in our Exhortations to Philosophy. My present purpose is only to set forth, that having nothing any longer to do, in the Government, I made choice of This Subject for my private Entertainment. But I must expect to be here encounter'd, and that by some of the Learned too, with a charge of contradicting my self.

*An Obje<sup>t</sup> on Answer- ed.* For how does it consist, say they, the entring upon *Disputes*, and delivering *Precepts* of *Duty*,

as things *Certain* ; and yet at the same time, to maintain that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing* ? I should be glad to be a little better understood ; For I am none of those Roving, Wandring heads, that Live, and Live on ; without proposing to themselves any Scope, or Design. How Miserable were That mans mind, or rather his Life, that should be debarr'd the Use of his Reason, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being ? Now for those Points which Others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain* ; it pleases me better, that they should be *distinguished* by calling them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what should hinder me now from Embracing the One, and disallowing the Other ? provided that I keep my self from being either Arrogantly positive ; or Rash and Inconsiderate ; Two qualities that hold no fellowship with Wisdom. But our people, on the Other side, will dispute every thing : For ( say they ) without comparing *Both parts*, how shall any man know which is the *Right* ? But This matter ( I suppose ) is sufficiently clear'd, in our

*Aca-*

*Academical Questions.* Now for You, (my Son) tho' you have been train'd up in the most Ancient, and Noble sort of Philosophy, and under the Institution of *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferior to the most Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to your Fathers Writings, which you will not find differing from your Own. But now to the Point.

WE have, for methods sake, made a Distribution of *Humane Duties* into Five Parts; Two, <sup>upon</sup> the Points of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; Two <sup>the Whole</sup> more, with a respect to the *Commodiousness* of *Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a Fifth, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, than *Another*, when several things, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*. We have already gone through the First Branch of this Division which I must recommend to your particular Attention, and Study. The Point now in *The Word* hand is That which we call *Profitable*? A word, <sup>Profitable</sup> which by the Corruption of *Time*, and *Custom*, <sup>is Corrupt</sup> <sup>ed.</sup> is perverted insensibly to the signification of somewhat that may be separated from *Honesty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*, that were not *Honest*, or any thing *Honest*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the most pernicious consequence imaginable to the Life of man. These Three Points, how confused soever they may appear to be, are yet by Philosophers of great Authority, very Judiciously, and ingeniously distinguished in the Imagination: concluding in This, that *whatsoever is Profitable, is Honest*, <sup>Profitable</sup> *and Honest are* *and whatsoever is Honest, is Profitable*: And consequently that *whatsoever is Either of them, is the Other*. From the not understanding of *this* <sup>Convertible Terms.</sup>

this matter aright, it comes often to pass, that we have a Cunning, Artificial sort of People, in great Admiration: mistaking *Craft*, for *Wisdom*. *Craft mis-taken for Wisdom.* This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following persuasion erected in the stead; that, there is no compassing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent, and Indirect Courses, but only by just Dealings, and honest Counsels.

*Things In-animate.*

*Animate.*

*Unreasonable.*

*Reasonable*

*One man is the greatest Benefit or Mischief to another.*

*The Necessity of Mutual Help and Society.*

NOW the things appertaining to Conveniences for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, and the productions of the *Earth*; or *Animated*, and endu'd with *Impulse*, and *Appetite*; And those again are divided, into *Unreasonable*, and *Reasonable*. Of the former kind, we may reckon *Horses*, *Oxen*, and other sorts of *Cattle*; *Bees*, &c. whose labor contributes in some measure, to the Use and Necessities of Life: and then for *Reasonable*, we may account the *Gods*, and *Men*. By Piety and Holiness, we make our selves acceptable to the *Gods*; but in the next place to the *Gods* themselves, it is in the Power of Men to render themselves most Beneficial to one another. And those things which may be hurtful, or Injurious to us, do fall likewise under the same Division. But in This Case the *Gods* are excepted; as presuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greatest mischief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we spake of, are most of them, the Effects of Humane Industry and Labor. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art, to the very preparing of them; and then there must be Humane Application to the *Using* of them: For neither *Physique*, *Navigation*, *Tillage*, the *Reaping* and *Gathering*.

Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conservation of them, could be effected without the labor of *Man*. There would be no Exporting what we have to spare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How should we fetch up Stones out of the Quarries for our necessary use : or Iron, Brass, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labor, and the Hands of men ? whence came our Houses, at First ; to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold ? or How should we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruines, either by Tempest, Earthquakes, or even by Age it self: If the Obligations and Necessities, of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another ? Our *Aquaducts*, Our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbors, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Industry ? From these Instances ; and a thousand more it appears undeniably that the very advantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally lost to us ; but for That Labor and Endeavor that gives us Profit of them : and to which we are likewise indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beasts themselves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man too : the Application of them to the Use of Mankind ; nor can we at this day either Feed, Reclaim, or Preserve what we have occasion for, or make our Best of their Service, without the Assistance of one another. It is not by the help of Men, that we destroy those Creatures that are hurtful to us ; and take others, that we may be the better for ?

What

What should I speak of those Innumerable Arts, without which we are little better than *Dead, Living?* What *Cure* for the *Sick?* What *delight* for the *Sound?* What *Food, or Clothing,* without the help of *Arts, and Trades,* to supply us? This is it that furnishes, and *Sweetens* *Humane Life:* and in our manner of *Feeding,* and *Covering,* raises us above the *Condition of Beasts.* How should *Cities* have been either *built, or peopled* without *Correspondence, and Commerce?* And hence come *Laws, and Customs,* the *Equal and Universal Bounds of Common Right,* for the *Comfort, and Regulation of our Lives.* And this *Communication* produces *Gentleness of Manners, and Modesty,* and This is it that supports us in a *State of Security,* and furnishes us in all our *Wants,* by the *Intercourse of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchange of Good Offices, and Conveniences.* A great deal of this might have been spar'd; For it is clear to every man, That which *Panatus* has so much *enlarg'd* upon; Which is, that never any Prince or General, either in *War, or in Peace,* atchiev'd any *Great, and Profitable Exploit,* without the *Concurrence of Humane Aid.* He makes his Instances in *Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander;* who could never have done those mighty things (he says) without the help of Others. But there was no necessity of *Witnesses* in so evident a matter. Now as the *Advantages* are very *Great, which we receive by Communication, and Agreement;* So there is no *Mischief* so *detestable,* which one man does not bring upon another. *Dicearchus,* a *Famous, and an Eloquent Peripatetique,* has written an *express Tract of the Destruction of Men.*

*The great  
Mischiefs  
are from  
one man to  
another.*

Men. He sums up all the *Fatalities of Mankind*; as *Inundations, Plagues, Desolations*; the sudden *Incursions of Wild Beasts*, and *Serpents*, which, according to his Relation, have sometimes devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he says) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought *one upon another*. Now since it is without dispute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our selves, it must be the Bus'ness, as it is the Property of Virtue, so to mould and fashion mens minds, as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward the Common good of Mankind. Now for those Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind soever, in the use and ordering of Beasts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather than of the *Mind*. But those Studies, that fit, and dispose us for the Emprovement of our Fortunes, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men: For almost all Virtue moves upon *These of Prudence and Virtue.* Three Points. First, the *Accurate Perception*, of every thing in its *Naked Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correspondence of Circumstances, and the Consequences of things, with the Rise and Causes of them. Secondly, the Moderating of our *Passions*, and *Apperites* (which the Greeks call  $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$  and  $\delta\eta\mu\alpha\delta$ ) and subjecting them to the Government of Reason. The Third, is, the Skill of managing our *Conversation* with so much *Courtesie*, and *Discretion*, as to gain the kindness and assistance of our Acquaintance, toward the furnishing of us with all things that our Nature requires, in competency and plenty; Defending and Protecting us from Violence, revenging our selves

selves upon those that affront us, by inflicting such punishments only as may stand with Humanity, and Justice. As to the Means, and Faculty both of Making Friends, and Keeping them, (which we shall speak of in due Time, and Place) only a word, in passage.

*The Power of Fortune.* W E are all of us sensible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Prosperity*, and *Adversity*:

When she gives us a Fair Gale, our Course is smooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our desired Port. But when the Wind blows strong against us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thousand hazzards. Now there are some Casualties, less frequent than Others: which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. *First*, from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempests*, *Ship-wracks*, *Ruines*, *Conflagrations*; from *Beasts*, as *Stroaks*, *Bitings*, *Trampling under foot*, &c. These are *Accidents*, as I said, that fall not out often. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no less then Three lately:) the Loss of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Person but the other day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*, an a World of *Gallant*, and *Deserving Men*, by *Prescriptions*, *Imprisonments*, and *forced Escapes*, sacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honors*, *Empire*, *Victory*; tho' these things are All look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to pass, without the Interposition of *Labor* and *Industry*. Now since thus it is; let us consider by what fair Means we may make such Interests, and Friendships in the World, as may turn to our Advantage. If you shall think the Discourse over-long; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wish there had been more on't.

W H A T

WHAT good Office soever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, or Credit, he does it either upon the Account of *Good Will*, and *Personal Affection*; or of *Re-Esteem in speet*, as wishing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or else, upon the score of *Trust*, and *Confidence* in him: as one that is able to give us good *Advice*: Or otherwise, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*. Or in hope of a *Reward*: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular Pretenders, to scatter their *Donatives*.) Or Lastly; Many Men are mov'd by the bare Obligations of *Money*, and *Reward*. The *foulest*, and the *basest* of all Considerations, both to Him that entertains the *Mercenary Natures*, Address, and to the Other, that makes it. For Matters are at an Ill pass, when that which should be obtain'd by *Virtue*, is attempted by *Money*. But since there is, many times, a *Necessity of That Provision*, we will give some Directions for the *Using* of it. Only something must be said in the First place, of Those Things that have a nearer Affinity with *Virtue*. There are several Reasons for which One Man puts himself under the *Power*, and *Government* of Another; Either *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency of Endowments*, *Hope of Profit*; *Fear* of being forc'd to't: Or Men are Inveigled by *Liberal Promises*; or in fine, by *Corruption*, and *Reward*; which we find to be a common case in our *Republique*.

THERE is nothing that secures *Power*, and *Greatness*, like *Love*: Nothing that endangers it, like *Fear*. Wherefore *Ennius* says very well, *He that is Fear'd, is Hated*; and they that hate *Hated is a Man*, wish him *Dead*. But when it comes once to a *General Hatred*, there is no force that *is*

is able to encounter it: As we have found by late, and dear Experience, even if the thing had been unknown to us before. And it is not only in the Violent Death of that *Tyrant, Casar*, (whom this Oppressed City was forc'd to bear, for want of Power to make Resistance) but we may read it also in the common fate of our Oppressors; scarce any of them coming to a Natural End. *Fear* is a *False*, and *short-liv'd Security*; but *Love* on the contrary, and *Benevolence*, are Firm, even to the *Death*. In the Case of a *Conquer'd People*, I must confess; if nothing else will keep them in Order; I should advise the same Rigor, and Authority to be exercis'd over them, that a *Master* uses over his *Servants*. But for any Man to pursue the same course in a *Free City*, of making himself *Fear'd*, were a direct Madness. For let the Laws be never so much Oppres'd, by Might, and Faction, and the very Foundations of the Common Liberty shaken, there will be secret contrivances yet, private Consultations, and Inrolling of Parties; that will some time or other put Life again into the Government. For Men are more sensible of the Want of Liberty, than of the Enjoyment of it. Let us therefore imbrace that which most conduces, not only to our *Security*, but also to *Wealth*, and *Power*. The Ready way to the attaining of our Desires, either in *Publique Affairs*, or in *Private*, is, to cast out *Fear*, and to preserve and maintain *Charity*. For whosoever would be *Fear'd*, must necessarily be afraid himself of all that are afraid of him. What shall we think of the condition of the *First Dionysius*, under the horror and the torture of his Terrors? that findg'd his very Beard, because he would not venture his Throat

*The Condition and Fate of Tyrants.*

Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander the Pherean*; that durst not trust himself with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded Slave, with his drawn Sword, for his Conductor; and his Guards sent before him to search all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and Linnen, for conceal'd Poniards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durst venture himself only from his Table, into his Bed-chamber? O miserable wretch, that could put more confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his own *Wife*! But his Fears fell upon him, for she kill'd him with her own Hand, upon the jealousie of a private *Amor*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that can long maintain it self against a pressing and an Universal Fear. And this we may see in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant celebrated for his Cruelty: who was cut off, not like the *Pherean Alexander*, by secret *Treachery*; nor yet like *Our Caesar*, by a particular band of *Conspirators*: But he was put to Death, by the Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*; in the very Market-place. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrthus*? Were not the *Lacedemonians*, for their Iniquity, and Mis-government, almost totally deserted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battle of *Lemstra*? Where they stood looking on, as Idle Spectators, till the *Lacedemonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces. I had rather make use of Foreign Instances, than Domestique upon This Subject: But this however let me say, so long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleness*, more than of *Violence*: so long as they fought only for their

*The End of  
Phalaris.*

*Rome was formerly the Sanctuary of the Oppressed.* Friends, or for Empire; the Issue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worst, no manner of Unnecessary Rigor. The Senate of *Rome* was in those days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppressed Kings, People and Nations: And the Magistrates and Captains of Those Times, had no Other Ambition, no Other Pique of Glory in prospect, than to defend their Provinces, and to support their Associates with Truth and Equity: so that *Rome* did rather affect the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This custom, and Disciplinae began sometimes since by little and little to decline; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct: And in Truth, it would not have lookt well after such Barbarities exercised upon the *Citizens Themselves*, to have kept Touch in any point of Faith and Justice, with their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cause attended with a most Impious, and Shameful *Victory*. The Goods of so many Honest, Worthy, and Eminent Citizens expos'd to Sale in the Market-place: And to heighten the Affront; under the very Title of *Sylla's Booty*. There was another that came after him; whose Cause it self was bad, and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction*; and after infinite Vexations, and Ruines wrought abroad, we liv'd to see the Image of *Marseilles* born in Triumph: *Marseilles*, I say without which, we our selves could never have carry'd a Triumph beyond the *Alps*; and This was the condition too of the lost Empire. I might reckon up Histories without end, of our perfidious dealings with our *Allies*: but This

*The Miseries that befel Rome for Cruelty and Injustice.*

This One shall suffice ; being the basest perhaps that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us is Just : For the Sufference of *many Criminals* made way to the boundless Licence of *This One* ; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And their shall never want either Disposition, or Matter for a Civil War, so long as *Sylla's* Successes shall stand upon Record, for an Encouragement to desperate Wretches to enrich themselves by his Example. Those bloody, and prosperous Usurpations of *Sylla*, which, as they were formerly Acted in the *Dictatorship* of *his near Kinsman*, so they were now renew'd six <sup>Prosperous Cruelties are dangerous Presidents.</sup> and thirty years after, with more Outrage, and horror. He that had been but a *Clerk* under the former *Dictatorship*, was now preferr'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treasurer*. Why should we expect now, ever to be quiet, when Sedition meets with such Rewards ? 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet standing, and in Being, tho' in continual dread of the utmost of Extremities : But the Government it self is absolutely sunk already. And to return to my Subject, all these Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our bus'ness rather to be *Fear'd*, than *Belov'd*. Now if the Power of *Rome* could not support it self under *Tyranny*, and *Oppression* ; how should any particular person expect to escape ? it is sufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much stronger than those of *Fear*. We shall now debate upon the Fairest means of obtaining that Affection, which we so earnestly <sup>How to gain a fair Reputation in the</sup> desire, with Honor and Justice. But we do not all of us stand in need of it alike : so that we must accommodate the Matter to every *World*.

Mans condition, and course of Life ; to see whether it be necessary to procure a General Esteem, or that the kindnes of some few may do the bus'ness. We may however conclude upon this, as the First, and principal point : That we contract Faithful Friendships ; and make acquaintances with those that truly Love, and value us. And this is a *Common Medium*, almost indifferently, betwixt Great, and Small. And a Rule that holds with Both alike ; not as if all men stood equally in need of Glory, and Reputation ; but they are good Helps yet (whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other advantages, and the making of Friendships : which in my *Lelius* I have expressly handled. And I have written two Books also upon the Subject of *Glory* ; which yet I must touch over again, as a thing of great moment in the Conduct even of our most Important affairs.

What is  
perfect  
Glory.

WE are then arrived at the highest pitch of *Glory*, when we have gain'd These Three Points : The *Love*, the *Trust*, and the *Reverence* of the *People* : When we can hear them say ; *That Man is worthy of Honor*. Now to speak Short, and plain ; The Method is well nigh the same of Ingratiating our selves with a *Single Person*, or with the *Multitude*. But yet there is another manner of address also, toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favor.

Bounty and  
Gentleness  
work much  
upon the  
People.

TO speak in Order now, to the three Points before mentioned ; Nothing works so much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberality* or *Bounty*. And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination* : even without the Means of expressing it in *Effects*. For the very *Fame* and

and *Opinion* of a Mans Frankneſs, Bounty, Justice, Faith: and briefly of all those Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetning, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderful power over the hearts of the people. There is ſuch a Charm in That *Gracefulness* and *Decorum*, which we have already Treated of, that the very Nature, and bare Appearance of it does move us ſtrangely. Beside that as it receives its Lustre from the aforesaid Virtues; wherever we find those Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the person that possesses them. These are the most powerful attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives alſo, tho' of leſs moment.

As to the Matter of *Trust* and *Credit*; if we *The Power* can get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Just*, our Bus'ness is done: For we have naturally a confidence in those that we think *Wiser* than our ſelves; In men of *Providencē*, and *Foreſight*, upon whom we may depend for our ſeafonable direction, and advice; as thoſe that in Case of any difficulty, are able to help us out. This is the True, and Profitable *Wifdom*: As to the *Trust* now which we repole in *Just*, *Good*, and *Faithful* Men; we muſt not entertain ſo much as the leaſt ſuspicion in it, of Fraud, or Injury: These being the men into whose hands we do reaſonably commit our Lives, our Children, and our Fortunes. But it is *Justice* yet, that creates the greater Confidence of the Two: For *Justice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wifdom*; but *Wifdom* can do nothing without *Justice*. For take away the Opinion of a mans *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtile* he is, by ſo much is he the

Wisdom  
without  
Justice, is  
Craft.

more *Hateful*, and *Suspected*. *Justice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit*, he pleases; but taking them *Apart*, *Justice*, even without *Wisdom*, may do very much; but *Wisdom*, without *Justice*, is nothing Worth. Let not any man wonder now at my dividing One Virtue from Another, as if it were possible for a man to be *Just*, and not *Prudent*; when the Philosophers are all agreed upon't (and my self too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philosophical Decision; and another thing to make a Discourse in Words accommodated to Vulgar acceptance: And that's my intent in this place, when I say that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wise*. For these are popular Opinions, and must be clothed in Common and popular Terms; which was also *Panatius*'s way of expressing himself. But to resume my purpose.

Admira-  
tion produ-  
ces Esteem.

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory, is This: So to behave our selves that people may hold us in Admiration, and account us worthy of all honor. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that are Great and beyond their Understanding: And so they are in particular Cases too: Where they find more Good in a man than they expected. But where they phansie any Virtues peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extol men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration, despising and vilifying such, on the other side, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Strength, or Courage. But they cannot yet be said to *Despise* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Couzening, Quar-

Quarrelsom Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Dislike*, they do not yet *Contemn*: For those only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy*, *Droning*, *Heedless Life*; without any Benefit, either to Themselves, or Others. The Admirable *Spir- Great Vir-*  
*its are such as have the Repute of a Preemi-*  
*tue produ-*  
*cence in Virtue*; and keep themselves not only *ces great*  
*from doing Mean and Dishonourable things, but*  
*Admirati-*  
*on.*  
*clear even of those Vices, which others cannot*  
*easily resist. For by the Charms of pleasures,*  
*our Minds are Dissolv'd, and withdrawn from*  
*Virtue; and we are as much discomposed and*  
*shaken, on the other hand, with the Burnings,*  
*and Tortures of Pain. It is a prodigious power*  
*that the Consideration of Life and Death, Riches*  
*and Poverty, has over the Weaknes of Flesh and*  
*Blood. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable*  
*must That Virtue be, that takes so absolute a possession of the Soul of man, in the*  
*Contemplation of Great and Honorable things?*  
As in that elevated state of mind, to make him *As Mag-*  
look down upon all the Circumstances of For-*nanimity.*  
tune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*. This Bravery  
of mind never fails of moving great Admiration:  
Especially accompany'd with *Justice*; which  
single Virtue constitutes the very Character of a *Justice.*  
*Good Man*; and makes him wonderful in the Eyes  
of the people; and not without reason neither. For  
no man can be *Just*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pain*,  
*Banishment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before  
*Equity*, the Comforts that stand opposed to these  
Calamities. But the highest Veneration of all  
is paid to him that holds out against *Mony*: And *Contemn;*  
wheresoever they find such a man, they think they *of mony.*  
can never do enough for him. So that by *Justice*  
we

we gain all those points that lead to *Reputation*; As *Benevolence*, by Obliging as many as we can; *Repute* and *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of those things which the greater part of the World pursues with *Greediness* and *Passion*.

*The very  
Opinion of  
Justice  
gives a man*

*Reputation.*

*Justice is  
sacred, even  
among  
Thieves &  
Pirates.*

N O W in my Opinion, there is not any Design or Condition of Life wherein one man does not stand in need of Another; and especially, as to the matter of *Familiar Discourse*, and *Conversation*: which a body shall hardly find to his satisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honest man*. Nay, the very *Opinion of Justice* will stand a man in great stead, even in the strictest solitude, and retirement immaginable; and more perhaps in that State, than any other, as living, in some sort, out of Protection; and more exposed to affronts; which, under the Notion of an impious person, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Bus'nes* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Justice*. Nay so great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and those that support themselves only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet subsist without it. Insomuch that if one Theif does but Steal from another of the same Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith. And if the Captain of the Band shews but any partiality in the Distribution of the Booty, he is at least deserted by his Party, if it does not also cost him his Life; For there is a Discipline even among Pirates themselves: And their Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompos* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bargulus*) that was celebrated for his *Justice* to his Partners, and made

made himself a great Fortune by't; but not so great alone yet as *Viriatus* the Portuguese; of whose Power, and Courage some of our Armies, and Generals felt the sad Effects; till the *Prætor Lalius* ( surnamed the *Wise* ) defeated and scattered his Forces; and finally put such a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for those to do that came after him. How great now must the force of *Justice* be in a *Regular*, and *well order'd Government*, which of it self alone is able to Advance, and Establish even a *Piratick Power*, without any other support?

HERODOTUS tells us that the *Medians Kings* chose their Kings Originally, for the Probity <sup>osen for</sup> of their *Manners*, and in hope of enjoying the <sup>their Vir-</sup> Benefits of *Common Justice*: Which I am per-  
suaded was the End, and practice likewise of our Predecessors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppressed by the Stronger, the people presently betook themselves to one more Excellent than the rest, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the distressed, and to make such Provisions, that common right might be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making of their *Laws*, they had the same Prospect, as in the choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*, and in Truth, it could be no Right, without being so qualifi'd. If under the Administration of some *One man* that was *Just*, and *Good*, they attained that End, they were well contented There to rest: But in Case of failing, there were Laws Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, should still pronounce one and the same sentence. This now is clear, that in all Elections, the poeple have still had a Care to pitch upon him for

for their *Governor*, that was most reverenc'd for his *Justice*: Always provided, that he were a *Man of Prudence* too. And what is it that a Nation would not believe it self able to compass, under so *Auspicious* a *Conduct*? We are therefore obliged to cherish, and to preserve *Justice* by all manner of Means. *First*, for its Own sake, (for otherwise it were not *Justice*;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honor*, and *Glory*. But it is in *Glory*, as it is in *Money*; there must care be taken, both in the *Getting*, of it, and in the *Laying of it out*; for we shall have perpetual Occasions for it; and we must provide for Uses of *Dignity*, as well as those of *Necessity*. It was a great thing said, That of *Socrates*; *The nearest way to Honor* (says he) *is for a Man so to live, that he may be found to be That in Truth, which he would be Thought to be.* 'Tis a gross mistake, for any Man to think of getting a lasting Reputation in the World, by false Appearances of Things. Vain Ostentation, or study'd Fornis of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted in the very *Soul*, and brings forth fruit in our *Actions*. All Disguises pass away, and shed like Flowers; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Instances in abundance; but for Brevity sake, I shall content my self with an Observation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son of *Publius*, shall be famous to Posterity, so long as there shall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it self: But for his *Sons*, they were neither beloved, *Living*, nor Lamented, *Dead*; All good Men agreeing in a Detestation of their Lives; and approving the *Justice* of their Executions: He that would make himself truly Eminent

Eminent for the Love of *Justice*, must discharge the *Duties* of it ; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But how easily soever we may make our selves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point rests in being such Men, as we would be thought to be) it will not be amiss yet to lay down some certain Precepts concerning this Matter. He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumstance to make him taken notice of, either in respect of Fortune, or Family ; as the Son for the purpose of such or such a Father, (which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Case : ) All Mens Eyes are presently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and Manners : He lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made Publique. Now for Those, who by reason of their Obscure Extraction, are in their tender age not so much known in the *World*, I would have them prompted Early to-  
make them-  
ward great Undertakings ; And bend their En-selves so.

deavours directly That way ; which they will do the more Vigorously, in regard that Young Men are so far from being *Envy'd* that they are rather cherished, and Encouraged in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

THE First Lesson that I would give to a *Young man* for his advance of his Credit with the *people* ; should be to addicthimself to the *Study*, and *Practice* of *Arms* ; at least where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues*. Our Predecessors, that were almost Continually in War, made themselves Famous by This Profession : But it has been Your Lot, (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broils of a Divided State, where the One side was

Extremely

*Some are  
Born re-  
markable.*

*Others  
make them-  
selves so.*

*the Use of  
his Arms.*

Extremely Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under Pompey ; even in This very War, you acquitted your self as a *Man at Arms* to all purposes ; an Excellent Horseman, a person of Indefatigable Industry : and all This to the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth it self funk here, and so did your Glory. It is not upon your particular, but a general account, that I have taken up this Discourse : Wherefore I shall now proceed to that which remains.

*The Virtues of the Mind are more Noble than those of the Body.*

A S the Operations of the *Mind*, are in all Cases much more Noble than those of the *Body* ; so are the things that we compass by the Faculties of our *Reason*, and *Understanding*, of much greater value than those things that we bring to pass by *Corporal Force*. The First point that recommends us to a good Esteem in the World, is *Modesty* ; after that, comes *Piety*, and *Reser- and Piety.* verence to our *Parents* ; and then follows a Tenderness of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*.

*It is a good Sign when a man loves good Company.* It is a promising Sign, when a Young Man applies himself to persons of Eminence for Wisdom, Authority, and Good affection to their Country : For it Creates an *Opinion*, and *Expectation* of *Great Matters* from him that proposes to himself the Imitation of *Great Examples*. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rusticus*, that if he liv'd, he would make a *Famous Civilian*, and an *Honest Man*. And what was This grounded upon, but the frequent Conversation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius*? But *Lucius Crassus*, I must confess without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his own Fame, and dignifi'd himself

himself in that Generous and Memorable accusation of his. He was at That time of an age to be rather held by Flatteries and fair Words to his very Exercises, than left to himself. And yet at That age, with *Demosthenes*, the things which he had so happily conceiv'd at Home, he did with no less Honor Execute in Publicke.

WE may divide *Speech* into *Familiar Discourse*, and matter of *Argument*, or *Pleading*. The *Latter* undoubtedly is of the greater Efficacy toward the purchasing of *Glory*: And this is it which we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a certain *Affability*, and *Gentleness* of *Fashion* too, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet extant some Epistles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Cassander*; and of *Antigonus* to *Philip*; (Three persons highly esteemed for their Wisdom:) And they do all of them prescribe the Use of *Courtesie*, and *Fair Language* to him that would Ingratiate himself with the *Multitude*; and only the Caress of some Frank and Familiar *Name*, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow-Souldier*, or *Camarade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himself to the *Souldiery*. But *Eloquence* then it has another kind of force, the Faculty *the Power* of *Haranguing* the *Multitude*; when with *One of it*. *Speech* sometimes a Man gets an *Eternal Fame*. It is wonderful, the Transports that are wrought by the Power of *Eloquence*, and *Wisdom*: And the Veneration that is paid by the Auditory to a person whom they take to be so much Wiser, and Intelligent, than other Mortals. And yet there is a *Mixt way of speaking*, that does wonders too; Especially with a Concurrence in it of both *Weight*

*Weight and Modesty*; which, in a Young Man, makes it still the more admirable. There are many Occasions that require *Eloquence*; and many of our Country-men, (and young Men too) that are highly esteem'd for it, both at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which I look upon to be the most *Effectual*, and *praise worthy*, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar*; and the Subject of it, is either *Accusation*, or *Defence*: the *Latter* is the more *Laudable* of the Two, and yet in many Cases, the *Other* is likewise to be *Approved*. As in what I said just now of *Crassus*; and *Anthony* also, when he was a Young man, did the same thing. *Publius Sulpicius* raised the Glory of his *Eloquence* by his Charge against *C. Norbanus*, a *Seditious* and an *Unprofitable Citizen*. But this is not a thing to be done often; nor, in *Truth*, is it to be done at all, unless on the behalf of the *Government*, as the *Two Luculluses*: or in favour of the *Oppressed*, as I my self did for the *Sicilians*: *Julius Caesar* did as much for the *Sardinians*; and *Fusius* shew'd his Skill too against *Marcus Aquilius*: so that it may be once done, but no more; unless a Man be call'd to it by his Duty to the Commonwealth. And in the very Case of *Publique Enemies*, there may be an excuse for *Frequent Accusations*: But even There too, we must keep within the Bounds of *Moderation*: For it is the part of an *Ill-natur'd Man*, (or I might rather say, *scarce of a Man*) to make a *Trade* of hunting People to death. And beside the danger that it brings upon the *Persecutor*, it is an *Infamous*, and a *Rascally Character*, that of an *Informer*. It was the *Nick-name* that was given to *Marcus Brutus*, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian) and it cast a blemish upon the

*It is a busie Office that of an Informer.*

the very Lustre of his Family. And moreover, be sure to observe this Duty, as Inviolable, and Sacred; *Never to have any thing to do in the Exposing of Innocent Blood.* For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the World can justifie; for what can be so Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reason, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conservation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Destruction of Honest Men? But it does not follow yet, because we must not upon any terms persecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in some Case defend the Wicked, and the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Custom, and to Humanity, so to do. It is the part of the Judge, constantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not so strictly ty'd up to the *Precise Truth*, as not to make his best sometimes of that which carries some near *Resemblance* of it. I should not take This Freedom upon This Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Panatius*, (one of the soundest of the *Stoiques*) to support me in it. The greatest Favour and Renown, is gotten by a *Defensive Eloquence*; and it is so much the Greater, as the Power, and Opposition of the Adversary is the Stronger; and according to the Straits, and Exigencies of the Party relieved. We have brought off many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roscius Amerinus* against the Force and Authority of *L. Sylla* himself: The Oration you know is still Extant.

HAVING already set forth the Methods *Liberality* by which a Young man may advance his *Reputation* in the World; we shall now discourse that matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Two-fold*;

*Have a  
Care of In-  
nocent  
Blood.*

fold; For we oblige those that stand in need of our Help, either by our *Labor*, or by our *Mony*. The *Latter* is the *Easier* way; especially where the *Benefactor* is Master of an *Estate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honorable* and *Splendid*, and better becoming a *Clear* and *Generous* Mind. For tho' the Will may be Frank enough in Both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his *Fortune*, but the other to his *Virtue*. And then by These Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry, and one Bounty is destroy'd by another; and in the very act, we lose the Means of Obliging. But he that is Liberal of his *Pains*, that is to say, of his *Industry*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to assist him toward the doing of more: and then by the Custom and Practice of doing good Offices a man does not only learn the *Way* of *Obliging*, but gets the *A generous Habit* of it. It is a Notable Reprehension, *Reprof.* that of *Philip* in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*, for endeavouring to ingratiate himself with the *Macedonians* by the Force of *Mony*. *What is it*, (with a mischief) says he, *that should make you expect Faith from those People whom you your self have Corrupted?* *Is it that instead of their Prince, you would be lookt upon only as their Servant or Purse-bearer?* An Office so much below the Dignity of a Monarch! Such a Bounty could not have been better exprest, than by calling it a *Corruption*: For the very Receiver is the worse for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epistle was written only to his Son; but it may serve as a Precept to Mankind.

NOW

NOW as there is no question, but that the *Bounty* which consists in *Labor*, and *Industry* is <sup>of Labor</sup> the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extensive*, <sup>is the fairer</sup> because more men are the better for't; we meet <sup>ext of the</sup> *Two*. with several Occasions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exercise also of the *Other* sort of *Bounty*, which in some Cases must be put in Practice, but with Choice, and within Compafs: *Give with* For there are many people that squander away <sup>in compass</sup> their whole Estates upon Inconsiderate Gratiuities. Nor can any thing be more sensles, than for a man to take pains to put himself out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do. And these unadvised Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Overgiving, they fall to the repairing of their *Profusions* upon *Some*, by *Violence* upon *Others*: and the Friends they get by *Giving*, on the *One* side, will not ballance the Enemies they raise, by *taking away* on the *Other*. Wherefore, as I would not lay my Fortune in Common, so neither would I refuse a part of it to my Friend, but still in proportion to the whole. We have a common saying which is grown by use into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembring. For what Mean can be There expected, where by the Custom of *Giving*, and of *Receiving*, both the *Giver* and the *Receiver* come to desire the *same thing*?

OF large *Givers* there are *Two* sorts; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they <sup>Prodigally</sup> lash out upon Treats, Popular Doals, Prizes, <sup>iy.</sup> Publique Sports, and Spectacles, and other Entertainments, which are no sooner past, than forgotten. The *Liberal*, they employ their <sup>Time Liber-</sup> *Expenses* upon Redeceming of Slaves, setting a Friend out <sup>rality.</sup>

of Debt, or helping him out in the bestowing of a Daughter, in the getting of a Fortune, or the Encreasing of it. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theophrastus*'s head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among so many Excellent things, he should be guilty of one so very gross an absurdity. His Discourse runs much upon the Honor, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Presents; and he makes this to be the great advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furnishes a man with means to be at That Expence. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more certain, and Considerable, in the few Instances I have before-mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Aristotle*'s, upon This Subject: *We make nothing (says he) of our Profusions upon the Humoring of the Common People, but to hear of Ten Crowns given in a Siege for a Bottle of Water, what a wonderment is made of it*, as a thing Incredible; till upon second Thoughts, we find the price excus'd by the Necessity? But in the Other Extravagant Spoil, and Excessive Prodigality, where there is neither Honor, nor Necessity consulted in it, and the very pleasure passes with the Spectacle; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but the weakest of the people that stand affected with this Vanity? and no sooner are they satiated, than the Delight it self is forgotten. And who are they that are so much taken

*Fine shews* with these Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves, that is to say, people either of servile Condition, or of servile Minds, scarce any man of Sense, Judgment, or Consideration, approving of them? I know very well that it is an Antient Custom in This City, for the *Ediles* to

to exhibit Shews to the People, upon entring his Office ; and that very good men expect it from him. *F. Crassus the Rich* ( as well in his *Fortune*, as in his *Name* ) made a very *Magnificent Entry* ; and so did *L. Crassus*, after him ; tho' joyned with *Q. Marius* too, a man of singular *Moderation*. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*, with a great many more ; as *Lucullus*, *Hortensius*, *Silanus* ; which were all out done by *P. Lentulus*, in my *Consulship*, and *Scaurus* Emulated him. But the most *Pompous*, and *Expensive Solemnity* of all, was that of our *Friend Pompey*, in his *Second Consulship* ; This is enough to shew you my opinion in all these Cases. But yet however, we must have a Care on the other hand, not to incur a suspicion of *Avarice*. *Mamercus*, ( a very Rich man ) was repulsed *In what* when he stood for *Consul*, because he had refused *C. f. I. P. r.* the Charge of *Ædile*. Wherefore, if the people *fus. m. y. be allw. d.* call for it, on the One side, and wise men be not against it, ( tho' they do not desire it ) on the Other ; the thing ought to be done : But according to our Abilities, as it has been my own Case : or otherwise, where we may reap some advantage by it, that will more than Countervail the Charge. As it turn'd much to the reputation of *Orestes*, not long since, the publique Dinners that he expos'd in the Streets, to the Multitude, under Colour of Dedicating his Tenth to *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for supplying the people in a great Scarcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Bushel : when by so doing, he delivered himself from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude ; and ( being *Ædile* too ) by a Liberality, that was neither Dishonorable nor Burthensome.

*But still  
within  
Bounds.*

But it was a most Glorious, and Memorable action my Friend *Milo*'s engaging of the *Sword-players* for the *Publique safety*, which in my own particular I was not a little concern'd in: and by means whereof, all the attempts and outrages of *Cladius* were Crusht and disappointed. So that Bounties should be grounded either upon Necessity or Profit; and even in These Cases too the best Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a person of great Worth and Understanding) was wont to make it his Vaunt, that it never cost him one peny of Money to the people, the obtaining of all the Favours that were ever conferr'd upon him. *Cotta* said the same thing, and without Vanity, so might we our selves too, in some degree; for the expence of my *Ædileship* was so small, that it could not signifie any thing toward the gaining of those Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon me as by a Common Consent; and That in my own year too: which is more than any of those before-named, can boast of. I take that Mony to be best laid out which is employ'd upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquaducts, and other works, for the good of the Publique. Those Bounties give more of present satisfaction, I must confess, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may say; but the Other will find better acceptation with Posterity: As for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I shall speak the more Favourably of them, for *Pompey*'s sake: But Learned men, I perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panatium*, for one, whom in this Discourse I have rather Follow'd, than Interpreted: and then there is *Phalcreus Demetrius*, who was very sharp upon the famous

mous *Pericles*, for his Extravagant Profusion upon the Porch of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Discourse of a *Commonwealth*. Now for a Conclusion; This kind of *Liberality*, upon the whole matter, is stark naught; and yet by the Circumstances of Times, and the like, it may be render'd Necessary; But in all Cases there must be observ'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion*.

AS to the Other sort of a *Bounty* that arises *Of Privy* from *Liberality*, we must accommodate our <sup>ter Liber</sup> selves to the Occasion, and in Differing Cases *rality*. use Differing Methods. One man lies under the pinch of a pressing Calamity: another man's Condition is not much amiss perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My *How to be-* Charity binds me in the First place, to assist the *Charity* *to them*. Miserable Person; at least if he did not make himself so by his own fault. And yet I would not be so hard neither as not to help him also, that is Well already, in order to his Farther advantage: but this is a point that requires singular Care and Judgment in the Choice. It was well said of *Ennius*, *A Benefit misplaced turns to a Crime*. But in that which is bestow'd upon a good and a Grateful man, there's, First, the Conscientious Comfort of the Virtue it self; and then the Satisfaction that it brings us in other respects: For the most acceptable thing in the World is a discreet *Liberality*, and the Reputation of it must needs be great, when the Goodnes of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind.

WE must have regard also to the Benefit, *A Regard* as well as to the person; and that it may be of <sup>to the Bene-</sup> such a Quality as to Descend in the memory of it <sup>fit as well</sup> *as to the* <sup>as to the</sup> *Person*.

to the Children and Posterity of the person Obliged, that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Detestation for it, and every man looks upon himself as Injur'd in the discouragement of Bounty: And the Guilty in this Case, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Beside the Benefit that this piety of Disposition brings to the Publique, in the Enriching of the poor, and the Redeeming of Captives, which, as *Crassus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the Work of the Senate it self. And is not this now a Nobler way of Obliging than the Casting of our mony away upon *Pageantries*, and *Popular Spectacles*? This is an Expence for a man of Sense, and Honor; whereas the other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the phanies of the Common people.

*Our Obligations should be Frank.*

AS we are to Oblige with Frankness; so we are not to Exact any thing again with Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, selling, letting, hiring, &c. to behave our selves toward our Neighbor and acquaintance, with Candor, and Respect: tho' to the prejudice sometime of our Own Right: avoiding Law-suits as much as may be, and a little more perhaps than needs; for it is not only Generous, but profitable too, for a man in some Cases to remit somewhat of the straitness of his just due: but in so doing he must have an Eye yet to his Family, or Estate, which it were Impious not to defend: but in such a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harshness, or Greedines in the Dispute. For a man cannot employ his Mony better, than to do others good with it, with a regard still to the maintaining of his Own.

IT is with great Reason that *Theophrastus* recommends *Hospitality*: for in my Opinion it is a very Honorable fashion for the Houses of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illustrious Guests: and it gives no small Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That sort of Beneficence in This City. But then for those that would make an Honest Interest abroad in the World, it is a very great advantage, the Favour, and Recommendation which they get among Foreign Nations through the friendship of those they meet with upon This Occasion. *Theophrastus* writing of the Hospitality of *Timon of Athens*, tells us that he gave strict Order to his Servants in the Country that his House should be still Open, to whatever *Lacian* (or *Townsman* of his) past that way.

NOW for Those Obligations that are only *Obligations* the Effect of *Care*, and *Industry*, without *money*, of *Care* they are both *Publique*, and *Private*: Extending <sup>and indu-</sup> from the *Commonwealth* it self, to every *Par-*  
*ticuliar Member of it*: For what readier way can there be in This World to Eminent *Wealth*, and *Preferment*, than the Skill of Directing, and Advising in Difficulties of *Law*: together with the Power of Obliging so many upon That Score? Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of *The Repu-*  
*our Fore-fathers*, the Knowledge, and Interpretation, as well as the Constitution of the *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Esteem: and reserved *tation of*  
*until this Confusion of Affairs*) as a Matter *the Civil*  
*Sacred*, in the Possession of Men of Highest Authority and Wisdom. But the Glory of This Science, as Well as That of our Ancient Nobility and Virtue, is now quite Extinct: and to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a person not *in-*

inferior in *Honor* to all that went before him, but in *Letters* much their Superior. So that This is a Study generally acceptable, beside that it puts us in the way of doing a thousand Good Turns.

*Some Affinity betwixt a Civilian and an Orator.*  
*The Force of Eloquence.*

AND there is some Affinity or Resemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and that of an *Orator*: Only the *Latter* has more in it of *Vigor*, *Agreeableness*, and *Elevation of Spirit*. There is not any thing that moves the Soul, like *Eloquence*. It fills the Hearers with *Admiration*: it gives *Hope* to the *Miserable*: it creates as many *Friendships* as there are Persons that it Defends, and our Predecessors accounted of it as the most Honorable of all Professions. It is a General and Publique Blessing, when men of *Eloquence*, and *Industry*, (after the Example of our Fore-fathers) undertake the Patronage of so many as stand in need of it, without either *Grudging* or *Reward*. I should take Occasion here, over and over to Lament the Discontinuance, if not the utter Loss and Destruction of this Divine Faculty, if it were not for appearing over much concerned in my own Interest and Case. And yet we cannot but take notice how many brave *Orators* we have lost; how few we have any hope of, among those that are growing up; and the smaller number yet, of those that are left; tho' 'tis true that we have men of *Boldness* without *Knowledge* in Abundance. Now since we cannot be all of us either *Orators*, or *Lawyers*, (having indeed but few great men in either Faculty) we may do a world of good services yet, by Recommending, or Solliciting on the Behalf of Petitioners, or Clients; and by Employing our Interests either with the Bench, or with the *Counsel*, for their Behoof. Whosoever

*The Decay of Orators.*

ever takes This Course, shall be sure to Oblige a great many men, and consequently by a great many to be well spoken of. But then we must have a Care ( which every man will look to in his Own Discretion ) that while we would Oblige one man, we do not Offend another. For it happens many times that either through Heedlessness, we disoblige some body that does not deserve it, or out of Rashness provoke some Other body that may make us rue it. In which Case, we ought to excuse our selves, as well as we can, for the least offence given to any man, even where we never intended it ; by shewing him the Inevitable Necessity that forc'd us upon it, and the desire we have, upon any favourable Occasion, to make him some favourable amends.

IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have usually a regard either to peoples *Manners* or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common saying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the Man only that we consider, and not the In Benefits Estate.* This is a handsome flourish, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly bestow his Time and his Pains, upon the service of a powerful, and a Wealthy person, than in the support and protection of the best Poor man that ever was born ? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our services where we may reasonably hope for the speediest, and the most Certain Return. And This proceeds from a Mistaken Estimate of the Nature of Things. For what if *That Honest Poor man* cannot requite us in *Kind*, He may do it yet in *Thankfulness of Heart*, and in *Just Acknowledgments* ? It was well

consider the  
Man, not  
the For-  
tune.

well enough said, (whoever said it) *He that Has my Mony, has not Restor'd it; and he that has Restor'd it, Has it no longer. But in the Case of Good Will, he that has Paid it Has it The Pride still; And he that Has it still, has Paid it.* Now and *Vanity* for those men that value themselves upon their *of Great Men.* Titles, or Possessions, and have the World at Will; they are so far from accounting themselves under any Obligation for a Benefit Received, that they look upon the very acceptance of it, (let it be never so great) as an Obligation laid upon the other side. Nay they will not stick to be Suspicious, and Jealous of it, as a Prologue to some Petition, or farther Design. But to tell them, *that ever they stood in need of, or were Beholden to any man,* is to strike them to the very Heart. Whereas the *Poor man,* that takes all Friendly Offices to himself, *The Poor mans Gratitude.* without any respect to his Condition; *This Poor man* (I say) makes it his Bus'ness, not only to express his Gratitude to those that have already obliged him, but to ingratiate himself likewise to those which he hopes hereafter may be kind to him; as having Occasion for many Friends. And if it be his Good Hap to render his Patron a profitable service, his Humility makes the Value of it to be Less than it is, rather than Greater. And it is farther to be Observed, that upon the Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledgment terminates either in Himself alone, or, at the Utmost, in the Effect it may have upon his Children, and Family. But in the protection of a poor Creature, that is yet Virtuous, and Modest, a man makes to himself an interest in all the poor honest men in Nature;

ture ; which is no Inconsiderable party out of the Body of the Common people. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the *Good*, than the *Fortunate*. We should do our best however to leave no sort of men unsatisfied ; and if This point should come in question, let *Themis* — *A Wife sayeth* — decide the Controversie. It was put to *him* *Whether a man should rather bestow his Daughter upon a Poor man that were Honest, or upon a man that had More Wealth, but Less Integrity.* And his Answer was This ; *I had rather bestow her upon a Man that wants Mony than upon Mony that wants a Man.* But our Minds and Manners are now-adays corrupted and depraved with the Love of *Mony* : and yet, as to the matter of *Superfluity*, what is any man the *Better for't*? it may be of some use perhaps to him that has it; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Cases* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it serves only to make a man the more powerful, but not one jot the more Honest. Not that I would serve a good man ever the less, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would still serve him for his *Virtue*, and not because of his *Wealth* : and govern my self by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with one Precept more I shall Conclude : We must never Employ our *Fa-  
culties and Endeavours, either to uphold Iniquity, the Foundation of a  
Justice is  
or to overthrow Justice.* For *Justice is the Foundation of a  
Lasting  
Fame, and there can be no-  
thing Commendable without it.*

HAVING already treated of Benefits with *of Publick  
a regard to Particular Persons* ; we shall now *Bounties.*  
Dif-

Discourse of That sort of Bounty, which respects the *Universality* of the Commonwealth: Of This Bounty there are Two Kinds. The *One* concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community*; the *Other*, the *Particular Members* of it: And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both: or however, to take Care of particulars: but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it; or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus's Excessive Largeſſ of Corn* to the people, was *Miſchievous*; for it exhausted the *Treasury*; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People*; and consequently both the Republique it self, and the Citizens were the Better for't.

*The Propriety of Particulars must be protected.*

I T should be the Principal Care of him that has the Administration of Publique Affairs, to see that every Individual be protected in his Propriety; and that private men may not be dispossess'd of their Rights and Estates, under the pretext of a Publique Good. It was a pestilent proposition, That of *Philip's*, in his *Tribuneship*, about *an Equal Partition of Lands*; But then it was a great Instance of his Modesty, the letting of it fall so easily again. He did many Ill things, to curry favor with the People; and he dropt one lewd speech too, *that there were not Two thousand men of Estates in the whole City*. What a desperate Hint was That toward the bringing of all things to a Level, and all Conditions of men to a Parity: One of the greatest Plagues that can befall a State? For it was the main

*The danger of Leveling Principles.*

main End of the Founding and Establishing of Cities and publique bodies, that particulars might be secur'd in their Possessions, and every man safe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though men Associate by an Impulse of Nature, it was Desire and Hope yet of keeping what they had gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the charging of the people with Extraordinary *No Extra- Taxes: which happened either through the Low- ordinary Taxes.* Necessity of the Treasury, or the Expence and Burthen of a Continual War. This is a Course by all means possible to be avoided, by laying in of Provisions beforehand; but if ever any Commonwealth should fall under This Necessity (for I had rather foretel it of any Other, than Ours; as I speak This only by way of General Discourse) it will be highly necessary that the people be punctually enformed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to subist, but by complying with such a Necessity. It behoves all Governors to furnish the Publique Stores with Necessaries, before the Danger presses them; in what Proportion and of what Kind, is a matter so well known, that it is sufficient the bare mention of the thing thus by the By.

BUT above all things, let all men in Publique Administration keep themselves clear from *Corrupt Magi- the least suspition of Avarice. I would to the strates are Heavens (says C. Pontius the Samnite) that the Bane of Fortune had reserved me for another Age, and any Go- kept me from coming into the World, till the Ro- mans had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I should quickly have put an end to their Empire.* Truly

Truly he must have staid a good while then ; for 'tis but of late that *Rome* has been tainted with This Evil. Now if *Pontius* was a man of such a Resolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The first Law that ever we had against the *Corruption of Magistrates*, is not as yet of *a hundred and ten years standing* ; and that was *Piso's*. But we have had a great many Others since That time ; and every one still more severe than the Other. How many Criminals have we had ? How many Condemned ? What a Confusion upon the *Social War in Italy* ? And that War excited too merely by the *Guilty*, to save themselves from *Punishment* ? There was no longer any Course of Law, or Justice ; but our Friends and Allies, lay expos'd to Seisure and Pillage, without Relief : And if we are not totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakness of Others, than from our own Virtue.

*PANÆTIUS* extols *Africanus* for his *Abstinence* in the matter of *Mony* : And why *Africanus* not ? But still he might have found greater Virtues in him than That : For That Abstinence of his was not the Virtue of the *Man* only, but of the *Times*. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Persus*, made himself Master of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite value ; and brought so much Mony into the Publique Treasury, that One Captains Booty deliver'd the People from any farther need of Taxes. And This he did without any other Advantage to his Family, than the Honorable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Action. *Africanus the Younger* ( in imitation of his Father ) got as little

little by the Destruction of *Carthage*; and his *Fellow-Censor*, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the Magnificent City of *Corinth*. But his Bus'ness was rather the Ornament, and Lustre of his *Country*, than That of his *House*. Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left.

THE RE is not certainly a more Detestable Vice (especially in Princes, and Publique Magistrates) than Covetousness: And it is not only a Mean thing, but an Impious, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That which the *Pythian Oracle* deliver'd in the Case of *Sparta*, looks like a Prediction, not only Applicable to the *Lacedemonians*, but to all Opulent Nations also whatsoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Destroy That Commonwealth. There is no surer way in Nature for men in Power to gain upon the affections of the multitude, than by *Frugality* and *Moderation*. But yet when out of an affectation of Popularity they come to propound such a *Levelling Division of Lands* as is above-mentioned; and either to Force the Right Owners out of their possessions, or to the remitting of Just Debts, these people shake the very Foundations of Government; In the first place Dissolving the Bonds of Concord and Agreement, which can never consist with This way of taking Monys from some, and Discharging others. And what's become of common Equity then, when no Man is left the Master of his own? For it is a Priviledge Essential to a Community,

I

that

*Avarice a  
Detestable  
Vice.*

*The Power  
of Frugality  
in Pub-  
lique Ad-  
ministra-  
tions.*

that it be Free, and every Man secur'd in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Interest and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine: for it makes the Loser still your Enemy; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither: Or at best, so coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to: Especially dissembling the Inward satisfaction of being forgiven a Debt; for fear of being thought unable to pay it. Whereas the Injur'd party will never forget it, but carry the purpose of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there should be more to whom we Unjustly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjustly take away? This does not mend the matter one jot: for we are not to judge in This

*The danger of Injustly giving Properties.* case by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never had an Estate, to dispossess another of an Estate that has been many Years (nay Ages perhaps) in the Possession of it, himself and Family; and that he that hath an Estate, should have it taken from him? It was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedemonians* Banish'd *Lysander*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all President of former times. And there follow'd such Broils upon it, that there best men were Banish'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place of an *Aristocracy*, even to the utter dissolution of one of the best Constituted Republiques upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither; but the Contagion of Those Tumults spread it self so far, that the rest of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd by That Example. What shall we say of our *Gracchi*? (the

( the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Africanus* ) It was this very point of Controversie about *Lands*, that destroy'd them too. But on the contrary, how much Honor has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himself, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon*? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Possession of *Usurpers*, when he recover'd it by a surprize from *Argos*, suppress'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Restor'd six hundred of the Wealthiest Citizens that had been Banish'd, and set the City it self at Liberty. But finding great difficulty at last how to accommodate the bus'ness of *Lands* and possessions ; and considering that it would be hard on the One side for those that he restor'd to their Town to live still in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Estates ; and little Better, on the Other side, to break in upon, and take away Possessions of Fifty Years standing ; wherein so many several Interests were concern'd, by Purchases, Portions, Settlements, and the like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners : He concluded it Unreasonable either to take from the One what they were posses'd of, or not to satisfie the Other, in some degree, for their Just Pretensions. Wherefore he be-thought himself, and resolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria*; giving Orders that all things should continue in the same state he left them, until his Return : So that he presently posted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolemy the Second King of Alexandria*; He had no sooner informed that Generous Prince of his Bus'nes, with the Design he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country ; but without any diffi-

*A Generous  
account of  
Aratus.*

ty, this Illustrious person prevail'd upon him for a large Sum of mony. This Treasure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal persons of that place, to advise with upon This Affair, and to take a strict account, as well of those that were possess'd of Other Mens Estates, as of those that had Lost their Own. The matter was so hand-led, that upon a reasonable Estimate of the Lands, some were perswaded to content themselves with the value in Mony, and to yield the Land; and Others chose rather to take Mony for their Land, than to contest for the Recove-  
ry of it. So that in the Conclusion, the Contro-  
versie was Compounded; and Both parts abun-  
dantly satisfi'd with the Accord. What Pity was  
it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of  
*Rome*! This is the right way of proceeding in  
such Cases; without exposing the persons and  
goods of Citizens (as it has been Twice in our  
days) to *Froscriptions*, and *Outcries*. This  
*Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wise man, con-  
sulted the Common welfare: And it is the high-  
est point of a Good, and a prudent Magistrate,  
to Maintain the Properties of the people, and  
not to Invade them; but keeping all within the  
Bounds of common equity. Why should any  
Man dwell *Gratis* in my house? as if I were to  
purchase, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for  
Another (in despite of my heart) to reap the  
Fruits of my Labor, and Expence? For This  
is the Case in taking away from me That which is  
my Own, and giving to another That which  
does not Belong to him. And what's the End of  
these *Letters of Protection*, (if I may so call  
them)

them) but that you shall buy Land with my Money; you keep the Land, and I lose my Money?

IT is a matter therefore of great Moment, No Debts to be permitted, that may endanger the Publique. that no Debts be permitted, which may endanger the publique. And This may be several ways prevented, if such a Course be taken, that Prodigals and Debtors may not raise their Fortunes upon Defrauding their Creditors; the One losing their Own, and the other getting what belongs to another Man. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth like Faith, and Credit: which can never be expected where people do not lie under a Necessity of Paying their due Debts; a thing which was never so violently prest, as when I was Consul: All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it: And yet I resisted all Motions tending That way, to the very Rooting of This Evil out of the Commonwealth. There was never more mony stirring, nor ever was there surer, or better Payment: For where the Hope of Deceiving is cut off, Men must necessarily keep Touch. It is true, that *Cæsar*, ( who was in Those days subdu'd, tho' now a Conqueror ) that *Cæsar*, I say, did put his former purposes in Execution, even when he had no need so to do: His very Appetite being so Vicious, that he took pleasure in the Evil it self, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good Patriots to keep themselves clear of this same perverse sort of Liberality, that takes from one, and gives to another: and in the first place, to provide that all men may be equally supported in the Enjoyment of their own, by Law, and Common Justice. And that the poor, and simple may not be Cir-

invented, or Oppres'd by Power, nor the Wealthy obstructed in the holding or receiving of their Dues, by the Envy and Malignity of the people. And moreover, they should by all means endeavour both in War, and Peace to advance the Republique, in Empire, Possessions and Revenue: These are the proper Offices and Achievements of Great men, and this was the Study, and the Exercise of our Forefathers. Those that addict themselves to these Duties, gain great Glory and Good will to their Own particulars, beside the profit that they bring to the Publique. *Antipater the Tyrian* ( and a Stoique ) that lately deceased at *Athens*, charges *Panactius* with leaving out Two Branches touching Health, and Money in these Precepts concerning Benefits. But I suppose that they were rather pass'd over by That famous Philosopher, as things well enough understood, and needless to be farther inculcated, how advantageous soever.

*A Caution  
in matter  
of Health  
and Estate.* IT is a good means of preserving *Health*, for every man to understand his own Constitution; and to observe what agrees with him, and what not. To live Temperately in all respects, as well in our Diet, and the care of our Bodies, as in our Pleasures: Using the common helps of *Physique* also, in case of need. In the gathering of an Estate, we must do nothing but what is warrantable, and honest: And when it is fairly gotten, it may be preserv'd, and improv'd by Parsimony, and caution. This Point is excellently well handled by *Xenophon* ( the *Socratist* ) in his *OEconomiques*; which I my self, at about your Age turned out of *Greek* into *Latin*.

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THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things in Comparison, (which was the Fourth Consideration, omitted by *Panctius*) is a case which very often happens: For sometimes *Bodily Goods* fall into Competition with the Goods of *Fortune*: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Those of the *Body*: And sometime again, One of either of them is compar'd with Another of the same Kind. As in the *First* instance, I had rather have *Health*, than *Mony*: In the *Second*, I had rather have a *Great Estate*, than a *Robust strength of Body*. And so forward: I had rather enjoy *Health*, than *Pleasure*; I had rather be *Strong*, than *Nimble*. And then in the Collation of *External things*, I had rather have *Honor*, than *Wealth*: and a *Fortune in the City*, rather than in the *Country*. The Comparison that we find in the *Elder Cato*, was of This Quality. The Question was put to him, What he look't upon as the greatest convenience in a *Country Life*? His answer was, in the *First place*, *Good Pasturage*. What next then? *Pasturage* that was *Indifferently Good*. And what then? *Pasturage* still, tho' a *Degree worse* than the Other. And what again? *Tillage*. What do you think of *Usury*? (says the *Enquirer*.) And what do you think of *Murther*? (says *Cato*.) By This and abundantly more, we cannot but understand that Things Profitable came often in Competition: And that This Fourth enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting, Disposing, or Using of monys, it is a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philosopher; and better understood by the Good Men upon the *Bourse*, than by the Learned Men in the

*Schools.* It is a thing needful however to be known, as appertaining to the Bus'ness of *Profit* : of which having discoursed sufficiently in This Book, we shall now proceed to what remains.

*The End of the Second Book.*

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*TULLY's*

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## TULLY's OFFICES.

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### *The Third B O O K.*

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**I**T was the saying (my Son *Marcus*) of *A famous Scipio Africanus the Elder*, (as we have it <sup>saying of</sup> from *Cato*, his Cotemporary) that *he Scipio Africanus*, *was never Less Idle, or Alone, than when he most appeared so to be.* It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Busines; his Solitudes, in Discourses to himself, without any Loss of Time: and without need some whiles of any other Company. Insomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Listless, and Heavy, did even set an Edge upon him: That is to say, *Solitude*, and *Leisure*. Now tho' I cannot come up to the Imitation of that Illustrious person, I am not much behind him yet in my *Good Will* (I would I could say as much of my self, as he does in *Effect.*) For since I have been driven by the force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Bus'ness of the Bar; I have apply'd my self to a Life of Leisure too: upon That very Consideration, <sup>Cicero's Retreat.</sup> quitting

quitting the Town, and betaking my self to the Privacy and Solitude of a Country Life. Not that I compare either this Leisure, or solitude with that of *Africanus*. For his was only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himself some Respite from the Honorable Charges he sustained in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Recess, as a man sometimes puts into a Port: But my Leisures proceeded not from a desire of Respite, but from want of Employment. For since the Dissolution of the Senate, what is there to be done, either in the Palace, or in the Hall, that is worthy of us? The world swarms every where with Criminals; and after a life spent in so Eminent a Post, and in the Open View of the people, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, and live (in a manner) quite alone to avoid the very sight of them. I have heard Wise men say that we are not only to chuse the least of necessary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themselves to extract somewhat of *Good*. I shall therefore make the best of my Repose, tho' not such perhaps as he has deserv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed so much to Their Quiet. And tho' this be a Solitude wholly of Necessity, not Choice; I would not yet have it absolutely Fruitless. *Africanus* (I must confess) gained to himself a Fairer Reputation, but we have no Monuments of his Thoughts, committed to Writing: No Remains of his Leisures, and Solitude that we find extant. But we may conclude however, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, from his Glorious Actions, which were only the Product of Deliberation and Thought. But Alas! I have not that strength of Mind to

Cicero  
compares  
himself  
with Afri-  
canus.

think

Think away my Solitudes, and supply the want of Company with bare Meditation. So that My whole Diversion is to pass away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that way now, in a little while, since the overturning of the Government, than I did in many years before, while it was in a flourishing Estate.

NOW (my Son) tho' Philosophy be Profitable and Fruitful from one end of it to the other, without any Waste, or Desert: there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields greater advantage, and benefit, than that part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus*'s care in the inculcating of this Lesson daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiss yet to be often minded of so necessary a point; and (which way soever you turn your self) to have this voice still sounding in your Ear, even, if it were possible, without hearing any thing else. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himself an Honest Course of Life; and it is your Interest perhaps as much as any bodies; because the world expects it from you, that you should succeed to the Industry, the Honors, and (if I may so say) in some Measure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to answer for upon the score of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Dishonorable than after so ample a Commission granted you to the famous Staple of the whole World, for *Good Manners* and *Letters*, to come back empty; to the Dispragement both of the Master, and the City?

Where-

Wherefore you must Labor with all the Faculties of your Soul, and Body, to make good This expectation : ( if I may call that a Labor, which is so great Pleasure ) and let it never be said that after all other supplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your self : But let this suffice : having written so much, and so often to you already, upon This Subject. We shall now return to the remaining part of the Division propounded.

Panætius  
of Civil  
Duties.

*PANÆTIUS* is the man, without Dispute, that hasthe most accurately handled This question : and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with some amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propositions* that men are wont to deliberate and advise upon, in the Case of *Duty*. *First* whether the matter in question be *Honest*, or *Dishonest*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honest*, and the *Other profitable*; how to distinguish. He has written Three Books upon the Two former Heads ; and promised a Discourse upon the Third ; but he has not been so good as his word : which I do the more wonder at, because I find in his Scholar *Posidonius*, that he liv'd Thirty years after the Publishing of these Books. And I am in some Admiration too, that *Posidonius*, in his Commentaries, should pass the matter over so lightly ; especially making this Remarque upon it, that of the whole Body of Philosophy, This is the most necessary part. There are some that will not have This to be an *Oversight* in *Panætius*; but a point left out upon Consideration ; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reason

Reason they give, is This. *Honest*, and *Profitable* (they say) are *Convertible Terms*; and not to be so much as Imagined in Opposition. From hence there may arise another Question, whether the Third Branch of *Panatius*'s Division should not have been absolutely rejected, without any mention of it at all. But it is Certain however, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall. He that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes through with Two parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third: And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the Authority of *Posidonius* himself to Witness as much; writing in a certain Epistle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panatius*) was wont to say. As there was never any Painter (says he) that durst venture upon Finishing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (such was the Delicacy of the Face, that there were no hopes of matching it with a suitable Body) so in the Case of *Panatius*, the Excellency of those things which he did perfect, was so Transcendent, that no man after him durst ever attempt the supplying of what he either Omitted, or left Imperfect. So that of *Panatius*'s Intention there can be no longer any doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Division, may perhaps bear a dispute: For taking it either according to the *Stoiques*, that nothing can be *Good* but that which is *Honest*; or with the *Peripatetiques*, that *Honesty* is the *Sovereign Good*, to such a degree, that all other Goods are as nothing in the Ballance against it; they do both of them however agree in This, that

*Profit*

*Nothing can be Profitable, but what is Honest.*

*Profit* can never be admitted into a Competition with *Honesty*. How does *Socrates* Curse the First dividers of *Honest*, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*, which are so *Inseparable* by *Nature*? And the *Stoiques* go so far along with him too, as to hold that nothing can be the One, without being also the Other. But if *Panaetius* were one of those that will have *Virtue* to be *There*, *fore Esteem'd* for the *Profit* that she brings us; measuring things *Desirable*, either by *Pleasure*, or *Freedom* from *Pain*; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Possible Repugnancy* of *Profit*, to *Honesty*. But being of Another Opinion, and that the *Only Good* is That which is *Honest*: and that whatsoever stands in Opposition to it, under the shew of *Utility*, a mans life is neither the *Better* nor the *Worse* for it, either With it, or Without it: He should not so much as have put the Case, methinks, where *Profit* and *Virtue* should appear in the *Comparison*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoiques* account for the *Sovereign Good*: is nothing else (as I understand it) than to lead a life Congruous to *Virtue*: And in all Cases whatsoever, to follow the direction of *Nature* in a Conformity thereunto. The matter standing Thus; some men are of opinion that This Comparison was not properly introduced; and that there was not any need of prescribing in This Kind, at all.

*True Honesty and True Wisdom are Inseparable*

NO man can be *Truly Honest*, but He that is *Truly Wise*; and there is no separating the One from the Other. There may be an *Imperfect Honesty*, 'tis True, with an *Imperfect Wisdom*; which is rather the *Resemblance* of *Honesty*, than the *Thing it self*. And therefore

all

all those Duties that we treat of in this Discourse, the *Stoiques* call *Middle Duties* : which are *Middle Duties* Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a *Duties*. large extent: and some people attain the knowledge of them by a Felicity of Nature; others, by a Progression, and advance upon Study. But those which They call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Consummate in all the parts (or numbers as they express it) and This perfection is only to be found in a Wise man. But he yet that acquires himself in the Discharge of these *Middle Offices*, goes for Currant with the *Multitude* for a *good* and *Wise man* in the *Abstract*: They not being able to distinguish betwixt what is *Perfect*, and *Defective*. Wherefore so far as They understand the Busines, there is nothing wanting. We see many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of other Instances, how strangely the unskilful are delighted with them, and yet for the most part commanding the least masterly stroke in the piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several parts; But when they come to be better instructed, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion.

THE Duties here Treated of, are with the *Stoiques* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not peculiar to *wise men*, but *Common to Humane Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature, or Virtue. Now when we speak of the *Magnanimity* of the *two Decii*, or the *Scipio's*, or of the *Justice* of *Fabricius*, or *Aristides*; we do not propose their Example as the Standard of *No man Good or wise in the Abstract*.

that

that *Courage*, and *Equity* that is required in a *Wise man*. For I do not look upon either of them to have been *Wise* to the Degree of *Wisdom here intended*; no, nor those very Persons upon whom the World has bestowed Both the *Reputation*, and the *Name of Wise men*. I speak of *Cato*, *Caius Lelius*, or the *Seven Sages* themselves. But by the Frequent exercise of *Middle Offices* they had somewhat of the *appearance*, and *Resemblance of Wise men*. So that we must neither Compare *Profit* in Opposition to that which is *truly Honest*; nor oppose any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Virtue*; whereupon these people value themselves, that would be accounted *Good men*. And we must as well uphold and preserve That Practical Honesty that falls under our Capacities; as that which in Strictnes and Truth, is only the Honesty of *Wise men*: For otherwise, how shall we know what progress we make toward *Virtue*? And so much for those that by doing *Good Offices* get themselves the Reputation of being *Good men*.

*The Epicureans* *mea-*  
*ju-e Hone-*  
*try by Pro-*  
*nt.* **B**UT for those that Measure all things by the Common Interest of *Gain* and *Benefit*, and will not allow *Honesty* to take place; it is ordinary for them to put *Mony* in the Scale against *Virtue*; which no good man will ever do. I suppose therefore, that *Panaetius*: when he says that men are wont to make some doubts upon the comparison, means only ( as he says ) that they are *Wont* to do so; and not that they *do well* in *so doing*. For not only the Preference of profit to *Honesty*, but the very comparing of them, and the making a doubt in the *Cafe*, is a shameful Bus'nes. But what is it that we doubt upon? Or what's the Ground of our Consideration?

tion? It is (I presume) upon the Quality of Circumstances at the Point in Question: For that whch is Dif-  
ferent the  
honorable at one time, may be Warrantable at another. As for Example, upon a supposition  
more at large; what fouler Villany can be ima-  
gined than the Killing not only of a Man, but a  
Familiar friend; and yet the people of *Rome* do  
not only Absolve any man that destroys a *Tyrant*,  
tho' his Familiar friend; but they reckon upon  
it as the most Glorious action of an Honora-  
ble Life. Is it in this case that *Profit* prevails  
over *Honesty*; or rather that the *Honesty* fol-  
low'd the *Profit*?

THE Certain way to keep its Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of *Profitable*, and *Honest*, will be the Establishment of such a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: which Rule I would have to be squar'd to the Reason and Discipline of the *Stoiques*: And This is the Rule which I shall observe in this Treatise; Because tho' the Ancient *Academiques*, and the *Peripatetiques* also, (which were formerly all one) give a Preference to that which is *Honest*, before that which seems to be *Profitable*; the matter is yet more Generously handled by the *Stoiques*, that make *Profit* and *Honest Reciprocal*, than by those that Imagine a thing may be either *Honest*, and not *Profitable*, or *Profitable*, and not *Honest*. Now our *Academy* allows great Liberty, and gives us a Right to defend That which appears most *Pro-  
bable*. But to Return to my Rule, to take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make my Own Fortune by the impoverishing of another, is more Contrary to *Nature*, than Death, *In our Judgments of Profitable and Honest.*

Beggery, Pain ; or whatever else can befall a mans Body, or Estate. For at First Dash it destroys all Neighborhood and Society : For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his own advantage may Assault, or make a Prey of another ; there follows necessarily an Absolute dissolution of Human Society, and a Violation of the most Certain and powerful Dictate of Nature. Put the Case that one Member should draw to it self the Health, and Good Blood of the Member next unto it ; the whole Body must, of necessity, Consume and Perish : In like manner if every man should take from another what he can get, and apply his Neighbors Goods to his Own Use, this would undoubtedly put an end to all Friendliness, and Fellowship among men. It is natural enough for a man to provide Necessaries for himself, in the First place ; But it is yet against Nature for him to furnish himself with Money or Provisions, by Spoil and Rapine : And it is not only by the dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Constitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawful for One man to do any Mischief to Another for his proper Benefit. It is the express Care, Will,

*Fraud and* and Intent of all Laws to maintain the Duties of *Rapine are* Society, Safe, and Inviolate : and they punish *against the* the Transgressors of these Rules with Death, *Laws of* Banishments, Prisons, and Fines : And much *Nature and* more does Nature her self exact this from us : *Nature* (I say) which is the *Law Divine and* *Humane* ; *Both in one*. Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propose to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a Reasonable Being) will never agree to the Coveting of what

what is Another mans, or to the taking away from his Neighbor, and Giving to himself. For Greatness of Mind, Gentleness, Justice, and Liberality are much more Consonant to Nature than Pleasure, Life, or Riches : which, in comparison with the Common good, are by all men of Brave and exalted Minds, neglected and despised. Whereas on the Other side, to Spoyl my Neighbor for my One Advantage is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Torments, and the like. And it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all sorts of Labors and Troubles for the Service and Conservation, (if it were possible) even of the whole World : After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of Men has placed for his Virtues among the Gods : All this (I say) is more Agreeable to Nature, than to live in Solitude ; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleasures, and Plenty ; with all the advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above. This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, so much to prefer difficulty and action, before a Life of Idleness and Sloth. From hence it comes to pass, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And besides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not against Nature ; or else he supposes that Death, Poverty, Pain, Loss of Children, Kindred and Friends, are more to be avoided, than the doing of Injuries. But if he conceives that one man may do an Injury to another without an offence to Nature, there's no dispute with One that has lost his Reason ; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of himself. But what if he thinks

*The Interest of the Whole, is the interest of every Part.* the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other, Worse?* He is in a Grievous Mistake, to phansie any Calamity of Body or Fortune comparable to the disorders of his Mind.

WE should all of us therefore agree upon this common proposition, That the Interest of the *Whole*, is the Interest of *Every part*; and that whoever draws more to himself than belongs to him, is an Enemy to the Publique. Now if it be the very prescript of Nature, that for Humanity sake, one Man shall take Care of another; it does necessarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publique, is the Interest of every particular, according to the same Principle. Let but This be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of the same Law: And then taking That for granted; to do an Injury to any Man is against the Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and so is the Other, by Consequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to say, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my Own Pocket; but to take from other People, is quite another case: as if every Individual were not concerned in the Protection of the whole: An Opinion utterly Inconsistent with the Rules of Government.

THESE are some again will have the *Citizens* provided for, but not *Strangers*: And These Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society. For take away That once, and there will be no longer any Good Nature; Liberality, Honesty, or Justice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth. And whosoever brings Matters to That pass, is to be accounted an Enemy to the *Gods Themselves*, for breaking that Union

Union among men, which was no other than a Constitution of *Divine Appointment*. It is the strongest Band of Society, a General Agreement in This Position, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from another, for my own Advantage, than to suffer all the *Better suffer any Miseries* that can possible befall any Man in his *Body or Estate*: Nay, that can befall the very *Calamity than do an Mind it self*; saving the single point of Justice, *Injury*. which one Virtue is the Misfrefs, and the Princes of all the rest. But what? (will some say) Shall a Wise Man rather Perish for want of Bread, than take a Loaf from another Man that's good for nothing, to keep himself from Starving? This must not be done yet? no not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my own Benefit. Suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloody Tyrant) should he not do it? This is a Case easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthleſs person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publique; and to take it purely upon That Consideration, it is not blame-worthy: But otherwise, I must rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my self by what I force from another Man: so that it is not more against Nature to be Sick, or Necessitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of another: But the abandoning of the

Common Good is an Offence to Nature ; for it is Unjust ; and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and Provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Translation of Necessaries from a slothful and unprofitable wretch, to the behoof of a Wise, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whose Loss might be of great damage to the Government : Provided that it be done merely out of such a respect, without any Vanity, or Self-love, or making use of a Publique Pretext for a Colour to a particular Injustice. In so doing, I keep my self still upon my Duty, consulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

As to the Case of *Phalaris*, the decision is Obvious : For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, than a Member of Human Society ; and there can be no Crime in the despoiling of an Usurper, whom it is Lawful to Kill ; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and pestilent sort of men were exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Blood and Spirits have in a manner forsaken them, and that they grow dangerous to the Rest : so should that fierce and outragious Brutality be separated, if I may so say, from the Common Humanity of the Publique Body. Of this Quality are all those Questions of Duty, whereof the Resolution depends upon the Circumstances of Times : which I presume, *Panetius* would have persw'd, if somewhat of accident or bus'ness had not taken him off from his purpose. We have said enough in our former Books upon This Matter ; to shew what we are always to shun, as evil and shameful

in it self, and what we are not obliged always to avoid, because it is not *always*, either *Misbecoming*, or *Dishonest*.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work Certain Principles to be given we have begun, I must deal with You, (my *Ciceron*) as the Mathematicians do with their *Disciples*. They lay down certain *Postulata*, to be for grant- <sup>ed.</sup> taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of discoursing the Points; to the end that they may make themselves more easily understood. So must I require of You (my *Ciceron*) to yield me this point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is desirable for it self, but what is Honest*. Now if *Cratippus* will not allow of the Proposition whole as it lies; This yet, I presume, will not be deny'd, That *Virtue* is *Chiefly*, if not *Only* to be *desired*, and *for its own sake*. It is all one to me, which of the Two you take, for they are Both of them more probable than any thing else: And First, let me vindicate *Panatius*, in This, that he never supposed a *Competition of Utility*, and *Virtue*; (nor could he have justifi'd it if he had) but he is not to be understood of things that *seem* profitable; for over and over in all his Discourses he still makes *Utility*, and *Virtue* to be *Convertibles*, and represents it to the most pestilent Error that ever enter'd into Human Life, the Opinion that divided them. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, betwixt *Appearances*, and *Truths*; not as separating the *Profitable* from the *Honest*; but for our Caution, and Instruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We shall therefore dispatch this remaining part without any help from others; and upon our own account, (as we say:) For since *Panatius* left This Subject, I have seen

*Not'ing  
can be be-  
neficial  
that is dis-  
honest.*

nothing yet that has given me any sort of satisfaction.

WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that presents it self unto us, under the appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is dishonest, or shameful, annexed thereunto ; we are not to leave it then, as a thing *Profitable*, but as considering that *Utility*, and *Dishonesty* cannot stand together. For if there be nothing so *Contrary to Nature* as the *One*, or so *Agreeable to it*, as the *Other* ; for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Constant, and despises the contrary) it is impossible that they should both meet in the same Subject. Again ; If we are born for *Virtue* ; either (according to *Zeno*) *Virtue is to be desired for it self alone*, ( according to *Aristotle*) *it weighs down all other things* : then does it follow, of Necessity, that *Virtue* must be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*. So that whether way soever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable* ; and that which is *Profitable*, is certainly *Good*. Those Men therefore are very short-lighted, that presently lay hold of that which *appears Profitable*, and consider it *apart* from that which is *Honest*. From Hence come Murthers, Poysonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publique Cheats, Oppressions, Squeezing of the People, or our Confederates : From Hence come the Intolerable Insolencies of Men of over-grown Fortunes ; and finally, Ambition, and the Thirst of Dominion ; than which nothing can be more Ruinous, or Pernicious in a Free City. They take false Measures of the *Value* of things, without so much as dreaming of the *Punishment* ; not the *Punishment* of the *Laws*, (for

(for that they can with ease break through) but *The great That of the Conscience* which is the bitterest <sup>punishment</sup> of all. Wherefore this sort of men should be excluded Humane Conversation, (as most Execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they should either follow That which they see to be *Honest*, or knowingly pollute themselves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the *Act* it self. Wherefore we should never deliberate at all, where the very deliberation it self is *Shameful*.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we should not entertain any *Hope* or *Design*, of *Concealing*, or *disguising* *Matters*; for we should take up This for a *Maxim*; (at least, if we be ever the better for our *Philosophy*) that *if we could* <sup>A Divine Precept.</sup> *carry things so Private, as that neither God nor Man should discover us, we should yet have such a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of Injustice, Uncleanness, or Immodesty, escape us.* *Plato's Fable of Gyges*, is not impertinent to our purpose. The Story has it, that a <sup>The Fable and Moral of Gyges's Ring.</sup> *Torrent* having eatena *Hollowness* in the *Ground*, *Gyges* went down into it, and there observ'd a *Ring*. *Brazen Horse*, with doors in his *Sides*. Upon the *Opening* of these doors, he discover'd the *dead body* of a *Man*, of a *Prodigious Size*, with a *Golden Ring* upon his *Finger*. *Gyges* boldly pluckt it off by *Force*, and put it upon his *Own*, and being the *King's Shepherd*, he went his *way*, and joyn'd himself with *Other Shepherds*. *Finding*, that upon turning the *Stone* of the *Ring*, *Inwards*, he became *Invisible* to *Others*, and yet saw every thing *H.mself*, and that upon turning it *back again* he became *Visible*, as before; <sup>by</sup>

by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Assistance Murther'd the King, his Master; and in a short time remov'd all out of the way that he thought stood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this Lewdness he Committed by the help of this *Ring*, and so made himself King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wise Man were the Master of such a Ring, he would reckon himself no more Priviledg'd to do an Ill thing with it, than without it; for an Honest man considers the *Goodness* of the *Action*, not the *Privacy* of it. It is objected by some ( that shew themselves to be better *Men*, than *Philosophers* ) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any man would report it for a thing either True, or Possible: but see however the Force and Scope of this Ring, and of this Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Lust, that no body knows of, or so much as suspects? Suppose that this Impiety could be kept so secret, that neither God nor Man should come to know it: Would you commit it? 'Tis a thing impossible, ( they say, whether it be so or not. ) But what would they do ( say I ) if they could do the thing, which they say they cannot? They return you the same senseless Answer over again: they say 'tis *Impossible*; and there they stick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Question. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or no: But I put the Question, as if it were in Case of the *Torture*. If they make answer, that if they were sure to escape *Punishment*, they would do what they found most *Expedient*, they confess themselves to be *Criminals*;

ness; and if they deny it, 'tis a Concession that all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themselves. But to Return now to my purpose.

THERE fall out divers Cases, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times disorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Resolutions: <sup>The appearance of Profit often distract us.</sup> not as upon a Deliberation whether a man should strain a point of *Honesty* in regard of the Greatness of the Benefit in Prospect; (for That were <sup>the times</sup> *Honesty* <sup>distraets us.</sup>) but whether That which seems so very Profitable may be done without Dishonor. It might look like an unjust thing in *Brutus*, the Depositing of *Collatine*, his Fellow *Consul*, who in the Expulsion of the Kings, was both his Partner in the *Advice*, and his Assistant in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the whole *Family*, and the Relations of that proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquinis*; (which was a Resolution of publique Advantage) This was so Honest, and Just an Action, that *Collatine* himself was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: so that this Utility was valid for the Honesty sake, without which, in truth, it had not been profitable. But this did not hold in the Case of that Prince that Founded our City: For he was so wrought upon by the shew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone than with Company. He cast off all Piety and Humanity, for the obtaining of that which seemed unto him to be Profitable, tho' it proved the clear contrary. The pretended *Honesty* in the Action, was to punish the Affront of his Brothers leaping in scorn over the Wall; but it was neither Competent, nor

nor likely. Wherefore under favour of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*; ( no matter whether ) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

*How far  
me may  
look to our  
selves.*

AND yet we are not to neglect our own advantages neither: or part with any thing to Others, when we want it our selves. But every man should attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to Another. *Chrysippus* had many Witty sayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Course, (says he) a man may be allow'd to strive, and contend his utmost: but to trip up his antagonist's Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So for any man to get That which may serve for the use of Life, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawful.*

*Many Ni-  
ceties in  
Friendships*

IN Friendship, 'tis true, there are many Niceties as well in the not doing of any Office which may Honestly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend contrary to Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon This wholeMatter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable; as Honors, Riches, Pleasures, and other Circumstances of the like Kind; these things are never to be preferr'd before Friendship; But no good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either against the Commonwealth, his Oath or his Word: No not if he were himself to be a Judge in his Friends Case; for he lays down the person of a Friend, where he takes up that of a Judge. I would have him wish that his Friend may have *Justice* on *his side*; and I would have him allow him all the Favour in point of *Time*, that the Law will permit; but when he comes to pass his *Sentence*, let him remember, and consider, that

that he calls God to Witness ; or ( as I suppose ) his Own Conscience, the Divinest thing Heaven it self ever bestow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practise of our Ancestors ; They never ask'd any thing of a Judge (and I wish we did so at This day) but upon Condition that it might consist with Justice. This Request has relation to those things which (as I said e'en now) a Judge may fairly allow to a Friend ; for if a man must of Necessity do all things that a Friend would have him do, this is no longer a Friendship, but a Confederacy. Let me be understood only of Common Friendships : For among men that are Wise, and Perfect, there can be no such thing. The Story goes of *Damon*, and *Pythias*, (*Pythagoreans*) so great was the Kindnes they had for one another, that when *The Genius* *Dionysius* had sentenced one of them to death, <sup>rous friend-</sup> the Party Condemned only desired a few days <sup>ship of Da-</sup> <sub>mon and</sub> <sup>mon and</sup> <sub>Pythias.</sub> respite to put his Affairs in order ; and the Other became Surety ( Body for Body ) for his Appearance. The Prisoner return'd at his day, and the Tyrant fell into such admiration at their *Generosity*, and *Justice*, that he requested them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendship. Wherefore in all Friendships, where the Profitable and the Honest meet in Comparison, we should never consider the Profit, but square our Actions according to the honesty. But wheresoever any thing shall be required in *Friendship*, which does not stand with *Honesty*, in that Case *Religion*, and *Faith*, must take place of *Friendship*. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choic of the Duty here in Questi-  
on.

Publique  
Mistakes  
under the  
appearance  
of Profit.

WE are Liable also to many Publique Mistakes under the appearance of Profit ; as our Countrymen were to blame in the Irrecoverable Destruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worse , in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only because they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, because of the Neighborhood of *Ægina* to one of their principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel* ; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary to Nature* than *Cruelty*.

Humanity  
to Stran-  
gers.

THE Y do very Ill also, that either Prohibit, or Banish Strangers from among them ; as *Petronius* did of Old ; and *Papius*, not long since. It is well enough not to suffer him that is no *Citizen*, to pass for a *Citizen*, (according to the Law of our Consuls *Crassus* and *Scævola*, who were Wise men.) But it is undoubtedly most Inhuman, absolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourse in a City, to Strangers. Those are Great and Remarkable Cases wherein the *Show* or *Colour* of *Publique Utility* is despised, in comparison with *Honesty*. We have in the Story of our Commonwealth, a World of Eminent Examples. How many times have we (and especially in the *Second Punic War*, after that Miserable Disaster at the Battle of *Canna*) shew'd greater Courage in our Distress, than ever we did in our Prosperity ? There was not the least sign of Fear among us, nor any mention of peace ; such is the Power of *Honesty*, that nothing of Profit can appear against it ! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to resist the force of the *Persians*, came to a Resolve

solve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Trazen*; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrcilus* that advis'd them rather to stay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counsel. He gave them the advice which he took to be most profitable; but it ceases to be *Profit*, when it stands in opposition to *Honesty*. *Themistocles*, after his Victorious War against the *Persians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of something that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth; but it was not convenient to be made Publique, and therefore desir'd them to appoint some body to whom he might impart the matter in private. They named *Aristides*; and he told him that the *Lacedemonian* Fleet, which was laid up at *Cytheon* might easily be Fir'd by surprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedemonians*. *Aristides*, when he had heard it, came into the Senate where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themistocle's* Counsel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honorable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not *A scrupulous point of Honor*. only upon the Report of *Aristides*, even without hearing it. How much did these people go beyond us; that suffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*, while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries*? Let it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Dishonorable*; no, not in the very possession of that which we account so to be. Nay it is a great Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagine that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Dishonest*.

B U T

BUT there fall out many Occasions (as I have said before) wherein the *Profitable*, and the *Honest* may fall in *Competition*: in which Case we should consider, how far they stand in direct Opposition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for instance, upon these Questions. An *Honest* man sets sail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodians* in great distress for want of it; and the Commodity bearing an Excessive price. This person knows that there are other *Alexandrian* Ships under way, and bound for the same Port, and with the same *Cargo*: whether or no shall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other Merchants coming with Relief, or say nothing of it, and make the best Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Case, supposing him to be a *Good* and a *Wise man*, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to *Conceal* this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes some doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*-In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babylonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoique*) is of One Opinion; and his Disciple *Antipater* (a very accute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumstances laid open; so that the Purchaser may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the Other knows. *Diogenes* says that the *Vender* is bound to discover all the *Faults*, so far as he is obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and to manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to sell the Commodity, he may without Deceit make the best on't. *Here* (says he) I have brought my Corn; I have run the *Risque* on't, and I set no higher a rate upon the Commodity than Others do; nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper:

Some nice  
Cases of  
Conscience.

If you can have it any where else, where's the *Injury*? Now *Antipater*, on the other side, Reasons it thus. How is That? (says he) It is our Duty to consult the Good of Mankind, and to serve Human Society; and we come into the World under that Obligation. We have Principles of Nature; which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing Profitable to our selves, that is not so to the *Publique* Profit, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of Men, which so much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply*? *Diogenes* will reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this instant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or the end of Good men; which are things much more Profitable to be known, than the price of wheat? And yet you will not say that I *Conceal* This from you. But it is not absolutely necessary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is necessary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (says the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be such a *Society* then, as that no man shall have any thing particular in it of his *Own*? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You see in this whole Dispute, that it is not said, tho' This or that be *Dishonest*, I will yet do it, because it is *Expeditious*: But it must be so *Expeditious*, that there be nothing *Dishonorable* in it. Now (on the Other hand) out of that very Consideration that it is *Dishonorable*, it is therefore

fore *not to be done*. Suppose an Honest man has a mind to put off his House for some fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himself: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the purpose) tho' it may (perhaps) pass for *Healthful*; all the Rooms annoy'd with Vermin, Ill-built, or Ruinous, which is only known (as I say) to the Master of the House. The Question is, if he Conceals these faults to get a better Rate for his House than he could otherwise have done, whether he does *well*, or *ill*, in That *Concealment*? *Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the Case of *not setting a Man Right that's out of his way*. A Crime which was punish'd at *Athens* by a Formal Solemnity of *Publique Execrations*. Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaser to ruin himself, and to fall into the worst of Snares, by a Mistake? Nay it is worse yet, than the *not shewing of the way*, for one man to lead another knowingly and wilfully into an Error. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other side, who forc't you to buy it? Nay he did not (says he) so much as Advise you to't. That which did not please the One, he exposed to sale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he shall not be taken for a Cheat, that sets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much less shall he be accounted one, that does not so much as Commend his House; for where the Purchaser uses his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not oblig'd, in all Cases, to make good every word we say, how should we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not say? Nor can any thing be more Ridiculous than for a Merchant

chant to publish the Faults of the Commodity he exposes to Sale. What would be more senseless than to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer ; *Here's an Infected House to be Sold* ? Now so it falls out, that in some doubtful Cases, the *Honesty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it so qualifi'd on the Other ; that it may not only be *Honorable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Dishonorable*, to *Omit* it. This is a Point that comes often into question betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honest*.

THESE Difficulties must be set right : for *Resolutions* it is not our *Business* to start a question, but to <sup>upon the</sup> give a Resolution. It is my Opinion, that nei- <sup>former C4-</sup> ther in the Case of the *Rhodian Corn-Merchant*, nor in that of the *House offer'd to Sale*, the *Concealment* there supposed was *Justifiable*. For it is not properly the *Concealing* of a thing, to say nothing of it ; but the keeping of another man, for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a *Concealment* This is, and the Quality of the man that uses it, who does not discern ? This is not the practise undoubtedly of an Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Just or a Good man : but rather of a Shifting, a Close, a Deceitful, a Malicious, a Sly Shuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to get by the Bargain, that wears these foul Names, and lies under all these Reproaches ?

BUT if the saying *Nothing* in this Case be so Blameable ; what shall we think of them then that spake *False* ? *Caius Camius* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor Learning) going sometimes to *Syracuse*, not

*A Pleasant  
Cheat.*

upon Bus'ness (as he was wont to say) but for his diversion; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy some Gardens there, where he might enjoy his Friends when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of, there was one *Pythius*, in *Syracuse*, that drove the Trade of a *Banker*. *I have Gardens here* (says he) *tho' not to be Sold*, *but however if Cannius pleases, he may use them as his Own.* And so he invites *Cannius* to those Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Cannius*'s promise to come, *Pythius* (whose bus'ness gave him a great Interest there, among all sorts of people) sent for the Fishermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fish just before his Gardens; and so gave them their Lessons what to do and how to behave themselves. *Cannius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fish he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius*'s Feet. What's the meaning of all this (says *Cannius*) so many Fishes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fish (says he) in *Syracuse* which is not to be had in this place. They take in their Water here, and the Town cannot be without This Convenience. This set *Cannius* agog upon the Purchase, and nothing would serve but *Pythius* must sell him the place; He seem'd, at First, very unwilling to part with it; but without more words they came at last to an Agreement: *Cannius* was a Rich man, and presently struck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own price:

price: Security was given for the Mony, and the bus'ness finish'd. *Cannius* invited some of his Familiar Friends thither the next day: and he himself coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighborhood whether the Fishermen kept Holy day that day, because he saw none of them There. Their Answer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any Fishermen that us'd to be There: Insomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thither the day before. This put *Cannius* into a Rage: But what Remedy? For my Friend and Colleague *Aquilius* had not as yet made any Provision against *Dolus Malus*, or *Couzenage*. Upon my Demand to *Aquilius* what was intended by that same *Dolus Malus*, he told me, that it was the pretending of one thing, and doing another. Which truly was a full and Clear Definition of it, and worthy of a Wise man. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that *Pretend one thing, and do another*; are to be accounted *Perfidious, Wicked, and Deceitful*; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by so many *Crimes*. But if *Aquilius*'s Definition be True, there must be no Feigning or Dissembling allow'd of in Human Society: And a Good man will neither do the one nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. And That Deceit was punishable also by the Laws: As in the Case of *Guardianship* by the *Twelve Tables*. And so was the *Circumvention* of *Minors* punishable by the *Latorian Laws*. And sometimes by *Arbitration*, even without a *Law*; where the Question was matter of Faith, and Trust. But of all other Judgments the Words that are used in the *Formulary* of an *Arbitrement* upon a *Marri-*

\* *words of rusage*-*Agreement* are most remarkable: As \* *M.E.*  
*Form.* *LIUS, AEQUIUS*, the Better, the Juster; and  
 in matters of *Contract*, or *Confidence*, *INTER*  
*BONOS BENE AGIER*; *Fair Dealing among*  
*Good Men*. Can there be any *Mixture of Fraud*  
 now in *BETTER*, and *JUSTER*? Or what  
 place is their for *Collusion*, or *Iniquity*, in *Fair*  
*Dealing among Honest Men*?

*Simulation*  
*and Dif-*  
*simulation.* NOW the *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceit* appears  
 either in *Simulation*, which is a pretence of some-  
 thing that is not? or *Dissimulation*, that is to  
 say, a *Disguise* or *Concealment* of somewhat  
 that *Is*. Wherefore there must be no *Lye* admit-  
 ted in any *Bus'nes*, or *Contract*; nor should  
 there be any *Underhand* substituting of a *Buyer*,  
 or a *Seller*, to enhance, or to bring down the  
 price; but Both parties should say *at a Word*  
 what they will *Give* or *Take*. *Q. Scævola*, the  
 Son of *Publius*, being upon a *Purchase*, bad the  
 Proprietor tell him in *One Word* what he would  
 have for the *Estate*: He did so: And *Scævola*  
 told him he had undervalu'd it, and so gave him  
*Two Thousand Crowns* more than his *Bargain*,  
*Scævola's.* There is not any *Man* but will confess that This  
 was the part of a *Good man*, tho' in the *Opinion*  
 perhaps of some *People*, not of a *Wise Man*:  
 As if the *Other* had set it lower than he could  
 afford it. This is a *mischief* therefore, that *Some*  
*Men* are accounted *Good*, and *Other men Wise*, as  
 if they could be *seperated*. *Ennius* says that a  
*Man's Wisdom* serves him to little purpose, if it  
 be not *Profitable to himself*. This may be true  
 enough, if it were but agreed with *Ennius* what  
 it is to be *Profitable*, I find *Hecaton* the *Rho-*  
*dian* (*Panatius's Scholar*) telling *Q. Tubero* in  
 his *Books of Offices*, that it is the part of a *Wise*  
*Man*

Man to do nothing against *Publique Customs, Laws, and Institutions*; and withall, to take good heed to his Fortune, and Family: For we should not propound to be Rich, only to our Selves, but to our Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly, for the Service of the *Republique*. For the Estates and Provisions of particulars, are the Wealth of the City. The Proceeding of *Sca-vola* above-mention'd would never suit with *Hecatōn*: For he only says that he would not do any thing for his own Profit that were Unlawful: and truly he deserves little Thanks, or Commendation for his pains. But allowing both *Lying*, and *Dissembling* to be this same *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceit*, there are very few things clear of That Fraud. Or if he be only the Good Man, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no body; such a Good man will not be easily found. It can never be *Profitable* to do an *Ill thing*; because it is always *unallowable*, and *shameful*. And it must ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, because it is always *Honest*.

IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the *Matter of Estates*, that the *Vendor* should still tell the *Purchaser* the *Defects*, or *Inconveniencies* of the *Estate*; for it being sufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man should make good what he promises or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the penalty of *Double Damages* for *Denying* it. The *Civilians* have also set a Punishment upon *Concealments* too, by enacting, that if the Seller of an Estate knew any Fault or Error in it, without expressly acquainting the Purchaser with it, he should be obliged to make it good. As in the case of the *Augurs Tower*; where they were to take their Observations

tions from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having some Houses upon the Hill *Calins*, the *Augurs* commanded him to pull them down, because they hinder'd their prospect. *Claudius* expos'd Those Houses to Sale, and so put them off; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaser. The *Augurs* found the same fault still with the Houses, when they were in His Possession; so that he pull'd them down. And coming afterwards to understand that *Claudius* had made sale of those Houses, after that the *Augurs* had appointed the demolishing of them; forc'd him upon an Arbitration, what in point of Conscience was to be done in That Case. *Marcus Cato* past the Sentence, (the Father of This *Cato*, of ours) For as we denominate Others from their Fathers, we shall make mention of the person that gave this Light to the World, as accounting from the Son.) The Sentence was This, That since upon the Sale of That Estate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to; he should Indempnifie the Buyer of it; concluding that the Proprietor was bound in Conscience to tell the Purchaser what damage might ensue upon it. Now if This was a Just Judgment, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that sold the *Infected Houses*, to conceal as is above supposed. But it is not possible for any Law to reach all the various Cases of these Concealments: And yet however, so far as they go, they are diligently observ'd, *Marcus Marius Gratidianus* sold to *Caius Sergius Orata* those very Houses which he himself had bought of him but a few years before. These Houses paid a Duty to *Sergius* (which was out of his mind.)

mind.) But *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cause was brought into the Court; *Crassus* was for *Orata*, and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*: *Crassus* insisted upon the *Law*, because the Seller knew that he ought to have acquainted the Purchaser with this Incumbrance, but did not do it. *Anthony* insisted upon matter of *Equity*, because That Incumbrance, was not unknown to *Sergius*, who sold the Houses, and so there was no need to say any thing of it; neither could he be said to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but to shew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with Wiles, and Shifts?

BUT Laws and Philosophers provide against *Frauds* several ways: The Laws regarding on-  
Laws and  
Philoso.  
ly matter of *Overt Act*, whereas Philosophers pro-  
judge according to *Equality*, and *Reason*: which Rea-  
phers pro-  
vide seve-  
ral ways  
against  
Fraud.  
son does it self require of us, that we do nothing perfidiously, or with False Pretence, or Deceit. But shall we call it a Treachery to contrive a Pit-fall, or set a Toy, without either driving or hunting any thing to it? Well, but the Beasts, many times fall into it, without a Pursuer. He that offers a House to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaser? His House is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and somebody is caught at unawars. Now tho' I understand that according to depraved *Custom*, and *Manners*, this is not accounted *Dishonourable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* against it: It is nevertheless yet forbidden by the *Law of Nature*. For, as I have often said already, and must say oftner, *Society*, in the *largest Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under

under. That is the *Society* of those of the *same Nation*, and after That, of the *same City*. Wherefore our Forefathers distinguish betwixt the *Law of Nations*, and the *Civil Law*. For the *Civil Law* is not consequently the *Law of Nations*, but the *Civil, and Law of Nations* does necessarily comprehend the *the Law of Civil*. Now to say the Truth, we have not among *Nations*.

*The Law* is not consequently the *Law of Nations*, but the *Civil, and Law of Nations* does necessarily comprehend the *the Law of Civil*. Now to say the Truth, we have not among *Nations*.

us any substantial or express Image of the *True Law*, or *sincere Justice*: So that we are fain to make use of *shadows*, and *Figures*; and it were well if we could keep up, even to Them too: For they are Translated out of the *best Originals*, of *Truth and Nature*. How glorious is that Provisional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honesty, I may not be deceived and brought into a snare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *We must live Honestly among good men, and without Fraud.* But then who are *Good men*, and what it is to do well, is a Great question.

Of Good  
Faith.

*Q. Scævola* the High Priest was wont to ascribe a very great force to all those Arbitrations that were grounded upon *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name* it self to be of a Large Extent: As having a respect to *Guardian-ships, Societies, Trusts, Mandates*, things *bought, or sold, hired, or let*, relating to the Community, and Enter-course of Life. He must be a great Judge, that in these Cases can determine (especially meeting in most of them with Contrary Opinions) how One man is to behave himself towards Another, under these Circumstances. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices should be avoided; And That *Craft* also which imposes upon the World for *Wisdom*; how far from it soever. For *Prudence* is placed in the *Choice of Good, or Evil*; but *Craft* pre-

prefers *Evil* before *Goad*; at least if things that are *Dishonourable* be *Evil*. And 'tis not only in *Lands*, and *Houses*, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to that of Nature, forbids Fraud and Circumvention; but even in the very dealing for *Slaves*, the Seller should act as frankly as in Other Cases. For he that is presum'd to know whether the *Slave* be *Healthfull*, *Honest*, a *Fugitive*, or the like; the *Ædiles Law* makes *That Master* answerable for the *Servant*. But this does not hold in the Case of an *Heir* that found such a *Slave*, or *Servant* in the *Family*. From hence it may appear, since *Nature* is the *Fountain of Justice*, that it is also according to *Nature*, that no man should make Advantage to himself of another mans Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Pest in Human Soceity, than a perverse *Craft*, under the *Masque of Simplicity*: And from thence proceed those Innumerable Cases, where the *Profitable* comes in Concurrency with the *Honest*. For, where's the man that would stick at any *Injustice*, if he might but hope for *Impunity*; or come off, under a pretence of *Ignorance*? Let us examine the Matter if you please; and in those Instances where the Common people, perhaps, are scarce sensible that they do amiss; For we do not speak in This place, of *Murthers*, *Poysonings*, *Forgeries*, *Robberies*, or *Embeſſiments* of the *Publique Treasure*, which ſhould rather be ſuppreſt by *Prisons*, and *Fetters*, than by *Words*, and *Philofophical Precepts*: But let us here rather conſider what we find commonly to be done, even among those that have the Reputation of *Honest* men. There were ſome people that brought out of *Greece* to *Rome* a forg'd *Will* of *Q. Minu-*

*No Pest  
like Craft  
under the  
Masque of  
Simplicity.*

*tius*

*tius Basilius*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'ness pass the better, they put into the Testament, *M. Crassus*, and *Q. Hortensius*, two of the most considerable men of the City; as *Joint-Heirs* together with *Themselves*. They did, Both of them, suspect it to be a *Counterfeit*; and yet having no hand in it themselves they were well enough content, to make advantage of other peoples Wickednes. And what then? Is it sufficient that they themselves had no hand in it? I am of another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, *I lov'd him* while he was alive, and I do not *hate* the *Other* now he is Dead. But when *Basilius* had made his Sisters Son (*Marcus Satirus*) his *Heir*, and would have had him take his *Unkles* Name upon him; (I speak of that *Satirus* that to the Shame of the Age had the Patronage of the *Picenians*, and *Sabines*) it was a most unreasonable thing that the Chief men of the City should carry away the *Testators Estate*, and leave nothing to the Right Heir but his *Name*. Now if he stands guilty of an *Injustice*, that neither *keeps off* an *Injury* from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulses* it when he may, (as we have said in our First Book) what shall we think of him that does not only not *Repel* an *Injury*, but even *Helps* it on and *promotes* it? Nay, for my own part, let the *Inheritance* be never so *Lawful*; yet if it be gain'd by *Craft*, *Flattery*, *Servile Offices*, or *False Pretences*; even That *Lawful Succession* I cannot approve. But in such Cases men are many times extremely misled, in taking One thing to be *Honest*, and Another *Profitable*, for the same Rule holds in both; and He that is not sensible of This, lies open to all sorts almost of

of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whosoever says thus to himself, *This is Honest*, 'tis true, but the *Other is Expedient*; he takes upon him, to divide those things by a *Mistake* that are *coupled* by *Nature*; which opinion is the fountain of all <sup>No Distr- ding of</sup> *De-* <sup>what Na-</sup> *ceits, Crimes, and Evil Deeds*. Wherfore if <sup>time has</sup> a *Good man*, for the very holding up of a Finger <sup>Coupled.</sup> could get himself made *Heir* to a Considerable *Estate*, which he has no *Title* to; he should not do it, tho' upon a *Certainty* that no man could ever so much as suspect him for it. But if *M. Cras-sus* could get an *Estate* upon the same *Terms*, upon my *Credit* he would leap out of his *skin* at it. But a *Just*, and such a one as we can allow for a *Good man*, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and transferring it to *himself*; and whoever wonders at This, does as good as confess himself *Ignorant* of what a *good man* is.

**B U T** he that will throughly examine the *Secrets* of his *Own Soul*, will be able to tell himself that only *He is a Good man*, who does as much good to *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without some *Injurious provocation*. How's That? He that supplants the *Right Heir*, to get himself into his *place*, has not that *man* as much to answer for as if he had remov'd him by *Poyson*? But what ( will some say ) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes, yes, If he will take This along with him, that it is not possible for any thing to be *So*, that is *Unjust*. He that has not learn'd This *Lesson*, can never be a *Good man*. I remember, when I was a *Boy*, I heard my *Father* speak of *Fimbria* the *Consul*: who was appointed *Judge* in the *Case* of *Marcus Luctatius Pythias*, ( a *Knight* of <sup>Rome</sup>

Rome, and a very *Honest man*) who undertook, upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Money, to prove himself a *Good man*: but *Fimbria* did absolutely refuse to pass Judgment in That matter; lest he should either derogate from the Reputation of a person so much Esteemed, if he gave it against him, or appear on the other side, to pronounce any man to be *Good*, considering the Infinite Circumstances of Qualities, and Offices to make him so. So that neither *Fimbria's Good man*, nor *Socrates's*, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honest*: And such a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare so much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in *Publique*. Is it not a Shame now, for *Philosophers to Doubt*, where the *Common people* themselves are *Resolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare *Proverb* is *Their's*; when they would express a man of an exact Sincerity and Justice, *You may play at* \* *Love with him in the dark*, they say; and what is the meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honest*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiser for't? In the *Moral* of this *Proverb*, we are taught, that neither *Gyges's* way is to be endur'd, nor so much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the case formerly supposed) tho' a man might make himself Master of the whole World by so doing. For whatsoever is *Shameful* and *Dishonourable*, let it be never so *Secret*, nothing can make it *Honest*; and that which is not *Honest*, it is as impossible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Opposition* to *Nature*.

BUT where *Criminals* find great *Rewards*, there is also a great *Temptation to offend*. When *C. Marius* appeared out of all hope of the *Confus*,

\* A little  
Play with  
the Finger.

*fulship*, and ( having lain still, for seven years after his *Pretorship*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: *Q. Metellus* ( a great man, and an Eminent Citizen ) sent *Marius* ( being his Lieutenant ) to *Rome*. Where *Marius* publiquely charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they had made him *Consul*, he would in a very short time have deliver'd up *Ju-* A Mean  
gurtha, either Alive or Dead, into the Power of *Action of* *C. Marius*. *But* This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Justice*; by a false Suggestion to draw an Envy upon so brave a man, and so Famous a Citizen: Especially *Marius* being *Metellus's Lieutenant*, and by his order sent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinsman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Pretorship* discharge the Office of a *Good man*. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Consulted the College of *Pretors* about some Common Standard for the Valuation of their *Moneys*, which were then sometimes up, sometimes down, at such a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They joyn'd unanimously in a *Decree*, with a *Penalty* upon any man that should not submit to't; and so they *Adjourn'd* for That *Morning*, resolving to meet again *After noon* for the publishing of it. When they were gone, some, one way, some another; *Gratidianus* stept presently from the *Bench* to the *Tribunal*; and there made *Proclamation* by *Himself alone* of that which was the *Common Act* of the *Court*: which you will find ( if you observe the Story ) to have given him great Reputation; the people setting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incense* and *Tapers*: In one word, no man ever

*Small mat- render'd himself more Popular. These are  
ters may be Points that may puzzle a man sometimes in his  
of great Deliberations; especially when the Matter is but  
Importance. small, wherein any Violence is offer'd to Justice,  
but yet the Consequence seems to be of great Im-  
portance. It did not appear to be so very foul,  
for the *One Marius* to prepossess himself of the  
Favour of the People, by preventing his *Col-  
leagues* and the *Tribunes*: And then it was, in  
appearance, a matter of great Advantage to the  
*Other Marius* to advance himself to the *Consul-  
ship* by the means he had propounded. But there  
is *One General Rule* that I would have you take  
special Notice of; See *First* that what you ac-  
count *Profitable*, be not *Dishonorable*; and  
*Then* if it be *Dishonorable*, let nothing per-  
suade you that it is *Profitable*. But what then?  
Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or  
the *Other* to be an *Honest man*? Set your Wits  
at work, and try, and consider with your self  
what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *No-  
tion* of a *Good man*? Will a *Good man* tell a *Lye*,  
*Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive*? Certainly no-  
thing less. Is there any thing then on the  
Other side, so *Profitable* or so *Desirable*, as that  
a man would forfeit the Reputation and the  
Glory of a *Good* and a *Wise man* to gain it?*

*A Good  
man will  
not do an  
Ill thing.*

Can That thing which we call *Profit*, bring us an  
Advantage to Countervail what it takes from us,  
in depriving us of the very *Name* of *Good men*,  
and divesting us of *Faith*, and *Justice*? What  
difference is there betwixt the turning of  
*Man* into a *Beast*, by a *Keal Metamorphosis*, and  
the bearing the *Figure*, and *Fierceness* of a *Brute*  
in his *Mind*, under the *Shape* of a *Man*? They  
that neglect and make light of all things that are

*Honest*,

*Honest*, for the Acquiring of *Power*, do they not do the same thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cesār's* Daughter to make himself *Great*, under the Boldness and Protection of his *Father in Law*? But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himself, to augment his *Own Power* by the envy that was born to the Other: but how *Unjust* This was to his *Country*, and how *Dishonorable* to himself, he did not consider. His *Father-in-Law* had often in his Mouth those *Greek Verses* of the *Phœnicians* out of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not so gracefully perhaps, but so as to be Understood.

*To get a Crown, a man would break a Trust,  
If break't at all: Every where else, be Just.*

IT was a Lewd and Horrible thing done of *Etheocles* ( or rather of *Euripides* ) to make That the *Exception* of a Crime, which of all Crimes is it self the most *Abominable*. But what do we talk of Petty things, as Inheritances, Traffiques, Fraudulent Bargains? What do you think of The Ambition of Julius Cæsar. Him rather, that having the Ambition to make himself the Master of the People of *Rome*, and the Emperor of the World it self, accomplish'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to justifie This Ambition: for in so doing he passes an Approbation upon the Subversion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honor*, that *Ignoble*, and *Dereftable Oppression*. But he that confesses the Unlawfulness of any mans Usurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought so to be; and yet supposes it a thing Profitable to him that can compass it;

M

I would

*Utility  
should be  
guided by  
Honesty.*

I would spare no Reprehension ; nor, in truth, any Reproach, to reclaim such a man from his Error : For ( I appeal to the Immortal Gods ) what *Profit* can any man find in the Foul and Execrable *Destruction* of his *Country* ; albeit he, that is Guilty of it should come afterwards to be stil'd the *Father* of it, by the *oppreſſed People* ? *Utility* should therefore be guided by *Honesty* ; and in such manner, that tho' the *Words* differ, the *Thing* should be still the *same*. I do not find any thing more *Profitable*, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, than *Power*, and *Empire* : Neither, when I look narrowly into the Matter, do I find any thing more *Unprofitable* to him that *Unjustly attains it*. For what *advantage*, can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulness*, *Fears*, Day and Night ; and to lead a Life that is beset with *Snares*, and *Dangers* ? There are more treacherous, and unfaithful men in a Kingdom ( says *Accius* ) than there are good. But of what Kingdom does he speak ? even of That which is reported unto us of *Tantalus* and *Pelops* ; a Kingdom that proceeded by a Lawful Descent. How much greater then is the Number of the Unfaithful to That Prince, who having opprest *Rome* it self by a *Roman Army*, and a City, not only *Free* in its own Constitution, but giving Laws to others ; brought That City, at last into subjection to himself ? How ulcerated a Conscience do you think This man must needs have ? What wounds in his Soul ? Or how is it possible that This mans Life should be Profitable to himself, when such was the Condition of it, that Posterity will ever have a Veneration, and Esteem for those that took it away ?

N O W

NOW If those things that carry the Fairest Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they ought to be, because they are full of Shame and Dishonor ; This, methinks, should Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewise *Honest*. Now as This has, in many Cases, been determin'd ; so most remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his second *Consulate* : For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerful*, and a *Generous Prince* ; there came a *Fugitive* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius* ; and promised him, upon Condition of a Considerable Reward, that he would convey himself back, as privately as he came ; and *Poyson* the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carry'd back to *Pyrrhus* ; and the *Senate* applauded the Resolution. Now if a man should regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion of profit*, This one *Fugitive* might have put a Period to That hazardous War, in the removal of the most Considerable Enemy of the Empire. But where the point in Controversie was *Honor*, it would have been a Scandalous and an Impious practice to have encountred a Noble Enemy with *Baseness*, and *Treachery*, instead of *Resolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who was as Eminent in *Rome*, as *Aristides* was in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never separated Profit from Honor) to subdue an Enemy by *Arms* or by *Poyson* ? If *Empire* be desirable for *Glories* sake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injustice* in the Attempt : For therein can be no *Wealth it self may be compassed* *Glory*. And we must have a care too how we *Ad- Unprofita- ble* *compass Wealth it self* ; for it can never be *Ad-*

vantageous to us with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable advice, that of *I. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to Tax those Cities over again, which *L. Sylla* had discharg'd, for a Sum of Mony, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And This too, without their Mony again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counsel, to the Scandal of the Empire. At this rate there's more *Faith*, to be found among *Pyrates* than among *Roman Senators*. Well! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long shall we dare to call any thing *profitable* that is not *Honest*? How is it possible that *Hatred*, or *Infamy*, should ever be *profitable* to any Government, that must support it self by its own *Reputation*, and the *good will* of its *Confederates*? Nay, I have had many a dispute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* himself, for insisting too rigorously upon the Interest of the *publique Treasury*, and *Revenue*: He was too hard methought to the *Officers*; for we ought to be Bountiful to the *One*, and treat the *Other* as we were wont to treat our *Colonies*: And so much the rather, because the Connexion of the *parts* did much contribute to the preservation of the *Whole*. And *Curio* did very Ill too: who, tho' convinced that the *Fran-spadans* were in the Right, still concluded, *Vincat Utilitas, Let Utility carry it*. Now he should rather have said that it was not *Just*, because it was not *profitable* to the *Common wealth*, than allowing it to be *profitable*, to conclude that it was not *Just*.

*Instances  
of Good  
and Profitable  
in  
Competition.*

IN *Heracitus's Sixth Book of Offices*, we find a great many Questions to our purpose. As for Instance, he puts the *Cafe*, *Whether in a great Scarcity*

Scarcity of Corn, a Good man be not oblig'd to Their S-  
-maintain his Servants? He reasons it Pro and vants were  
Con; but at last, concludes the Duty with a re-  
gard rather to profit, than to Humanity. He puts  
another Question, *Whether, in the Extremity of*  
*a Storm at Sea, a Man should rather throw over a*  
*Serviceable Horse, or a Servant of little value?*  
And here his private Interest draws him One way,  
and Humanity, Another. And again, Suppose  
that, upon a Shipwreck, a Fool should get hold of  
a Plank; whether or no may a Wise man take it  
from him, if he can? He's upon the Negative,  
because the thing is *Unjust*. But what if it were  
the *Master* of a Ship? Shall not he take his  
*Own*? No, by no means: He may as well throw  
a Man over-board, that is at Sea in *his Ship*, be-  
cause the *Ship* is his *Own*: For till they come to  
the End of the Voyage, the *Ship* is rather the  
*Passengers* than the *Masters*. But what if there  
should be but One Plank, and Two men equally  
Wise, and Deserving, in danger to be *Drown'd*?  
*Whether shall Neither of them take it, or shall*  
*Either of them yield it to the Other?* I would  
have it yielded to him that may do most Good;  
either in the *Republique*, or in his *Own partic-  
ular*, by *Living*. But what if they be both  
alike? I would have no Contention; But let the  
One render to the Other as if the point had been  
decided by *Lot*. What if my Father should *Rifle* Cases of  
Consciences.  
*a Church, or Dig a passage under ground to Rob*  
*the Treasury?* Whether or no should the *Son*  
give an Information of it to the *Magistrate*?  
This were an Unhappy Case; but I would how-  
ever *Defend* my Father, if he were *Accused*. But  
is not my Duty to my Country above all other Dut-  
ies? Yes, it is. But then my *Country* it self is  
concern'd,

concern'd, that the people in it should bear a Reverence to their *Parents*. But what if a Father should Design the betraying of his Country ; or the getting of the Government into his own hand ? Shall the Son Conceal it ? I would have him earnestly desire his Father to desist ; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuse him. But I would have him threaten him First ; and in the Conclusion, if he finds his Country in danger, he is to value the safety of it before That of his Father. He puts another Question, if a Wife, and Good man, shall by over-sight take False money, whether or no may he put it off again in payment, after he knows it to be Counterfeit ? Diogenes says he may : Antipater is against it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. Suppose a man sells, a piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep ; Is he bound to tell this or no ? Diogenes says he needs not ; but Antipater says that a Good man will tell it. These are the Propositions in Controversie, among the Stoiques. In the selling of a Slave, whether or no am I bound to discover all his faults ? Only those which the Civil Law obliges me to discover, or to take him again. But for discovering him to be a Lyar, a Gamester, a Thief, a Drunkard ; Some are For the telling of it, and Others not. What if a man should sell Gold, believing it to be Copper ? Is a Good man that knoweth it to be Gold, bound to tell him it or no ? Or whether can any man Justifie the buying of That for One Penny which is, worth a Thousand ? I have now clear'd my own Opinion ; And what are the Points in Controversie among the Philosophers before-named.

Conscience  
in Contracts.

WE come now to consider how far These Offices and Contracts are to be observ'd, that are neither

neither Extorted by Force, nor (as the Law has it) *Dolo malo*, or by *Circumvention*. I have a Remedy given me for the Drospie, upon This Condition, that if it Cures me, I am never to use that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapse into the same Disease, and the person with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any farther Use of it: What am I to do in This Case? It is an Inhumanity, in him to refuse me; besides that my Usag of it does Him no Hurt: In this Case, we must Consult the Means of *Life*, and *Health*. Well! Suppose a Wise man should be made Heir to a great Estate, upon This Obligation from the Testator, that before he touches one peny of the Profits of it, he should dance publiquely before a Court of Justice, or in the Market place? He promises accordingly so to do; and without passing That promise, he could never have been entitled to that Estate: Should he do it or no? I could wish he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has past his Word, if he accounts it a *Shameful*, and *Dishonorable* thing to discharge That Condition he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the *Estate*, than *Otherwise*; unless per-adventure the Benefits of it might be converted to so Great and Publique an Advantage, that it would be no longer *Dishonorable* so to do, as being *Profitable* to his *Country*.

Neither is a man (*always*) bound to keep *some* Pro-  
those Promises that are of no Advantage to those mises bet-  
to whom the Promise is made. *Phæbus* (*to ter broken*  
come back to Fables) having promised his Son *Phæton* *than kept.*  
a Grant of whatever he should ask;

*Phaeton* demanded the Government of his Fathers Chariot ; he had his Desire, and in his full Carriere *Jupiter* cast him down with a Thunder-bolt. Had not this *promise* of his Father's now been better *broken* than *kept* ? And then the Promise that *Theseus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it ? *Neptune* accorded to him *Three wishes* : One was the Destruction of his Son *Hippolytus*, upon a suspicion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law, and the Granting of That Wish was the greatest Affliction that ever came near to *Theseus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnon's Vow* to *Diana*, in promising her the most beautiful Creature that should be born within his Dominions that year ? which proved to be his own Daughter *Iphigenia* ; whom he accordingly sacrific'd , as the fairest Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promise had never been made, than so horrible a Crime admitted ? Wherefore sometime we should not pass a Promise : Nay a *Depositum* it self is not in all Cases to be restor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Trust with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad* ; Now to *Restore* it, in such a Case, were a *Crime*, and the *Refusal* of it, a *Duty*. *What if I should lay up Money for him*, and then find that he's about to make *War upon his Country* ? Shall I render it ? I think not ; because it is against the *Republique*, which we ought to prefer. So many things that seem *Honest* enough in their *Own Nature* , are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time* and *Occasion* : to make good a Promise, stand to a Bargain, deliver up a Trust ; when it comes to be rather *Hurtful*, than *Profitable* becomes *Dishonest*. This is enough said of those *Utilities* against

against *Justice* that are cover'd with a *pretext* of *Reason*. But as we have drawn all Duties from the four Fountains of Duty in our First Book, we'll keep still to our Subject ; and Shew, how those things that seem to be *profitable*, and *Are not*, stand in the greatest Opposition to Virtue. Here is enough said of *Prudence*, and of the *Counterfeit* of it, which is *Craft* : and likewise of *Justice*, which can never fail of being *profitable*.

THE Two remaining parts of *Honesty* follow, Of *Fortitude* the One is seen in the *Greatness* of an *Excellent* *Made*. *Mind*, the *Other* in a *Conformity* and *Moderation* of *Continence*, and *Temper*. It seemed *profitable* to *Ulysses*, the Counterfeiting himself *mad*, to avoid the *War*, as the *Tragædians* would per-*suade* us. (For there appears no such suspicion of him in *Homer*, who was an *Eminent Author*.) This was no *Honest* *Counsel*, but it may be said perhaps, that it was a *Profitable* one, to stay at *Home*, and *Govern*, in an *Easie*, *Lazie* *Life* at *Ithaca*, with his *Wife*, his *Son*, and his *Relations*, but do you *Imagine*, that in *daily Labors*, and *Hazards*, there can be any *Dignity* that is to be compar'd with *This Tranquility of Life*? And yet I cannot but have a *Contempt* for such a *Retreat*, because those things that are not *Honorable*, I cannot allow to be *Advantageous*. But what do you think the *World* would have said of *Ulysses* if he had gone on in that *Disguise*; who notwithstanding all his *Brave Exploits* in the *War*, did yet suffer these reproaches from *Ajax*, in the *Tragedy*?

*He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us take it,  
Was th' only man, himself, you know, that brake it :  
Playing th' Mad, Driv'ling Fool, under that Blind  
To sleep in a whole skin, and stay behind :  
And the bold Cheat had past, without all doubt,  
But for sly Palamede that found it out.*

NOW it was much better for him, to encounter, as he did, not only Enemies, but likewise Seas and Tempests ; than to abandon *Greece*, which was then by one Consent carrying a War among the *Barbarians*. But to pass over things Fabulous and Foreign. Let us now come to our

*The Case of* Regulus. *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, in his second *Consulship*, when he was surpriz'd, and taken prisoner in *Africa*, by *Xanthippus the Lacedemonian*, a Commander under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal* : ( who was then General ) he was sent to the Senate, under an Oath of rendring himself again at *Carthage*, unless certain *Cathaginian Noblemen* should be releas'd in exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as the Story makes it out, he found it *Vain*, and *Idle*. The condition of it was, that he might stay in his Country, live at home with his Wife and Children, suffering the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of the War, and still retaining the Honor of his *Consulary Dignity*. Will any man deny these things to be *Profitable* ? or what shall we say, when *Courage* and *Magnanimity* oppose it ? What Greater Authority or Security would a man desire ? For it is the Property of these Virtues not to fear any thing ; to despise all accidents ; and to

to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befall a man.

BUT what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his Bus'ness; but refus'd to give his Opinion; for so long as he was under an *Oath*, he was in the Condition of a *Prisoner* to an *Enemy*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as some will say) and one that stood in his own light) that which he did speak was against himself: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Interest* to exchange their Prisoners; for the *Carthaginians* were young men (he said) and good Soldiers, but himself wasted with Old age. His Authority prevailing, the Prisoners were detained, and himself return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquisite Torments he expos'd himself, by his Return; only he was resolv'd not to violate his Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death; his Condition was yet more Honorable, than if he had ended his days in his Own house; a *decrepit Captive*, and *Forsworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Prisoners, but also to dissuade it? But what? shall we call *That, Foolish*, that conduces to the *Good of the Commonwealth*? Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publique*, that is not so to the *Whole*? It is a subversion of the *Fundamentals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honesty*, for we do all of us desire that which is *Profitable*: It is an *Attractive* that draws us to it, whether we will or no. Is there any man that avoids it; or rather that does not vigorously pursue

pursue it? But since *Profit* is not any where to be found, but in that which is *Praise-worthy*, *Honorable*, and *Honest*, therefore do we account these Considerations as most Noble, and Excellent; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather necessary than Splendid.

*The Sa-  
credness of  
an Oath.*

BUT what is there, you'll say, in an *Oath*? are we afraid that *Jupiter* should take offence at us? Now this is a point common to all Philosophers, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us: and not only to those that take *God* himself to be *Idle*, and wholly careless of us, but to those also that will have *God* to be always in *Action*, and doing of something: But what greater harm could even an *Angry Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, than *Regulus* did to *Himself*? So that there was nothing of *Religion* in the perverting so great a *profit*. Was it least he should do a *mean* thing? First, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuse the *Least*. But was that *Dishonourable Proposition* then an *Evil Equal* to the *Torment*? And then, That of *Accius*: *Hast thou broken thy Faith?* *To any man that does not believe me, I neither have given, nor do give it.* Now tho' this was spoken by a *Wicked King*, it was yet well enough said: And moreover; as we say that some things appear *profitable*, which are *not so*; so do they say on the *Other side*, that some things appear *Honest* too, which are *not so*: As in this case of *Regulus*'s returning to the *Torment*, to save his *Oath*: For it is rendered *Dishonourable*, because it was done under a *Force*, and by an *Enemy*, and so ought not to be made good. And they go farther, that what soever is *very profitable*, becomes *Honest* upon That Consideration, tho' it was not so before.

This

This is it which is commonly urg'd against *Regulus*. But let us examin what it amounts to. *Jupiter* was not to be fear'd, lest he should hurt us in his *Anger*, because he does not use to be either *Angry* or *Mischievous*. This Reason lies as strong against all other Oaths, against This of *Regulus*. But the question is not in an *Oath*, the fear of being *punish'd* for *breaking it*, but the *Conscience* and the *Obligation* of keeping it. Now an *Oath* is a *Religious Affirmation*; and whatsoever we promise positively, as in the presence of *God*, we must keep it: for this does not concern the *Anger* of the *Gods*, which is none at all; but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Justice*! It is a glorious *Exclamation* of *Ennius*.

*O Holy Faith! the Tye o'th' Gods;  
And fit to have thy Mansion in their Blest Abodes.*

HE therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Divinity of *Faith* it self, to which our Forefathers ascribed *Divine Honors*; placing her in the *Capitol*, as (*Cato* tells us) next unto *Jupiter himself*. But even an *Angry Jupiter* (you say) could not have hurt *Regulus* *more than he did himself*. That were true, if there were *Pain is no* no evil but *Pain*: But we have the Authority of *Evil*. the greatest Philosophers for it, that *T torment* is so far from being the *Greatest Evil*, that it is *None at all*. And let me recommend *Regulus* to you upon this point, as no Ordinary Testimony; Nay, perhaps none more convincing. For what nobler Instance can be desir'd, than to see so Illustrious a *Roman* subject himself voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather than forego his *Duty*? for in saying the *Least of Evils*, it is meant by suffe-

suffering rather *Dishonorably*, than *Miserably*. Is there any *Greater Evil* than a *Shameful Dishonesty*? How offensive is it to the *Eye*, and *Deformity* of the *Body*? But how much greater then should we account the *Pravity*, and *Corruption* of a *Polluted Mind*? Wherefore they that argue these things with the greatest Generosity and Vigour, as the *Stoiques*, pronounce *That Only* to be *Evil* which is *Shameful*: Nay, the *Peripatetiques* themselves (who are not so Masculine as the other) make no difficulty of unanimously pronouncing it to be the *Greatest Evil*. As for that saying, *I have neither given, nor do I give, my Faith to a Faithless man*: It was well enough said of the Poet, in the Case of *Atreus*; because it was accommodate to the person: But if they take up This once for granted, that a man is not oblig'd to keep *Faith* with him that has *no Faith*: let them have a care not to make use of that Shift as a Cover for *Perjury*.

A S to the Rights and Customs of *War*, and keeping *Faith* with an *Enemy*, they are points we must be very *Tender of*: For whatsoever we swear, upon a full Perswasion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That must be observ'd: But Otherwise, a man may dispense with what Obligation without *Perjury*. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Thieves*, should promise them a certain Sum of Mony for the saving of his *Life*: 'Tis no deceit, the receeding from it, tho' I had given my Oath for the performance: for we are not to look upon *Pirates* as *Open* and *Lawful Enemies*; but as the Common *Adversaries* of *Mankind*. For they are a sort of men with whom we have neither *Trust*, nor *Oath* in Common. For *Perjury* is not

*A Pagan Dispensation.*

not the *Swearing false*, but the not *performing* of that which we swear, with an *Intention to* do it; as may be gathered from the very form of our Oath. It was wittily said of *Euripides*, *I swore with my Tongue, but not with my Heart.* But it was not for *Regulus*, however to embroyl the Conditions, and Rules of *War*, with *Perjury*; having to do with a *Just*, and a *Lawful Enemy*; in which Case, all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For *The Rigor* if it were otherwise, the Senate would never <sup>of the Ro-</sup> have sent and deliver'd up so many famous men in <sup>man Dis-</sup> *Chains* to their Enemies. Which was the Case <sup>cipline.</sup> of *Titus Veturius*, and *Spurius Posthumius*, in their *Second Consulships*: Who when they were beaten at *Caudium*, and our Legions disarm'd, for concluding a Peace with the *Sannites*, were deliver'd up to them as their Prisoners, because they had done it without the *Order*, and *Consent* of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the same time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes of the Common people*, were deliver'd up likewise, to Evacuate the Peace concluded, because it was done by Their Authority; and *Posthumius*, himself, that was deliver'd up, was the man that advised and propounded it. And the same thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the *Carthaginians*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perswaded the representing of it to the *People*, himself, that he might be deliver'd up to the *Enemy*; which proposition being so recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Attilius*, was accepted, and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was more Honorable yet, than that of *Q. Pompeius*, who in the same case, upon his sup-

supplication that such a *Decree* might not be past against him, prevail'd, and was discharg'd. Here that which seem'd *Profitable*, was more consider'd than the *Honest*; but in the *Other Example*, the *false Appearance of Profit*, was overcome by a *Dignity of Honor*, and *Virtue*. But in the Case of *Regulus*, the Promise was made under a Force, and he was not oblig'd to Perform it. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: Why did he go to the Senate then, expressly to move against himself, and dissuade the Release of the Prisoners? This is to reprehend the most Generous point in the whole case, he would not rest upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cause, that the Senate might pass judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interposed, the Prisoners had been certainly restor'd to the *Carthaginians*; and then, *Regulus*, might have continu'd safe in his own Country. But as he did not account that course *Profitable* to his *Country*, so he took the *Honest* Part, in chusing rather to suffer, and undergo what he did. Now as to their saying, that when a thing is very *Profitable*, the advantage justifies it, tho' it were not *Honest* otherwise: Let me tell you, that it must *Be* so, and not be *Made* so: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honest*; and it is not *Honest*, because it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, because it is *Honest*. So that out of many Wonderful Examples, a man shall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Instance than This. For in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the most Worthy and Generous part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Prisoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now adays, he could not yet at That time do

do otherwise : So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather than of the *Man* : For our Fore-fathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the most *The Tye of*  
*Sacred Obligation in Nature*. And this we find *an Oath.*  
in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacra*, stiew as much: And so do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an *Enemy*; and so do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Censors*; who were not so strict in any thing, as in the bus'ness of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Aulus*) in his *Dictatorship* was summon'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people* for Exercising the Power of a *Dictator*, some days beyond his time; And was farther accus'd for Banishing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is said to have gone presently to *Rome*; and the next morning by day-light, to *Pomponius*'s house. To whom it was suggested that *Torquatus* being very Ill us'd, had probably brought him some Complaint against his Father. *Pomponius* presently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and so order'd the young man to be brought unto him. He was no sooner in the Chamber, but *Titus* drew his Sword, and swore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not presently give him his *Oath*, that his Father should be discharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehension of his present danger, past his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the people; telling them he was forced to desist, and the reason of it: Whereupon *Manlius* was let go. Such a Veneration had they in those times for the Tye of an *Oath*!

N

This

This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a Frenchman in a *Duel* upon a *Challenge*, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*, which the *Latines* call *Torquis*, took the *Sirname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Consulship* the *Latins* were routed and dispersed at *Veseris*, near the Mountain *Vesuvius*. He was a man of the highest rank of *Brave men*, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, than he was afterward severe to his Son.

*The Severity of the Romans in case of Treachery.*

BUT as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath, so were those *ten men* after the Battle of *Canna* as much to be despised. *Hannibal* sent them to the Senate, upon an *Oath* to render themselves again in the Camp of the *Carthaginians*; if they could not obtain such an exchange of Prisoners as was propounded. But this Story is variously reported: *Polybius* (an Author of singular Credit) says that *Nine* of the *ten Noblemen* that were sent, delivered themselves up without prevailing for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the *Ten* never went back again; Having Returned to the Camp, so soon as he was out of it, upon pretence that he had left something behind him; by which *Return*, he would understand himself to be discharg'd of his Oath: But without reason; For the *Fraud* increases the *Iniquity*, without *dissolving* the *Perjury*. Wherefore it was a foolish piece of Cunning, and a most perverse Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this shifting Jugler should be sent bound to *Hannibal*. But the most glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Prisoners; not taken in the Battle, or that had run any hazard of their lives, but they were only such as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Consuls*,

*Consuls, Paulus and Varro.* They might have been redeem'd for a small Sum of Money: but the Senate would not agree to't: for a Lesson to the *Roman Soldiers* that they must either *Conquer, or Die.* This resolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him than any thing else (as the same Author has it) to see that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greatest Adversity, should still uphold so generous a Resolution. So that things *seemingly Profitable* are still overcome by things that are *really honest.* Now *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to *Hannibal's Camp*, under the same Colour, to deliver themselves from their Oath; and that they were branded for it with all sorts of Ignominy by the *Censors.* We shall now put an end to This matter; for it is clear, that whatsoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, because it is Flagitious, Dishonorable, and Shameful: as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather consulted his *Own Interest*, than that of the *Publique*, in the business of the Prisoners; or rather chosen to have staid at home.

THE Fourth part yet remains, consisting in *Decency, Moderation, Modesty, Continence, and Temperance.* Now can any thing be *profitable*, in opposition to this Catalogue of such Virtues? But *Aristippus's Cyreniques*, and the *Annicerian Philosophers* place all *Good* in *pleasure*, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Landable*, for the *pleasure* it produces. As these grew out of date, *Epicurus* came on; the Supporter, Improver, and in a manner, the Author of the same Op-

nion. With these we must contend (as they say) for Life; if we are resolv'd to defend, and to maintain the Cause of Honesty: For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happiness of Life* rests in a *Sound Constitution of Body*, or in the search and hope of such a Constitution (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the highest degree too (for so they understand it)) will be found to clash with *honesty*. For first, what Province shall we assign to *prudence*? If the search and enquiry after Delights; How wretched a thing is *Virtue*, when it comes to serve *pleasure*? But what is the *Office of prudence*? To judge learnedly of *pleasure*; Suppose that nothing could be more *Delightful* than That: There is nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Dishonorable*. Now for him that pronounces *pain* to be the greatest of *Evils*; what place is there in such a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that Exercises it self in the Contempt of *Labors*, and *pains*? For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places speaks Generously enough (as he does in This) of *pain and Affliction*; We are not yet so much to consider what he says, as what may be reasonable for him to say, upon the Foundation of Terminating all *Good* and *Ill*, in *pleasure* and *pain*: As to hear him now speak of *Continence* and *Temperance*; he says many very good things in several places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we say) For how can any man commend *Temperance*, and yet place our *Chiefest Good* in *pleasure*? For *Temperance* is the *Enemy of Sensual pleasures*, and our *Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Followers* of them. And yet in these Three kinds, they shuffle as well as they can, and their Evasions are not without some Colour. They make

*Epicurus places Good and Ill in Pleasure and Pain.*

pru-

prudence to be the skill of supplying or procuring *pleasures*, and keeping away *pains*: And then they make a shift too, to acquit themselves. in the point of *Fortitude*: which they say enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *pain*. And in speaking of *Temperance*; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themselves after a fashion; for they say that the *Greatness* of *pleasure* arises only from an *Absence* or *Detraction* of *pain*. And as for *Justice*, it is with Them, either *Tottering*, or rather *Grovelling* upon the *Ground*; and so are all those Virtues that are exercis'd in Common, and in the Society of Mankind. For there can neither be any *Goodness*, *Liberality*, or *Gentleness* ( any more than *Friendship* ) if these things be not desirable for *Themselves*: or else desirable only in Relation to *pleasure* and *profit*. But let us bring the matter into a Narrow Compas: For as we have laid it down, that nothing can be *profitable*, in Opposition to *honesty*, so we do here affirm that all *Pleasure* is directly contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Dinomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controversie, by coupling *pleasure*, with *honesty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beast*. Whereas *Virtue* is so far from admitting such a Conjunction, that on the contrary, it Rejects, and Despises it: neither is it possible to accomodate the Disagreements, and Confusions of the One, to the Abstracted Simplicity of the other. But of this elsewhere more at large: And it is a weighty bus'ness. But to my purpose now in hand. Concerning any matter to be determin'd in the Case of a *Concurrent Opposition* betwixt *profit*, and *honesty*, we have said enough already. But if *pleasure*

sure shall be said to carry some shew of profit also, there can be no Conjunction of it with Honesty. For allowing the most we can to *pleasure*, it does but serve us for *Sawce*, without any Profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Present*: in *My Opinion* a *Great* one: but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow These Three Books of Mine, an Entertainment in your Study, among the Commentaries of *Cratippus*. If I my self had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had not Commanded me back, even when I was half way through) you should sometimes have been your Fathers Disciple too. So that I am now fain to speak to you in these Writings, Bestow as much of your time upon them as you can: and what you have a mind to do, you may do. When I shall understand that This Study pleases you, I hope it will not be long before I be with you my self. And however, at this distance, though in absence, I shall still be speaking to you. Wherefore my *Cicero* farewell: And assure your self that you are exceeding dear to me: And yet much dearer you will be, if I shall find that you take delight in these Memorials, and Precepts.

T H E E N D.

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# TULLY's OFFICES.

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51 bid.	<i>Let Reproof be without Anger,</i>	66
53 d 54 bid.	<i>ostentation is Hateful,</i>	ibid.
55 56 urse	<i>Of Building and Palaces,</i>	67
57 bid.	<i>Fit the House to the Master,</i>	ibid.
58 bid.	<i>Keep the Expence of it within Compass,</i>	68
59 oth,	<i>Three Rules for all Undertakings,</i>	ibid.
60 and	<i>The Decorum of Place, and Time,</i>	ibid.
61 bid.	<i>Order Desir'd,</i>	ibid.
62 bid.	<i>Indelicacies in Respect of Time and Place,</i>	69
63 pe-	<i>The Niceties of Conversation,</i>	70
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65 The	<i>Great Virtues are a Privilege to some mistakes,</i>	ibid.
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67 bid.	<i>There is a Trade Sordid, Voluptuary, and of Candor</i>	
68 bid.	<i>and Credit,</i>	72, 73
69 bid.	<i>Of Duties which to Chuse,</i>	ibid.
70 and	<i>Wisdom is the Principal Virtue,</i>	74
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